Tuesday, January 31, 2012

The Saudi Persian War

Ah, you know how it goes - a few texts here and there - a bit of flirtatious sexting - a chance encounter and it's time to put out or get shut out. 

Not unlike the Cold War betwixt Hatred's Kingdom and the equally tolerance and gay free combat cleric Barbie haters of Preacher Command.

As best understood, all the sectarian chiz, provocative proxilicious puissance and heated talk amidst certain mindsets in the ME devolves to all that shialicious sunnitastic jazz. Iran see's herself as the Supreme Leader (hey they call him that for nothing ya know!) protector, arms patron and Guidance Councillor for all the earth's shias.

At the same incredible instant - the original He Man Women Hater Royals of Wahabbi Arabia are the Official Custodians for all the world's sunnis.

 Like hanging out in sucking range on the event horizon of a really bad about to happen event, The Saudi Persian Cold War may very climax with a real live war!
Saudi Arabia is generally perceived by Iran as possibly the greatest obstacle to its ambitions in the Middle East, in that Iran has been trying to export its Shi'te Islamic revolution both culturally and militarily throughout the Middle East.
Saudi Arabia tried to do everything it could, both politically and militarily, to stop a recent Shi'ite uprisings in Bahrain -- an island off the coast of Saudi Arabia that is predominately Shi'ite but ruled by Sunnis -- which Iran has been claiming belongs to Iran, and which is separated from Saudi Arabia by only a small causeway a few miles long. 
 The Saudis are concerned that the Shi'ite uprising in Bahrain might embolden Saudi Arabia's own minority Shi'ite population -- located by the oil fields, far from Riyadh, Mecca and Medina -- thereby increasing Iran's influence over the Arabian Peninsula.
Iran might soon start a war in Middle East as the only way to show that Tehran still has influence in region and can threaten whoever opposes its plans. If Bashar al-Assad is removed from power in Syria, Iran could be concerned that the world might perceive Iran as isolated; it could therefore want to make the point that even if Syria might be lost for now, Iran can still take control of Iraq, and fight proxy wars by means of its proxy group, Hezbollah. To Iran, the main enemy that stands in its way is Saudi Arabia, which has already fought Iran's influence in Lebanon, Syria, Bahrain and Iraq.
As Saudi Arabia is the first new superpower in the Arab world ( don't laugh LOLZ), Iran has designer designs on replacing it.

Saudi Arabia be freaking that Great Satan is unAssing Iraq (to be fair - tons of Great Satan's combat cats and gear are sweetly loitering in Kuwait) and corrupt Royalty in Ray Bans might well assume that even though they were able to stymie Iran's influ in Bahrain -
Iran will nevertheless manage to try to take control of the oil-rich region by way of Iraq. The Saudis have desperately been trying to find strategic ways to prevent such a scenario.
 Hold up!! Ebberdobby knows that in sunny sunny climes straddling the Nile and Indus - open warfare enjoyed by the faithful versus the faithful is uncool. Warfare should be conducted by the faithful upon the heads of the infidels - right?

Please. Ancient Aegypt"s General Nasser rained blistering agent WMD on hapless Yemenis xforming them into shrieking living blisters for the rest of their mercilifully short lives. And the m"Hammedist world pretty much just stared in silence at their fingernails as if they were the most interesting thing in the world!

Not to LOL too much -  yet the horrible Iran Iraq left 2 million dead and failed to change the borders an inch.

Soooo how do thangs stack up in a match up betwixt Saudiland and Persia?
Iran's military accelerated its missile program (11K can be fired per minute!!) as a way to compensate for its inability to match the air power of potential rivals. As a result, Iran now possesses various models of various types (ballistic, cruise, et cetera) of missiles, most of which can reach well into Saudi Arabia and some of which are accurate enough to be used against military bases of various types. These missiles could also hit facilities of the Saudi oil and gas industry, as well as desalination plants, potentially dealing severe damage to the Saudi economy.

Royal Saudi Air Force would have no choice but to eliminate Iran's many missiles as quickly as possible. The Saudis would not necessarily know which of the missile sites are home to the high-priority missiles of higher accuracy, thus forcing them to attempt to neutralize them all. If the Iranians are smart, they have prepared (or will prepare) dummy missile sites, which can serve as decoys. The Serbs did this to great effect in 1999 during the attacks on their country by NATO.  In any case, the Saudi planes will have to make numerous sorties against Iranian targets (real or dummy), exposing themselves to attack from Iran's fighters and air defenses. 

All the while, the Iranians would launch as many missiles as possible, potentially eliminating much of the Saudi air force on the ground, and/or at least rendering bases unusable and forcing the Saudis to withdraw to bases further to the west. Saudi Arabia's ships, leaving port to avoid incoming missiles, would actually be in greater danger than if they remained in port, but at least they might be able to take the fight to the Iranians.

Would war unite much of the Iranian population in nationalistic enthusiasm, or the dissent of recent years erupt again? If the Saudis struck first, the former scenario is more likely. As for the Saudis, King Abdullah is in his late 80s, Crown Prince Sultan is only slightly younger and in poor health, and the line of succession becomes contentious after that. The Kingdom's restive Shi'a primarily live in oil-producing regions near Bahrain, and they (like most Saudis, only more so) do not share their government's enmity towards Iran. 

Indiscriminate Iranian strikes could change that, and this may or may not figure into Teheran's calculations. The upshot of all of this is that a war between Iran and Saudi Arabia could be a fairly even contest, one in which interested third parties might want to play a decisive role.    

Third parties! Like a menage a troi l'guerre?
It has scarcely gone unnoticed inside the kingdom that, at least in regard to Iran, Riyadh has been speaking almost in concert with Little Satan - an embarrassing situation that official announcements can neither hide nor satisfactorily justify. Intelligence reports indicate that Saudi Arabia has granted flyover rights for a Little Satan attack on Iran and will help refuel returning aircraft.
 Pic - “The Gulf states now see themselves as mutual powers in the region who can increasingly stand up for themselves. They survived the Arab Spring without too much trouble — except for Bahrain — and have come out of it more confident and more willing to go head to head with Iran.”

Monday, January 30, 2012

Monroe Doctrine

"Got your skinny girls! Here at the Western World"

Such a delightful little ditty from paw paw"s Box St Collective could somewhat dubiously function as a seductive soundtrack for the magnetic pull the woman worshiping Western World sweetly enjoys.

