Sunday, October 11, 2015

WoW!!


WoW - the Watchers Council- it's the oldest, longest running cyber comte d'guere ensembe in existence - started online in 1912 by Sirs Jacky Fisher and Winston Churchill themselves - an eclective collective of cats both cruel and benign with their ability to put steel on target (figuratively - natch) on a wide variety of topictry across American, Allied, Frenemy and Enemy concerns, memes, delights and discourse.

Every week these cats hook up each other with hot hits and big phazed cookies to peruse and then vote on their individual fancy catchers.

Thusly sans further adieu (or a don"t)

Council Winners

Non-Council Winners



See you next week!

Thursday, October 8, 2015

A Three Wars At Once Military


The next president must begin to rebuild America’s military.

The current force is too small; its equipment—largely the legacy of the Reagan-era build-up—is too old; and it is not trained or ready for a large or long fight. The military services are in danger of losing their best, brightest, and most battle-tested people: the “all-volunteer force” marks a moral compact between the American public and the small number of Americans who risk their lives to keep the rest of us safe. That compact requires us not only to care for the wounded, the widows, and the retired but also to provide those who would go in harm’s way with the means for victory. When we fail to do so, it breaks faith with those in uniform.

This failure also endangers America. Even in the current hothouse media environment, it is impossible to miss what the decline of US military power means for the world, in Europe, in East Asia, and most especially across the greater Middle East. Things are falling apart as the American center cannot hold.

This report shows a way forward. Grounded in a traditional understanding of our national security goals and strategy, the path is clear. Defense planning for the next administration must:

Adopt a “three-theater” force construct.

 To remain a global power, the United States must preserve a favorable balance of military power in Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia. Deterring further Russian and Chinese aggression requires forces that are powerful and constantly present, and securing our interests in the Middle East requires not just presence but also an effort to reverse the rising tide of our many adversaries: Iran, ISIS, and al Qaeda and its associates. America cannot lead the world by “pivoting” among these theaters nor by retreating to the continental United States.

Increase its military capacity.

 Since the end of the Cold War, US forces have been unrelentingly deployed. After 9/11, they were not sufficient to successfully conduct campaigns simultaneously in Iraq and Afghanistan, despite a massive mobilization of reserve component troops, an increase, though tardy, in active-duty numbers, and innovative employment of Navy and Air Force leaders in ground missions. Neither the rapid introduction of new equipment such as the massive ­mine-resistant vehicles nor the renaissance in counterinsurgency operations could make up for the lack of forces. The United States needs a force sufficient for a three-theater posture.

Introduce new capabilities urgently.

Programs to transform the military or to offset the new weaponry now fielded by adversaries have been a disaster; the failure to modernize across the force since the 1980s now leaves the US military without the great technological advantages that allowed it to “shock and awe” its enemies and conduct decisive operations with very few casualties. The Pentagon must be allowed to buy what it can quickly and economically and begin to build what it needs within the next decade.

Increase and sustain defense budgets. 

The defense spending cuts of the early Obama years and the further reductions mandated by the Budget Control Act have merely accelerated a pattern of defense divestment that began a generation ago. The damage is too great to repair within the course of a single administration. A “two-target” investment strategy is required: first, return military budgets to the level set by former Defense Secretary Robert Gates in his original 2012 budget, and second, gradually build up to an affordable floor of 4 percent of gross domestic product that would sustain the kind of military America needs.

Sound defense planning demands a long-term perspective, resting not on what changes—threats and technologies—but on what remains constant—American security interests and political principles. Since 1945, the one constant of international politics has been the military power of the United States. Our next commander-in-chief must rebuild America’s military power.

Wednesday, October 7, 2015

By Proxy!


Proxy creation is not unlike nation building...

“It is frequently said that there is no ‘military solution’ to Syria,” Gen. Petraeus said in his testimony. “This may be true, but it is also misleading. For, in every case, if there is to be hope of a political settlement, a certain military and security context is required—and that context will not materialize on its own.”

Two New York Times reporters — Eric Schmitt, a national security reporter, and Tim Arango, Baghdad bureau chief — have a thought-provoking article about why American attempts to build up foreign militaries have fared so badly in recent years. The record is indeed replete with failures in places such as Iraq, Syria, Mali, Yemen, and, arguably, even Afghanistan, where the Afghan forces continue to fight hard but have had some of their deficiencies exposed by the temporary fall of Kunduz.