As a birth control method for protecting western hemisphere's hot attraction for enemy influence, muscle or just uncool colonialism since way back in the last millennium - Monroe Doctrine serves as Great Satan"s Diplopolititary demarche'.
"We owe it, therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety."
Old school worries, right? Maybe not! Check Preacher Command's web of relations in Western Hemi - in partic - south of the border

What about non state actor outer terrorist groups  from the ME?
It is something of a truism of American politics that policymakers in Washington pay only sporadic attention to the happenings in their own geopolitical backyard. The relatively low profile of Latin America in our national security policymaking is deeply counterintuitive, given the region's proximity to the U.S. homeland. It is also potentially dangerous, because its political environment—marked by large ungoverned areas —has created a fertile operating environment for a range of radical groups, including those from the greater Middle East.
 Hiz"B"Allah, however, is far and away the most prominent. Its presence in the region stretches back to the 1980s, when operatives—taking advantage of weak regional governance and with support from Iran—began to expand the organization's already-substantial international drug-trafficking and smuggling activities from Lebanon's Beka'a Valley to the "Tri-Border Region" at the intersection of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay

To ward off its international isolation and undermine US influence in the region, Iran, with its Hezbollah proxy in tow, has made a major diplomatic and economic push into the Western Hemisphere.  

Hugo Chávez in Venezuela and other radical anti-American populists have made common cause with Iran and Hezbollah in waging asymmetric warfare against the United States. 

HbA’s criminality in the region has multiplied as it has established deeper relations with transnational criminal organizations.

Sensitive sources within various governments has identified at least two parallel yet collaborative terrorist networks growing at an alarming rate in Latin America. 

The stakes are clear. In a May 2011 visit to Bolivia, Iranian Defense Brigadier General Ahmad Vahidi proclaimed that in the event of any military confrontation between Iran and the United States, “The strong Iran is ready for enemy-crushing and tough response in case of any illogical and violent behavior by the U.S.”

There is every reason to believe that such a response would utilize every weapon in Iran’s arsenal, including Hezbollah. But we do not have to wait until an outbreak of military hostilities between the United States and Iran to confront Hezbollah’s continuing efforts to consolidate its presence and expand its influence in the Western Hemisphere. 

The United States and responsible governments in Latin America need to act now, precisely so that we do not have to respond later

Pic - "If Washington does not transition from monitoring to acting against Iranian advances in Latin America, it may find itself confronting a grave and growing threat that it can neither diminish nor evade."

Saturday, January 28, 2012


WoW - the Watchers Council - it's the oldest, longest running cyber comte d'guere ensembe in existence - started online in 1912 by Sirs Jacky Fisher and Winston Churchill themselves - an eclective collective of cats both cruel and benign with their ability to put steel on target (figuratively - natch) on a wide variety of topictry across American, Allied, Frenemy and Enemy concerns, memes, delights and discourse. 

Every week these cats hook up each other with hot hits and big phazed cookies to peruse and then vote on their individual fancy catchers.

Without further adieu - (or a don't) here are this weeks winners 

Council Winners

Non-Council Winners

See you next week! And don’t forget to follow us on Facebook and Twitter

Friday, January 27, 2012

Declination Diss

So, what all would the world look like if Great Satan were to unAss her hot hyperpuissant gig as  global leader in order to focus all her energies on solving probs at home? 

And yo, what about the chiz the declinationists are always going on about? Is Great Satan really in decline? 

New York Times best-selling author and one of Great Satan"s most more bigger brainiacs and most influential strategic thinkers, paints a vivid, alarming pic of what all the world might look like if the Great Satan were to truly to let her uh, influence wane like hoochie number 7 at Last Call.
"Much of the current pessimism is misplaced, if America were indeed to commit “preemptive superpower suicide,” the world would see the return of war among rising nations as they jostle for power; the retreat of democracy around the world as Vladimir Putin’s Russia and authoritarian China acquire more clout; and the weakening of the global free-market economy, which the United States created and has supported for more than sixty years. We’ve seen this before—in the breakdown of the Roman Empire and the collapse of the European order in World War I."
See -

The present world order—characterized by an unprecedented number of democratic nations; a greater global prosperity, even with the current crisis, than the world has ever known; and a long peace among great powers—reflects American principles and preferences, and was built and preserved by American power in all its political, economic, and military dimensions. If American power declines, this world order will decline with it. It will be replaced by some other kind of order, reflecting the desires and the qualities of other world powers. 

Or perhaps it will simply collapse, as the European world order collapsed in the first half of the twentieth century. The belief, held by many, that even with diminished American power “the underlying foundations of theliberal international order will survive and thrive,” as the political scientist G. John Ikenberry has argued, is a pleasant illusion. American decline, if it is real, will mean a different world for everyone.

But how real is it? Much of the commentary on American decline these days rests on rather loose analysis, on impressions that the United States has lost its way, that it has abandoned the virtues that made it successful in the past, that it lacks the will to address the problems it faces.

The perception of decline today is certainly understandable, given the dismal economic situation since 2008 and the nation’s large fiscal deficits, which, combined with the continuing growth of the Chinese, Indian, Brazilian, Turkish, and other economies, seem to portend a significant and irreversible shift in global economic power. Some of the pessimism is also due to the belief that the United States has lost favor, and therefore influence, in much of the world, because of its various responses to the attacks of September 11. The detainment facilities at Guantánamo, the use of torture against suspected terrorists, and the widely condemned invasion of Iraq in 2003 have all tarnished the American “brand” and put a dent in America’s “soft power”—its ability to attract others to its point of view. 

There have been the difficult wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, which many argue proved the limits of military power, stretched the United States beyond its capacities, and weakened the nation at its core. Some compare the United States to the British Empire at the end of the nineteenth century, with the Iraq and Afghanistan wars serving as the equivalent of Britain’s difficult and demoralizing Boer War.

With this broad perception of decline as the backdrop, every failure of the United States to get its way in the world tends to reinforce the impression. Arabs and Israelis refuse to make peace, despite American entreaties. Iran andNorth Korea defy American demands that they cease their nuclear weapons programs. China refuses to let its currency rise. Ferment in the Arab world spins out of America’s control. Every day, it seems, brings more evidence that the time has passed when the United States could lead the world and get others to do its bidding.

Some of the arguments for America’s relative decline these days would be more potent if they had not appeared only in the wake of the financial crisis of 2008. Just as one swallow does not make a spring, one recession, or even a severe economic crisis, need not mean the beginning of the end of a great power. The United States suffered deep and prolonged economic crises in the 1890s, the 1930s, and the 1970s. In each case, it rebounded in the following decade and actually ended up in a stronger position relative to other powers than before the crisis. The 1910s, the 1940s, and the 1980s were all high points of American global power and influence.

Less than a decade ago, most observers spoke not of America’s decline but of its enduring primacy. In 2002, the historian Paul Kennedy, who in the late 1980s had written a much-discussed book on “the rise and fall of the greatpowers,” America included, declared that never in history had there been such a great “disparity of power” as between the United States and the rest of the world. Ikenberry agreed that “no other great power” had held “such formidableadvantages in military, economic, technological, cultural, or politicalcapabilities.... The preeminence of American power” was “unprecedented.” 

In 2004, the pundit Fareed Zakaria described the United States as enjoying a“comprehensive uni-polarity” unlike anything seen since Rome. But a mere four years later Zakaria was writing about the “post-American world” and “the rise of the rest,” and Kennedy was discoursing again upon the inevitability of American decline. Did the fundamentals of America’s relative power shift so dramatically in just a few short years?

The answer is no.

In economic terms, and even despite the current years of recession and slow growth, America’s position in the world has not changed. Its share of the world’s GDP has held remarkably steady, not only over the past decade but over the past four decades. In 1969, the United States produced roughly a quarter of the world’s economic output. Today it still produces roughly a quarter, and it remains not only the largest but also the richest economy in the world.

Military capacity matters, too, as early nineteenth-century China learned and Chinese leaders know today. As Yan Xuetong recently noted, “military strength underpins hegemony.” Here the United States remains unmatched. It is far and away the most powerful nation the world has ever known, and there has been no decline in America’s relative military capacity—at least not yet. Americans currently spend less than $600 billion a year on defense, more than the rest of the other great powers combined. 

America’s actual superiority in military capability means American land and air forces are equipped with the most advanced weaponry, and are the most experienced in actual combat. They would defeat any competitor in a head-to-head battle. American naval power remains predominant in every region of the world.

 In sum: it may be more than good fortune that has allowed the United States in the past to come through crises and emerge stronger and healthier than other nations while its various competitors have faltered. And it may be more than just wishful thinking to believe that it may do so again.

he underlying assumption of such a course is that the present world order will more or less persist without American power, or at least with much less of it; or that others can pick up the slack; or simply that the benefits of the world order are permanent and require no special exertion by anyone. Unfortunately, the present world order—with its widespread freedoms, its general prosperity, and its absence of great power conflict—is as fragile as it is unique. 

Preserving it has been a struggle in every decade, and will remain a struggle in the decades to come. Preserving the present world order requires constant American leadership and constant American commitment.

Pic -  "An American world order is worth preserving, and America dare not decline."

Thursday, January 26, 2012

Audie Murphy Day!

For those of us born betwixt the Fall of the Wall and 911, we kinda grew up with Great Satan unbound. Until Operation Iraqi Freedom, for older Americans - battles and history were old school stuff that would probably never happen again.

As "Rock of The Marne" blitzed through the largest Arab army in history in 20 days, her combat power was unparalled:

"An infantry division in name only, fielding 270 Abrams M1 tanks with mobile infantry that could be hastily formed into adhoc battle groups to handle a variety of missions"

Thunder Running into downtown Baghdad, even phoning up the Iraqi Minister of Misinformation at Palestine Hotel to request "Parking for 88 tanks" seemed like the debut of audacious American war fighting.

Actually - "Rock of the Marne" was following in the footsteps of their spiritual great grandfathers

"On 26 January 1945, 2d Lt. Murphy commanded Company B, which was attacked by 6 tanks and waves of infantry. 2d Lt. Murphy ordered his men to withdraw to prepared positions in a woods, while he remained forward at his command post and continued to give fire directions to the artillery by telephone. 

"Behind him, to his right, 1 of our tank destroyers received a direct hit and began to burn. Its crew withdrew to the woods. 

"2d Lt. Murphy continued to direct artillery fire which killed large numbers of the advancing enemy infantry. With the enemy tanks abreast of his position, 2d Lt. Murphy climbed on the burning tank destroyer, which was in danger of blowing up at any moment, and employed its .50 caliber machinegun against the enemy.

"He was alone and exposed to German fire from 3 sides, but his deadly fire killed dozens of Germans and caused their infantry attack to waver. The enemy tanks, losing infantry support, began to fall back. For an hour the Germans tried every available weapon to eliminate 2d Lt. Murphy, but he continued to hold his position and wiped out a squad which was trying to creep up unnoticed on his right flank.

"Germans reached as close as 10 yards, only to be mowed down by his fire. He received a leg wound, but ignored it and continued the single-handed fight until his ammunition was exhausted. He then made his way to his company, refused medical attention, and organized the company in a counterattack which forced the Germans to withdraw.

"His directing of artillery fire wiped out many of the enemy; he killed or wounded about 50. 2d Lt. Murphy's indomitable courage and his refusal to give an inch of ground saved his company from possible encirclement and destruction, and enabled it to hold the woods which had been the enemy's objective.

"The President of the United States of America, authorized by Act of Congress, March 3, 1863, has awarded in the name of The Congress the MEDAL OF HONOR to LIEUTENANT AUDIE L. MURPHY, UNITED STATES ARMY

Today is the anniversary of Lt Murphy's heroic achievement - Americans everywhere should get on their knees and thank God Almighty for raising up this laughing race of free men.

Pic - "Our Heroes Live In Our Hearts"

Wednesday, January 25, 2012

État de l'état

Since 44"s SOTU was more like the 1st of many nat"l TV"d re electile teleprompted maneuvers, may be it's time to like zoom out and czech on the State of Foreign Entanglements au courant.

Three top cats in Daemoneoconia gave up their assessments of 44 so far

Madame VP Foreign and Defense Policy @AEI.

Any short analysis of 44's successes and failures in foreign policy must necessarily be incomplete. Is it enough to weigh his undeniable good judgment in ordering Navy SEALS to take out Osama bin Laden against his vacillation when faced with the Arab Spring? His willingness to face reality vis-à-vis Iran versus his paralyzing missteps in promoting Israeli-Palestinian dialogue? Surely not. 

But at the heart of what must, by the standards the president set for himself, be judged a failure, is what seems to be 44's worst sin: The president's foreign policy lacks a guiding set of principles. Why surge troops into Afghanistan only to draw them down before the mission is complete? Why condemn Muammar al-Qaddafi in Libya for his crimes against his own people and remain almost indifferent to the same crimes when committed by Bashar al-Assad in Syria? Why knock off a dozen al Qaeda terrorists from the air, and release another group from Guantánamo? 

The answer, of course, is politics. Politics matters to any sane politician; but when politics suffers no competition from principle, the nation's foreign policy is rudderless. It is why our allies mistrust us, our adversaries underestimate us, and why we no longer seek to shape a better world, but instead to retreat from it.

Exec Director @ FPI

As 44 seeks reelection, he will likely tout the country's counterterrorism successes under his watch and, in a sop to his base, his ending of the war in Iraq and his efforts to wind down the war in Afghanistan. Although voters in 2012 will be focused primarily on the state of the economy, they should consider who is best suited to defend the country and advance America's interests as commander chief when choosing whether to reelect 44 or bring in 45. 