See...

There is no doubt that our military trainers can easily impart tactical skills — how to shoot a weapon, how to clear a room, even how to organize a combined arms offensive. But as Clausewitz reminded us, war is above all a political act. If a military force does not have a popular and legitimate political basis, it doesn’t matter how tactically proficient it is. It will either fail (as in Iraq or Yemen), or become so strong that it will take over the state (as happened in South Vietnam, Chile, and Mali, among other places).

The historical record suggests we need to place more emphasis on buttressing the political legitimacy of our allies rather than just the tactical proficiency of their armed forces. That requires nation-building — something that is hard and unpopular, but unavoidable if we want to avoid squandering a lot of effort on failed military-assistance programs.

History also suggests that there is one way above all others that we can be effective at nation-building — and that is by maintaining a long-term presence in a country we are helping. Surely it is no coincidence that the U.S. armed forces remain stationed in Germany, Japan, South Korea, Italy, and other post-1945 success stories. It’s likely that at least some of these countries would not have had such a successful journey toward prosperity and stability absent the ballast provided by a continuing U.S. presence.

The imperative is all the greater in countries as unstable as Afghanistan and Iraq. We have already seen in Iraq what happens when the U.S. pulls out too quickly; the army and, indeed, the whole state becomes corrupted and undermined by sectarian forces allowing for the rise of powerful foes such as ISIS. The recent takeover of Kunduz serves as a reminder that Afghanistan is in danger of a similar implosion should the U.S. leave at the end of 2016 as President Obama vows to do.

There is no magical formula to training effective foreign militaries. It simply requires learning the lessons of the past and emphasizing the importance of building a stable and legitimate polity through a long-term commitment.

Tuesday, October 6, 2015

Boots On The Ground

It’s a thorny issue that has experts divided. 

For some, a ground war is a trap and should not even be considered; only well-targeted, reinforced airstrikes will do the job. For others, it’s impossible to slay ISIS without hunting down its jihadists one by one, from street to street, hideout after hideout, a strategy that requires the immediate deployment of sufficient numbers of ground troops.
Everybody knows by now that ISIS beheads, tortures, rapes, slaughters, manipulates, dehumanizes. This so-called “Islamic State” destroys the bodies, the souls, the relics of the past, the art — in other words, everything that makes up humanity.
Nobody doubts that the cruelty of this group is without boundaries, that its determination is unyielding and its savagery extreme. And everybody can easily see that ISIS is getting bigger and stronger by the day. Tthe more atrocities it commits, the more its power of attraction on the world's angry masses intensifies and the more branches and allied groups are created, from the Maghreb to central Africa, and beyond.

Unless we’ve become desperately naive, it’s impossible to still imagine we could confine this danger and limit its scope. There is no such thing as a safebox where we can leave ISIS to rot. If we don’t fight it, corpses will keep piling up, entire populations will be destroyed and more ancient temples will be blown to dust. Not fighting it will
lead to terrorism spreading all over the globe, creating uncontrollable situations everywhere.

Common sense commands us to move to the rapid and total destruction of ISIS.

The terrorist group has time on its side. Hesitations and inefficient operations allow it to prosper and even to progress, step by step, in establishing a caliphate that dreams of becoming perennial and reaching worldwide. The later the great confrontation will come, the more difficult and uncertain the outcome will be.


As things stand today, defeating ISIS’ 30,000 men — even if they’re well equipped, determined and radicalized — is definitely within the reach of our armies. But if tomorrow they’ve grown more numerous and better equipped, scattered across more territory, operations will be even more risky and their outcome more difficult to predict.

At that point , the situation becomes entirely unthinkable.

That said, an efficient war is hardly easy to organize, and strategic, political and diplomatic hurdles must first be overcome. We’d need to secure a European consensus, cooperation from Arab countries, a transformation of America’s stance … In other words, nothing that’s simply or quickly obtained, to say the least.

But the biggest stumbling block is within each of our heads. It’s been a long time since we’ve ceased to understand
the Clausewitz formula, according to which “war is merely the continuation of politics by other means.” After two world wars, the construction of a peaceful European coexistence and the United Nations’ system, pacifism itself has become second nature for most Westerners. The idea of a “just war,” which used to be all too common, now seems strange, unreal or even obscene.