44th admin does have achievements to point to in the war against al Qaeda and affiliated groups -- the killing of Osama bin Laden by U.S. Navy SEALs chief among them. But the war on terror must remain a focus for the next president, whoever it is. 44, by deemphasizing the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan in favor of deniable covert efforts, has put the country at risk of being drawn back into both theaters because of his unwillingness to finish the job begun by his predecessor. 

So too is the situation with rogue regimes that threaten America and its allies. The West's confrontation with Iran is nearing a critical juncture as Iran approaches a nuclear weapons capability. Syria, Iran's closest ally, is wracked by what many observers now describe as a civil war. The broader Middle East is in turmoil in the wake of last year's momentous developments. North Korea, under the new leadership of Kim Jong Un, still challenges the stability of East Asia. 

Meanwhile, rising and resurgent powers such as China and Russia continue to undermine American interests. 44 has rightfully begun to devote more American diplomatic and military attention to Asia to deal with China's rise, but has pursued a wrongheaded "reset" policy with Russia that does not reflect the true nature of the Russian government, now facing its own popular uprising. On each of these issues, the 44th admin has refused to take assertive action, instead managing on the margins. 

In his first three years in office, 44 has made several correct tactical decisions, but he seems to lack an appreciation of America's unique role in the world and a coherent vision for the use of U.S. power and influence. What the country needs from its next president is a leader who can shape world events rather than be shaped by them. There is little to indicate that this is 44's interest or aptitude. 

Senior Cat @ Brookings Institution

On the accomplishment side of the ledger, credit 44 with a very smart policy in Asia. By taking advantage of China overplaying its hand in the South China Sea and generally unnerving most of the region, 44's administration has reconfirmed the central role of the United States in East Asia. The opening of a new base in Australia is a powerful symbol of America's enduring strategic presence in the region. The opening with Burma obviously has both strategic motives and strategic implications. 

He also has a fairly good record in responding to the Arab Awakening. 44's administration has fortunately ignored the "realists'" call for standing by the collapsing dictatorships in the Middle East. (How people can call themselves "realists" when advocating such hopelessly unrealistic policies is a source of wonderment.) In Egypt, especially, while the reaction to events has sometimes been slow, the administration has generally moved in the right direction. 44 deserves particular credit for not joining in the general panic at the electoral success of the Muslim Brotherhood. The operation in Libya was a success. The growing international pressure on Basha al-Assad in Syria is encouraging -- but eventually the United States will have to do more.

More generally, 44 has made steady moves in support of democracy. After treating it like a dirty word in its first year and a half, the administration has returned to a pro-democracy posture not only in the Middle East, but also in Russia and Asia. Given that the political evolution of countries in these regions will have a direct bearing on the international strategic situation and on the nature of world order in the coming years, this has been an eminently "realistic" approach.

As for setbacks, topping the list is44's failure to work out an agreement with Iraq to maintain a U.S. troop presence beyond the end of 2011. This has been a disaster and may prove to be one of the gravest errors of 44's first term, for which either he or his successor will pay a high price. If Iraq unravels into sectarian warfare, it could easily suck other regional powers into the conflict -- especially Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. Just as importantly, it would set back democratic progress in the region. Iraq is almost as much an anchor in the Arab world as Egypt. The decision to give up on the admittedly difficult negotiations with the Iraqis was clearly motivated by White House's desire to run on "ending" the war in Iraq. This was as unnecessary as it was unwise.  

The decision to allow deep cuts in defense spending -- rather than addressing entitlements -- is equally irresponsible. Here the 44th admin and Congress are both to blame. But 44's team has compounded the problem by elaborating a budget-driven defense strategy that is not commensurate with American strategic goals and interests. It is ironic that 44 is adopting Donald Rumsfeld's defense strategy -- high tech, light footprint. 

We will find, as we did in 43's years, 42's years, and in many previous decades, that drones and missiles can only go so far in preserving American interests. If not reversed, the deep cuts looming in defense will go a long way to undermining the U.S. position in the world. They will even undercut the 44th admin's efforts to make the United States a more reliable player in Asia, despite its unconvincing protestations to the contrary.

Pic - "In the end, you can’t help but feel American strategy is adrift, with Team 44 presiding over our decline as a world power. Great time for the president to make the case to the contrary — if that’s possible."

Tuesday, January 24, 2012

Going All The Way

Well see, doing Persia's super not so secret tender, sensitive portions of Preacher Command's new clear drive, with an airborne enrichmentus interruptus as indicted in the closing bits of uber snarky chiz aimed at a recent delish "Doing Persia" piece
An attack on Iran is almost certain to unify the Iranian people around the mullahs and provoke the supreme leader to redouble Iran’s nuclear pursuits, only deeper underground this time, and without international inspectors around. Over at the Pentagon, you sometimes hear it put this way: Bombing Iran is the best way to guarantee exactly what we are trying to prevent.
Well, the bit about a society suffering under a illegit somewhat unhinged Barbi hating Regime has an effective counter - tuff to think cats would get to crushing on the preachers, Secret Police and Control Freaks even more "thus making regime change hard to accomplish, if not impossible."

Attacking the new clear stuff may actually be a smokescreen. As darling Amir once fessed up in exclusive commentary: "Why not focus on the man holding the gun Courtney instead of the gun itself" 

An air campaign aimed at the new clear sites for starters would be intense - far beyond last millennium's Big Week und Blitz Week action that starting clawing Luftwaffe out of the sky. Even if Great and Little Satan hooked up with RAF and Royal Saudi Air Force for a menage a quad l'guerre d'l' air  no guarantees it would nail everything.

Consider instead:

"Given the likely fallout from even a limited military strike, the question Great Satan should ask her hotself is, Why not take the next step? After all, Iran's nuclear program is a symptom of a larger illness-- the revolutionary fundamentalist regime in Tehran."

If associated sites are not targeted for humanitarian reasons, Iran could still have a nuclear future. More troubling are, in the words of former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, the "known unknowns." There is no question that covert elements of Iran's nuclear program exist. 

After devoting so many resources to its nuclear program and suffering years of increasingly tough sanctions, it is entirely reasonable to believe that Tehran maintains at least a small pilot enrichment facility far away from the scrutiny of the international community. After all, hiding one from the world's eyes would not be difficult; the IAEA has very limited access to the workshops where Iran produces the components for and assembles its centrifuges and thus cannot precisely track the size and scope of Iran's enrichment activities.  

Further, Iran's capability to enrich uranium is a technical skill that cannot be bombed out of existence. Nor can the progress it has made on weaponization. Those aspects of the program would likely survive a limited bombing campaign along the lines advocated by Kroenig.  

To be sure, a limited strike is not pointless. Kroenig's support seems in part an effort to avoid the consequences skeptics of military action often highlight, such as Iran responding militarily or with operations via its terrorist proxies. He argues that the United States "could first make clear that it is interested only in destroying Iran's nuclear program, not in overthrowing the government" to moderate the Iranian response. But there, too, he is wrong. Iran has been in confrontation with the international community over its nuclear program for years. 

Whether a limited military strike or regime destabilization operation, Iran's leaders would almost certainly believe they would have to respond to such a challenge to maintain their credibility in the region, employing missiles, proxies, and/or their own terrorist operatives.

After all, Iran has been killing Americans for years -- most recently, U.S. troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. And, as the Iranian plot last year to assassinate the Saudi ambassador on American soil revealed, Tehran seems to be in no mood to modulate its behavior. It is dubious that the Iran's supreme leader and the Revolutionary Guard Corps would, or even could, accept a limited strike without retaliating. 

Given the likely fallout from even a limited military strike, the question the United States should ask itself is, Why not take the next step? After all, Iran's nuclear program is a symptom of a larger illness -- the revolutionary fundamentalist regime in Tehran. 

Thanks to internal political developments and sanctions, the regime is at its weakest point in decades. But the international community is slowly exhausting the universe of palatable sanctions, and even the pressure brought to bear on Iran thus far has not caused it to halt its program. A limited strike against nuclear facilities would not lead to regime change. But a broader operation might. It would not even need to be a ground invasion aimed specifically at toppling the government. 

But the United States would need to expand its list of targets beyond the nuclear program to key command and control elements of the Republican Guard and the intelligence ministry, and facilities associated with other key government officials. The goal would be to compromise severely the government's ability to control the Iranian population. This would require an extended campaign, but since even a limited strike would take days and Iran would strike back, it would be far better to design a military operation that has a greater chance of producing a satisfactory outcome.

Of course, there is no assurance that the Iranian regime would immediately crumble under such an onslaught. 

But once the cost to the country and the weakness of the current regime became clear, the door would open for renewed opposition to Iran's current rulers. It is sometimes said that a strike would lead the population to rally around the regime. But given the current unpopularity of the government, it seems more likely that the population would see the regime's inability to forestall the attacks as evidence that the emperor has no clothes and is leading the country into needlessly desperate straits. If anything, Iranian nationalism and pride would stoke even more anger at the current regime.  

At a minimum, it would be far better for Iran's rulers to be distracted by domestic unrest after a massive strike than totally free to strike out at enemies after a limited one.  

Some would argue that if the regime does fall, any subsequent leader would value the nuclear program just as much, especially considering Iranian nationalism and citizens' supposed pride in the nuclear program. But as the economic costs of the program have grown, so, too, has disillusionment with Iran's isolation. As the Iranian activist Shirin Ebadi told The Wall Street Journal in April 2011, "Ahmadinejad talks about nuclear energy as national pride . . . but that's not true. People don't care." The United States, in concert with its allies, would thus be in a strong position to make clear to Iran's new leaders that the path to prosperity is predicated upon giving up the nuclear program. 

The 44th administration has avoided the choice between a military operation and a nuclear Iran by relying on conclusions by the U.S. intelligence community that Iran has not made the final decision to develop a weapon. But its faith in receiving that intelligence in a timely and unambiguous way is, if history is any guide, misplaced. It is correct then to argue that a military strike should be in the cards.It is wrong to suggest that a limited strike is the one option that should be on the table.  

If strikes are chosen, it would be far better to put the regime at risk than to leave it wounded but still nuclear capable and ready to fight another day.

Pic - "Between the future and the past tense - Lies the present in the distance... Scoring points for passionate resistence. Between the lines and the highway - Lies the danger and the safety"

Monday, January 23, 2012


Oh, it just breaks your heart you know?

Every since that dementia heimers thing done got a hold of Paw Paw, the tragi comedy of errors has been like totally relentless - with only a few spots of 'what the heck?" type chiz - like the hilarious trying to feed the chickens cat litter (here's a tip - doesn't work bay bee) - to break up the steady wash of stuff that makes one think Time is predator.

Kinda like the headscratcher the white haired Congressional cat sallied forth with in the South Cackalackey DJ contest about the pre911 Buddha blower uppers that often whee laxed by executing girls in a soccer stadium
"Like to point out one thing about the Taliban. The Taliban used to be our allies when we were fighting the Russians. So Taliban are people who want — their main goal is to keep foreigners off their land. It’s the al-Qaeda — you can’t mix the two. The al-Qaeda want to come here to kill us. The Taliban just says, “We don’t want foreigners.” We need to understand that, or we can’t resolve this problem in the Middle East. We are going to spend a lot of lives and a lot of money for a long time to come."

Uh, wait, you said what now?
Everything in this statement is wrong. Everything. Let’s start with the most basic point. The Taliban most certainly were not “our allies when we were fighting the Russians.” How could they have been, considering that the Taliban did not exist at the time of the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan?
To claim that the Taliban is just opposed to foreign interference in Afghanistan is patently absurd. To begin with, the Taliban’s creation was a direct result not of foreign invasion but of Afghanistan’s internecine tribal warfare after the Soviets left and the Americans lost interest. Its unabashed goal was to crush Afghan factions that impeded its establishment of a retrograde sharia state.
Moreover, the Taliban craves foreign interference, without which it would never have come to power. A Pashtun movement driven by Islamic scholars and spearheaded by Mullah Mohammed Omar in Kandahar, the Taliban owes its existence to Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Two of the only three nations in the world to recognize the Taliban-led government in Kabul, nurtured, armed, and financed the Taliban in its origin. 
 They did so precisely because the Taliban was an effective ally in their machinations against regional rivals — India for the Pakistanis and Iran for the Saudis. The alliance was also grounded in the Taliban’s espousal of Deobandism, an uncompromising construction of you know whatslam propagated in Afghan madrassas built by the Saudis’ m"Hammedist World League in conjunction with Jamaat-e-Islami, Pakistan’s supremacist movement.
Even after Congress authorized the use of military force, 43 pointedly asked the Taliban to hand bin Laden and his organization over to Great Satan so that they could be tried — bin Laden having been indicted years earlier by an American grand jury.  Taliban repeatedly refused. The choice at that point was either to invade, overthrow the Taliban, and smash al-Qaeda, or to let it be known that Great Satan would tolerate a massive attack on our homeland. That was no choice at all.

What about the not digging foreigners part?
Taliban does not say, “We don’t want foreigners.” If you are an Arab jihadist, an operative of Pakistan’s heavily Islamist intelligence service, or a Saudi Wahhabist royal ready to build Afghanistan’s next-generation madrassas, the Taliban is delighted to have you in their country. It is non-m"Hammedists they don’t want. And such superpowers that they especially despise, since these they see as standing athwart their divine mission to subject the world to the rule of "slamic law.
That is why they protected al-Qaeda even at the cost of their own power. That is why negotiating with them is self-defeating and leaving them alone is suicidal.