We look at 20th-century fighting with a mixture of dread and incredulity. After some time, we surely understand that to eradicate savagery, it was necessary to take up arms. But we’ve failed to grasp the direct connection with the present. Until now, at least.


Those who see that connection say we can’t afford to wait until it’s too late. They cannot, therefore, keep quiet about it, even though they risk looking like blind warmongers and being labeled as "Neocons" and many other nasty things. But given the nature of ISIS, of how it acts and what it can become, it seems now as if a war on the ground is the only solution that remains. Of course, it’s also the worst solution.
Except, maybe, for all the others.

Monday, October 5, 2015

Reunification Day

On Oct. 3, 1990, the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic Germany ended 45 years of post-World War II division and near total separation to become a single country.

Following World War II, the area that was Germany was divided into four military sectors controlled by France, the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union. On May 23, 1949, the sectors controlled by France, the United Kingdom and the United States became the Federal Republic of Germany. On October 7, 1949, the sector controlled by the Soviet Union became the German Democratic Republic, which in Germany is generally referred to as the DDR (Deutsche Demokratische Republik).

The two countries developed very different political and economic systems and, due to the political tensions in post-war Europe, there was little contact between the inhabitants of the two countries. Life in the DDR was characterized by harsh repression against political adversaries. Thousands of inhabitants were kept under intimate surveillance by the infamous East German secret police, the Stasi (Staatssicherheit). At least 137 people died trying to escape from the DDR.

On September 4, 1989 citizens of Leipzig protested peacefully against the DDR government. More so-called “Monday demonstrations” soon took place in other cities across the DDR. The protests called for political reform and to open the borders. On November 9, 1989, the checkpoints between the two countries were opened and people were allowed to travel freely. This date marked the "fall" of the Berlin wall.

These events lead to political change. Democratic elections paved the way for unity in the German Democratic Republic on March 18, 1990. The "Treaty of Unification" was signed by both countries' leaders in August that year. Finally, Germany's unification became official on October 3, 1990.


The Berlin Wall had fallen less than a year earlier, a dissolution that immediately — within 48 hours — saw 2 million people pour into the western-friendly West from the communist-supported East.

Since then, a unified Germany has become a driving force in the European Union, as well as the region's largest and most powerful economy and political voice. In recent months, Germany was a leader on the world stage over Greece's debt situation and Europe's swelling migrant crisis. Germany has offered to take in large numbers of Syrian and other refugees on a scale matched only by similarly left-leaning and liberal Sweden.     

There used to be considerable differences between the East and West: in life expectancy, productivity, joblessness, wages, skills, political affiliation and access to goods.

The economies of Germany's eastern states are still relatively weak compared to those in the western part of the country — where banks, carmakers and other major employers have their headquarters — but those gaps have steadily closed. As has the perception of any marked differences between the people of these previously distinct countries.

25 years later - Germany has become the economic and political powerhouse of Europe, at the center of every major decision that affects the region.

Sunday, October 4, 2015

WoW!!

WoW - the Watchers Council- it's the oldest, longest running cyber comte d'guere ensembe in existence - started online in 1912 by Sirs Jacky Fisher and Winston Churchill themselves - an eclective collective of cats both cruel and benign with their ability to put steel on target (figuratively - natch) on a wide variety of topictry across American, Allied, Frenemy and Enemy concerns, memes, delights and discourse.

Every week these cats hook up each other with hot hits and big phazed cookies to peruse and then vote on their individual fancy catchers.

Thusly sans further adieu (or a don"t)

Council Winners

Non-Council Winners



See you next week!

Thursday, October 1, 2015

3rd Infitada Myth

Oh Palestine!

So weird both Palestines (the Strip and Westerbank) have yet to hold an election a decade after their last one.

Abu Mazen/M"mood Abbas at the UN unilaterally killed the olde Oslo Accord and threatened another Palestine uprising.

Yay.

Yet, most Palestinians are NOT hot for another mini Nakbah Redux...

“This is only a political game by the president,” a senior Palestinian official familiar with the prevailing mood told Al-Monitor on condition of anonymity. “Let’s face it. There’s no doubt that there’s great tension, frustration and despair, pretty much everything you need in order to have the people take to the streets. But only if Abbas wants it will an intifada that’s intense, violent and popular break out.”