Pic - "As long as the Taliban believe that they have a backer in Pakistan, even if is passive backing to provide safe havens, they are inclined to play the long game with the United States, which is to wait it out in Afghanistan."

Saturday, January 21, 2012


WoW - the Watchers Council - it's the oldest, longest running cyber comte d'guere ensembe in existence - started online in 1912 by Sirs Jacky Fisher and Winston Churchill themselves - an eclective collective of cats both cruel and benign with their ability to put steel on target (figuratively - natch) on a wide variety of topictry across American, Allied, Frenemy and Enemy concerns, memes, delights and discourse. 

Every week these cats hook up each other with hot hits and big phazed cookies to peruse and then vote on their individual fancy catchers.

Without further adieu - (or a don't) here are this weeks winners 

Council Winners

Non-Council Winners

See you next week! And don’t forget to follow us on Facebook and Twitter

Friday, January 20, 2012

Persian Perspective

Vom Kriege!

How did vClausewitz put it?  "Victory means making your enemies scream 'God! Please! Stop!"

Wunderliche Dreifaltigkeit mein schatzen bitte! nicht wahr?

GsGf"s Iran Security Initiative cat lays it out to play it out 

"Courtney, If Great Satan does not demonstrate through both word and deed the risks that Preacher Command and her proxilicious minions faces, overly optimistic Iranian hardliners may wrongly decide that the benefits of a confrontation outweigh the costs."

Check it out thru Preacher Command's Periscope:

War could turn out badly for the regime. Great Satan can do much to shape the perceptions of both Iranian leaders and world opinion regarding the risks Iran would face from such a conflict.

Resisting Global Arrogance
The Iranian doctrine of resistance assigns primary importance to psychological effects. In assuming that victory is achieved by demoralizing the enemy, it emphasizes the moral and spiritual dimensions of war over the physical and technological. From this viewpoint, how an action appears is the key test of its success. This fits well with a twenty-four-hour-news world in which image often matters more than reality.

The United States presents itself as, and is seen to be, a great military power. Standing up to U.S. forces could therefore be a great propaganda coup for Tehran. Consider that the Iranian navy still regards its 1988 confrontation with the United States -- sparked by the mining of a U.S. warship -- as a great victory that it studies closely, despite the sinking of several Iranian vessels. A new confrontation in the Strait of Hormuz and nearby Persian Gulf waters might play to Iran's greatest naval strength and the U.S. Navy's greatest weakness -- though of course even at its strongest, Iran's navy is still much weaker than the U.S. Navy at its weakest. 

Iran has invested heavily to create a multilayered system for sinking ships: mines, missiles from fast craft, missiles from bunkers hidden in the hills along the strait, and submarines. In the most realistic U.S. Navy simulation of what war with Iran might be like -- the $250 million Millennium Challenge exercise conducted in 2002 -- a similar array of forces sank sixteen American ships and might have done even more damage had the Navy not stopped the game to change the rules.

If Iran got lucky and sank a U.S. warship during an actual conflict, television viewers around the world might conclude that the Navy had lost the war no matter what happened next, since the destruction of a U.S. ship could define the conflict's public image. The Navy has not lost a ship since 1968, and its leaders rarely if ever mention the possibility that it might lose one in any war, much less one with Iran. Washington would therefore be prudent to shape expectations, frequently pointing out that while Iran might get in a few blows during a conflict, the more relevant measure of success would be whose forces are left standing at the end of the day, which would most assuredly be the U.S. military.

Iranian leaders might also decide that the U.S. and European strategy of escalating pressure leaves them with few options, in which case resistance may offer the best prospects. After all, when the United States got its nose bloodied by the 1983 Beirut Marine barracks bombing and the 1993 Somali "Black Hawk down" incident, Washington withdrew its forces from both countries. Iran may hope for the same result via confrontation in the Gulf. Demonstrated U.S. commitment to continuing America's seventy-year military presence in the Gulf is the best way to disabuse Tehran of this notion.

The threat of fierce U.S. retaliation to any Iranian attack may not matter to some Iranian hardliners as much as one might think. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Iran's most powerful political force, does not necessarily care so much about the regular navy's large ships. The IRGC navy's swarming approach relies instead on hundreds of small boats that could mix in with the thousands of civilian dhows and other small craft in the Gulf. The U.S. Navy could face something akin to guerrilla warfare at sea, not the conflict-at-a-distance it prefers. Defeating such an opponent would take time, during which U.S. forces might appear tied down and not necessarily winning. The best way to forestall this line of Iranian propaganda is shaping expectations with statements -- such as those recently made by U.S. military leaders -- pointing out that fully halting Iranian attacks on shipping could take many weeks. 

The United States should also carefully consider its escalation options, because each approach to broadening the fight could pose problems that must be prepared for in advance. For instance, attacks on Iran's oil infrastructure might drive prices up and invite Iranian retaliation against critical infrastructure in frightened Gulf monarchies -- a scenario that lends heightened importance to those countries' recent efforts to step up infrastructure protection. And ground operations, even by Special Forces, could prove controversial among Americans, most of whom would presumably not welcome perceptions of another land war. Any such actions should therefore be preceded by careful explanation of the underlying U.S. strategy.

Creating Disorder in Oil Markets
Iranian leaders may hope that attacks in the Gulf, especially if sustained for weeks, might create disorder in world oil markets. That would have two important benefits for Tehran. First, shortages could allow Iran to sell its oil at high prices despite U.S. and European pressure. The 1979 revolution, for example, cut Iran's oil exports in half but doubled world prices. Yet that outcome seems less likely today if plans are put in place to release strategic reserves and expand use of pipelines that bypass the Strait of Hormuz during the weeks-long process of halting Iran's attacks.

Second, Iranian hardliners may hope that chaotic oil markets -- with their attendant high gas prices hurting the American and European economies and U.S. Gulf allies becoming nervous -- might pressure Washington into ending the conflict even without securing Iranian concessions. Were that to happen, Tehran could conclude that U.S. military power is unable to stop it from doing as it pleases. Hardliners might see this as confirming Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's saying, "The United States cannot do a damn thing." Continuing consultation with potentially nervous allies will be needed to counter this problem.

Justifying the New Clear Chiz

A military conflict might also provide an opportunity for Iran to declare that the United States and Europe are hostile powers with which it cannot negotiate regarding the nuclear impasse, especially if European forces joined in the protection of shipping against Iranian attacks. Tehran could also claim that it needs a powerful deterrent against future U.S. or European action, namely, the capability to acquire nuclear arms in extreme circumstances if it exercised its claimed right to leave the Nonproliferation Treaty. 

If the United States were seen as the aggressor, that argument might win much sympathy around the world, possibly undermining the vigor with which UN sanctions were enforced. Hence the importance of emphasizing that Washington and its allies seek a diplomatic resolution to the nuclear impasse and have turned to sanctions only because Iran refuses to follow Security Council orders and engage directly with the United States. 

Rallying the Nation
Some Iranian leaders might welcome war with America in the hope of rekindling the revolutionary spirit and rallying nationalist sentiment. As described above, the most important factor in predicting Iranian actions is the leadership's perceptions of what will happen, not what is actually most likely to occur. In fact, an Iranian public already unhappy at privations due to hardline policies could well blame their leaders for starting a conflict. Iranians have already gone through one protracted, bloody war under the Islamic Republic, and there are few indications they would welcome another, this time against any enemy much more powerful than Iraq.

Would the United States Lose, or Would Both Sides Win?

Just because one side wins a war does not mean the other side loses. If both sides advance their political objectives, then both sides win. For the United States, a key test of any conflict with Iran is how it affects the nuclear impasse. In that sense, a war might work out well for the United States -- damage inflicted during the conflict could overcome Iran's factional infighting on the nuclear issue and force a dramatic reversal, as happened in 1989 to end the Iran-Iraq War. Yet war is a risky business, and naval conflicts could instead stiffen Tehran's resolve to acquire dangerous nuclear capabilities as quickly as possible in order to deter further U.S. attacks. In that case, further pressure might be needed to induce Iran to seek a diplomatic solution.

Nor is it clear what war would do to Iran's nuclear capabilities, as distinct from its intentions. In the event of a naval conflict in the Gulf, the United States might debate whether to attack Iran's nuclear facilities as well. If so, the challenge for the United States would be to ensure that such strikes significantly affect Iran's ability to reconstitute the nuclear program, and that the existing UN sanctions against dual-use items would hold after a strike. 

Will War Come?

Because it is by no means clear that war with Iran would advance U.S. interests, Washington is unlikely to start a conflict except in the most dire circumstances. The more likely scenario is Iran inadvertently stepping over a U.S. red line, and Washington reacting more vigorously than Tehran expects. Much as the Korean War began in no small part because of mistaken North Korean and Soviet assumptions about U.S. red lines, so too might Iran blunder into a conflict with the United States. 

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei was cautious for years, but he has made several risky decisions of late, such as rigging the 2009 presidential election. In his view, refusing to compromise and hitting back hard were the keys to victory over the mass protests that followed the disputed vote. Over the past few months, Tehran has at times applied that same principle abroad: when slapped, slap back harder. For example, when Tehran plotted to kill the Saudi ambassador to Washington, it may have been responding to Riyadh's prior intervention in Bahrain, which had prevented Iran from aiding the island's Shiites. Afterward, the UN General Assembly voted 106 to 9 to remind Iran of its obligations to protect diplomats (not one Muslim-majority country stood with Tehran), while Britain and other countries imposed financial sanctions. Tehran responded by orchestrating the ransacking of the British embassy the next week. Both the assassination plot and the embassy attack hurt Iran's interests, but the regime ordered them anyway. That is not reassuring when considering whether Iran might attack in the Strait of Hormuz. 

Indeed, the recent record suggests that Iranian leaders have become less cautious about taking aggressive gambles and more confident that the United States will not react. Washington should vigorously remind them how such over-optimism has repeatedly misled them. For example, they apparently -- and wrongly -- believed that the United States and Europe would not apply pressure against Iran's Central Bank, and that Europe would not boycott Iranian oil. 

Tehran's chances of achieving its objectives through war presumably look much better if it can convincingly portray itself as the victim rather than the aggressor. Iranian officials may therefore do their best to paint U.S. and European actions as an attack that justifies a response. Tehran is less likely to carry out that threat if Western allies and Iran's neighbors vigorously counter the "victim" claim and loudly repeat their calls for engagement with Iran and negotiation of all outstanding differences. 

For Washington's part, the proverb "if you want peace, prepare for war" holds true: the best prospect for persuading Khamenei to revert to his past cautiousness is to clearly lay out that the United States has red lines which, if crossed, will cost Iran dearly. Declaratory policy, such as 44's recent letter to Iran about red lines, helps. But Iran may be more impressed by deeds that back up those words. 

Peace is more likely to be preserved if the United States marshals its allies and demonstrates its power -- hopefully through military exercises alone, but also by vigorous response to any Iranian aggression if necessary. 

Pic - "What If Iran Strikes First?"

Thursday, January 19, 2012


While the Guitars of War amp up the overdrive for doing Persia - Center of Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) delivers the hot PDF ing climax for Velayat E 90 - Preacher Command's tactical and strategic MO for keeping Great Satan at arms length and closing up Hormuz Strait tighter than school girl night at Hooter's.

"Outside-In: Operating from Range to Defeat Iran’s Anti-Access and Area-Denial Threats"

Iran has had ample opportunity over the last twenty years to examine the  “American way of war” and to deduce that allowing the United States and  its allies to mass overwhelming combat power on its borders is a prescription for defeat.

Therefore, Iran is pursuing measures to deny the U.S. military access to close-in basing and make traditional U.S. power-projection operations in the Persian Gulf possible only at a prohibitive cost.

Oh snap! Check this bit 'bout getting Hormuz re opened:

Joint Amphibbin'

Two Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs), supported by SOF [special operations forces] and possibly Army airborne and air assault units, could seize and hold a lodgment at a time and location of Central Command’s choosing. An objective area for an amphibious landing should be located where enemy A2/AD [Anti-access/area-denial] threats have been suppressed, and may not be in proximity to “existing ports, airfields, and logistics infrastructure.”

Immediately after landing, SOF, Marine Corps, and Army forces would concentrate their efforts on expanding their operating perimeter and preventing the enemy from closing within range to use G-RAMM [Guided-rockets, artillery, mortars, missiles] weapons. Non-lethal capabilities and mobile high-energy laser weapons could help deny hostile forces access to key areas and create a defensive “barrier” against G-RAMM attacks.

U.S. forces could then use this secure lodgment as a jumping off point for follow-on assaults up the coastline of Iran to clear areas that could be used by the enemy to launch attacks against vessels in the Gulf of Oman and Strait of Hormuz, including vulnerable U.S. MCM [Mine countermeasures] forces.
Throughout a theater-entry operation, Air Force and Navy surveillance and strike aircraft, along with Army ATACMS [Army Tactical Missile System ] stationed in the UAE or Oman, if available, could help suppress Iran’s long-range ballistic missile and ASCM [Anti-ship cruise missile] threats, provide close air support to expeditionary forces, and prevent enemy ground forces from massing to execute counterattacks.