The official explained that without a prominent body coaxing the street, there will be no intifada on the scale of the two previous ones, which began in 1987 and 2000. According to him, the Hamas movement, which is being suppressed by the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank, is unable to rear its head. Moreover, given Hamas' dire situation in the Gaza Strip, it remains uncertain whether its leaders even want to stoke the fire at this time.

According to the official, Fatah is the only movement capable of setting off a violent popular confrontation against Israel, but it is experiencing a major leadership crisis. Its senior members are preoccupied with who will succeed Abbas if and when he decides to follow through with his recent threat to step down.

The Palestinian public has been disappointed for quite some time with Abbas’ policies and with the Palestinian leadership in general. The president is perceived, primarily by the younger generation, as someone clinging tightly to his seat without elections. This widespread criticism of Fatah's conduct should not be dismissed offhandedly. It could very well prevent senior Fatah members from initiating efforts able to captivate a weary and frustrated Palestinian public.

It appears that many, if not all, Palestinians in the West Bank have lost trust in the current Palestinian leadership. Sentiments to this effect can be heard everywhere, in all circles and walks of life, from Hebron to Nablus to Qalqilya and Ramallah.

According to a poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, headed by Khalil Shikaki, and whose results were published Sept. 21, 42% of respondents believe that only an armed struggle will lead to Palestinian statehood. In reality, however, by all indications on the ground and despite Palestinian frustrations, an all-out conflict with Israel, namely, a third intifada, is not really seething below the surface.

Two Palestinians were recently killed in the Hebron area. At the Hashoter roadblock on Sept. 22, Hadil Hashlamoun, 18, was shot dead while, according to the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), trying to stab a soldier. A few hours earlier, Diyaa Abdul-Halim Talahmah, 21, was killed, apparently after a makeshift grenade he was planning to throw at an IDF detachment exploded in his hand.

A few hundred residents attended Hashlamoun and Talahmah's funeral. Hebron, the most highly charged city in the West Bank and once considered the champion of popular resistance, quickly returned to its routine, without residents being carried away into a cycle of violent incidents.
Yunes Aida, who lives near Shuhada Street, Hebron's main commercial thoroughfare, told Al-Monitor that despite friction with Israeli settlers and the feeling among Palestinian residents of the city (and elsewhere) of being at a dead end, most young people prefer to stage popular demonstrations as acts of protest rather than a violent intifada, which they do not think will bring change to their situation.

“I was 14 when the second intifada broke out,” he said. “There were many fatalities and casualties. It was a big mess. It didn’t bring us a solution. People know that another intifada and more fatalities will only make their lives harder. They don’t have the energy for that. It’s not just my own personal opinion. I’m telling you what all the people here are saying.”

Another young man from Hebron, a news agency photographer who covered the second intifada and is currently covering events in the Hebron area, agreed with the perspective that an intifada is not imminent. Speaking on condition of anonymity, he acknowledged that there is no denying the tension on the ground, but he also said, “But your soldiers are also acting differently. You could see it during the funeral of the two young people that were killed. The military kept its distance and tried not to be dragged [into violence]. It wasn’t like this in the past. It looks like [they were given] orders to be extra careful. I wish they had acted like that during the second intifada.”

This, in essence, is the prevailing atmosphere in the territories. It is complex, complicated, confusing and rife with contradictions. Unlike the tumultuous period when Yasser Arafat was at the helm of the Palestine Liberation Organization, under Abbas’ leadership the Palestinian security forces have instilled a sense of order and personal security the likes of which have never been experienced in the territories, the tensions with Israel notwithstanding. It seems that no one, including the Palestinians themselves or Palestinian Authority (PA) leaders, is interested in a return to total chaos and destruction of PA institutions, which were painstakingly built and are now considered by all Palestinian West Bank residents to be their legitimate political and civilian establishment.

While according to Shikaki’s poll, there are many Palestinians who believe that only an armed struggle will help them realize the dream of Palestinian statehood, they are, at the same time, reluctant to join in an armed struggle.

 This may have to do with the leadership crisis and the deep disappointment with the incumbent Palestinian leaders. It is also possible that the wounds of the second intifada have yet to fully heal or that Palestinian society, much like Israeli society, is going through the same process of sadly coming to terms with the current situation.