Seizing Islands at Strategic Locations.

In addition to creating lodgments on the Iranian coast, islands just inside the Gulf—including Abu-Musa, Sirri, Greater Tunb and Lesser Tunb—should be targeted by precision strikes and occupied by U.S. expeditionary forces as required. If permitted to remain under the command of the IRGCN [Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy], these islands could be staging locations for operations to re-seed minefields and harass U.S. forces and civilian shipping transiting the Strait.

Clearing the Path in to the Persian Gulf.

Completing mine clearing operations would likely be a key task for Littoral Combat Ships equipped with MCM modules, UUVs [Unmanned underwater vehicles], rotary wing aircraft, and supporting sensors. To prevent Iran from regenerating its maritime exclusion defenses, U.S. air forces would need to continue attacks against known mine storage and distribution sites, and destroy or suppress small craft, helicopters, submarines, and enemy “commercial” vessels capable of dispensing mines.

Although it is unknown to what extent Iran will expand its inventory of smart mines in the future, history has shown that even a small number of mines placed in shipping lanes “have been able to halt surface traffic when their presence was known.” Moreover, as mine countermeasure operations in 1991 and 2003 suggest, clearing large areas in the Strait of Hormuz and Persian Gulf of mines could require a month or even longer.

Pic - "Given the likely fallout from even a limited militarystrike, the question the United States should ask itself is, Why not take thenext step? After all, Iran's nuclear program is a symptom of a larger illness-- the revolutionary fundamentalist regime in Tehran."

Wednesday, January 18, 2012


"7 knew exactly what to do with Great Satan"s enemies. Kill them"


The sirens of Isolationalistic intent often hope for the hap hap happy days of 1912. Withdraw, retreat, hide under our beds and let the rest of the world devour itself whilst Great Satan sweetly focuses on cool stuff like education, art, biz, communications, medical and technological break thrus, space exploration and women worshipping

Decorated ex Combat historian and all around America Rocks y'all! PHD Bevin Alexander prophesied that such doofussness giganteus, in heat with defeat or (even worse) - deceivers
"Many critics of American foreign policy - both at home and abroad - assert
that the United States has overextended herself unnecessarily in other
nations affairs. Some liberal critcs even chastise the United States for
becoming an "Imperial Power."
These criticisms are completely off the mark. Those who worry about America's projection of power are overlooking how America got to the position she occupies at this moment in history: the world's dominant political and military, the only nation that will actually go into the world and strike down evil."
This is significant. For Great Satan, "National Interest" is not a 'geo mapi - graphical' phrase (well maybe for trade and enviro regulating) it is global. Tiny and small nations might appropiately feel that their nat'l interest begin and end at the border. Natch, their foreign policy would most likely be defensive only.

A larger nation has more extensive interests - by design. Like Soviet Union time Russia and Great Satan today - collective ID is ideological, big boys have ideological interests in addition to purely materialistic concerns.

Sans something weird and unheard of, Great Satan will always feel bound and obliged to defend any democracy under the gun from unfree, unhinged and undemocratic threats - external or internal. Kinda like the Euro escapade in both world wars.

Same thing with Japan, SoKo, Taiwan or Little Satan today. When geopolitical best girl friends forever are under attack - the claws come out. Nothing magic about it.

Fact is, the Great Satan's 30 years in the future military is super superior (and some are in denial about this - which says more about their world views than anything else) to any imaginable combination that could be arrayed against her. This wasn't an evil plot by pre emptive, preventive plotters.

It came with the turf. Just lucky - bad or good - Great Satan racked up one heck of a military biz during the half century since WWII time Deutschland and Nippon gave up fascist and imperial ghosts and succumbed to Regime Changes.

While Europa rebuilt, recovered and rehabbed, Warsaw Pact time Russia laid out of real combat (except for losing their hide in Afghanistan) and used Soviet homies and local fanboys to do the fighting.

Not Great Satan! She was involved with combat ops nearly everywhere. Korea, Greece, Vietnam, Cambodia, Dominican Repub, El Salvador, Grenada, Lebanon, Libya, Panama, Kuwait, Somalia, Kosovo, the Balkans, Afghanistan and of course, her latest regime change - Iraq.

When Russia tried to put down Grozny the 1st time in the Commonwealth era - it was horribly embarrassing. - like catching a longtime Gf hooking up with a guy that she KNEW you liked.

"The initial attack ended with a major rout of the attacking forces and led to
heavy Russian casualties and nearly a complete breakdown of morale. An
estimated 1,000 to 2,000 federal soldiers died in the disastrous New Year's
Eve assault.
All units of the 131st "Maikop" Motor Rifle Brigade sent into the city,
numbering more than 1,000 men, were destroyed during the 60-hour fight in the
area of the Grozny's central railway station, leaving only about 230 survivors
(1/3 of them captured). Several other Russian armored columns each lost hundreds
of men during the first two days and nights of the siege."
The mighty Red Army quagmired in their own back yard with the first defeat suffered by Russia nearly 51 years to the day. Not since the wicked Wehrmacht desperately delivered a bloody nose at Zhitomir Ukrainia had the Red Army been defeated and retreated.

When an almost identical sitch occured at Ah Nasiriyah in '03 - Great Satan pretty much redecorated the place (in early millenium 'Steel on target' fashion), launched an on the spot counterattack that not only reached temporarily cut off units - but ended up capturing the entire burg.
Half a century of nigh constant confrontation cloned creative combat cadre that would never leave a comrade behind. Armed with the ultimate in Battlefield meds, real time communications and more precise firepower in hand, on hold and on call than panzer prima donna's ever dreamed.

Great Satan blinging for combat stuff rate wise expanded along with America's economic growth - while Euro powers blinged on social programs and refrained from fighting amoungst themselves, cut spending on their militaries and focused on trading and tech. 

The Soviet Union spent cash (rubles, actually) at an alarming rate. Mostly wasteful, Mother Russia's military AND economy bashed heads and knocked each other all the way out in collapse.

Magically, after 20 years or so, despite faux school ideas like "imperial decline" Great Satan busted out of her cocoon as uniquely powerful - the only one of Her kind. Meds, science and high tech were off the hook - and generously applied to creating and upgrading everything from electric pencil sharpeners to cruise missiles. 

Just like Spider - man, with all this great power came great responsibilities. It's a fact Jack - whether sought after, wanted, welcomed or not.

A lot like the armies of attention attracting sporty shorties at the mall that demand, deflect and encouragingly discourage players.

And, like little hottie drama magnets, Great Satan will find opportunities to use it - or the world will discover opportunities for Great Satan.

Pic -"Dangerous!"