Kurdistan!

Ard al-Akrad!

Ever since the Islamic State group began to lay claim to large stretches of territory in Syria and Iraq, conventional wisdom has dictated that the Kurds, even while relentlessly opposing the jihadist group, stand to benefit from the disintegration of state authority in the two countries.

During the summer of 2014, when Iraqi troops abandoned their posts in the northern city of Kirkuk, it was Kurdish peshmerga forces that stepped in to defend the oil-rich enclave from the advances of ISIS. "Six Iraqi divisions melted like the snow," said Masoud Barzani, president of the semiautonomous Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), in an interview later that year with The New Yorker. "I saw it in an opportunistic way."

Indeed, be it in Iraq, where the Kurds have served as the tip of the Iraqi spear against ISIS, or in Syria, where Kurdish rebel forces have become an invaluable American ally, it would appear that each ISIS defeat has created an opportunity for Kurds across the region.

"The Kurds, despite their large numbers (about 30 million worldwide), as well as their shared language, culture and identity, have never had a nation. But they're getting closer to one with every battle," wrote Time's Karl Vick earlier this year.

So, have the Kurds -- the largest ethnic group in the world still without a state -- altered the so-called facts on the ground? Has the Kurdish moment finally arrived?

Not so fast, writes Denise Natali of the Institute for National Strategic Studies. While the Kurdish government of northern Iraq appears to have laid the foundation for statehood, the region "remains a landlocked, quasi-state entity lacking external sovereignty." Natali goes on:

"This condition means that the degree and nature of Kurdish autonomy, including any potential for independence, is not determined by unilateral decisions made by Kurdish elites but rather by the demands, deals, and incentive structures brokered by powerful regional states and non-state actors."

Moreover, while Iraqi Kurdistan is rich in oil, it lacks the infrastructure to deliver crude to world markets, placing unilateral energy deals reached with neighboring Turkey, for example, on a shaky legal foundation:

"Because the Kurdistan Region is not a sovereign entity and continues to rely on Iraqi pipeline infrastructure, its exports are not fully independent. Baghdad retains international legal rights over oil flows and revenues from the [Iraq-Turkey Pipeline] based on the 2010 pipeline Tariff Agreement negotiated with Turkey -- and has already filed litigation against Ankara at the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris. It has also threatened to penalize [oil] and shipping companies that purchase Kurdish crude apart from [Baghdad], reinforcing the legal risks and opaque nature of KRG oil exports and sales. Moreover, Baghdad has cut the KRG budget (except for monthly food allocations), which represents 95 percent of the KRG's operating expenses."

Erbil's ongoing dispute with Baghdad over oil revenue sharing -- in addition to a growing refugee crisis -- has put a crunch on the flailing Kurdish economy, which had already been plagued by corruption and cronyism. A brewing succession crisis has only made matters worse within the KRG. Recent calls by rival political factions for Barzani to step down -- his presidential term ended in August -- have resulted in protests and violence.

The prospects for Kurdish statehood appear no better in neighboring Syria. While Kurdish YPG forces have taken on a key role in the United States' war against ISIS, there is virtually no chance that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan -- emboldened by his party's decisive victory in last weekend's parliamentary elections -- will allow any gains made by Syria's Kurds to evolve into a sovereign state. Turkish affairs expert Aaron Stein explains:

"Turkey's strategy is independent of the U.S. reliance on the YPG for operations east of Euphrates. This new AKP government is likely to continue with this program to provide rebels with weapons, particularly now that Russia has intervened on behalf of the Assad regime. The new Turkish government is also likely to continue to put pressure on the United States to adopt its preferred policy in Syria: the formation of a 110-kilometer-wide buffer zone extending up to 33 kilometers south into Aleppo province.

"This zone would provide a safe haven for refugees and a key area for the anti-Assad rebels to back-base. This proposed zone would also be free of the YPG, which Ankara accuses of indirectly bolstering the Assad regime by working at cross-purposes to the insurgency. Turkey has made one thing very clear: It will not tolerate a YPG presence west of the Euphrates, and will therefore not accept a Kurdish-led offensive on the ISIS-held city of Jarablus, or any YPG-led effort to unite its territory with the Kurdish-controlled enclave in Efrin in northwestern Syria."

The Kurds, in conclusion, may once again end up the victims of great power posturing, much as they did at the conclusion of World War I. Kurdish ambitions will continue to be tempered and curtailed so long as Ankara and Baghdad continue to play important roles in the plans of larger regional actors.

WoW!!

WoW - the Watchers Council- it's the oldest, longest running cyber comte d'guere ensembe in existence - started online in 1912 by Sirs Jacky Fisher and Winston Churchill themselves - an eclective collective of cats both cruel and benign with their ability to put steel on target (figuratively - natch) on a wide variety of topictry across American, Allied, Frenemy and Enemy concerns, memes, delights and discourse.

Every week these cats hook up each other with hot hits and big phazed cookies to peruse and then vote on their individual fancy catchers.

Thusly sans further adieu (or a don"t)

Council Winners

• *First place with 3 1/3 votes!–The Noisy Room – Harry’s Heroine Hikes 1,000 Miles For Wounded Troops… She’s An American Warrior All The Way [Video]
• Second place with 3 votes – Bookworm Room – The terrifying nihilism behind Leftists’ desire for socialized medicine
• Third place *t* with 1 vote Nice Deb – Saturday Movie Matinee: Black Violence In Schools
• Third place *t* with 1 vote –The Independent Sentinel – Wait Until You Hear What Obama Calls Convicts
• Fourth place *t* with 2/3 vote –Maggie’s Notebook – IBD Ted Cruz Tax Reform: Economically, Politically Revolutionary –– Intellectually Dominating
• Fourth place *t* with 2/3 vote –The Razor – Hillary Is Going To Miss
• Fourth place *t* with 2/3 vote –The Right Planet – BILL GATES: Only Socialism Can Save Planet
• Fourth place *t* with 2/3 vote –Joshuapundit–JK Rowling – When Cowardice Calls

Non-Council Winners

• First place with 2 2/3 votes! –Mike Adams/Townhall–Get Out of My Class and Leave America submitted by Bookworm Room
• Second place with 1 2/3 votes – Sultan Knish –The Death Of The American Welfare Statesubmitted by Fausta’s Blog
• Third place with 1 1/3 votes –Dave King/Conservative Daily News –Next Leftist Push Is “Climate Justice” And The U.S. Is Once Again The Culprit They’ll Punish submitted by Puma By Design
• Fourth place *t* with 1 vote –Robby Soave/Reason – Even Salon Thinks Trigger Warnings Have Ruined College submitted by The Razor
• Fourth place *t* with 1 vote –David Warren – All Hallows Eve submitted by Joshuapundit
• Fifth place *t* with 2/3 votes –The Objective Standard – Individualism vs. Collectivism: Our Future, Our Choice submitted by The Right Planet
• Fifth place *t* with 2/3 votes –Ben Caspit/al-Monitor – Lions Over Syria: Russia and Israel Face-off submitted by GrEaT sAtAn”S gIrLfRiEnD
• Fifth place *t* with 2/3 votes –Mark Tapson/Frontpage Magazine –Monica Crowley On Today’s Totalitarians Left submitted by The Independent Sentinel
• Fifth place *t* with 2/3 votes –Mike Nelson/Real Clear Defense – A Failure of Strategic Thinking in the Middle East submitted by The Glittering Eye
• Fifth place *t* with 2/3 votes –Politically Short –The Days Of American Despotism submitted by The Noisy Room

See you next week!

Supreme Leader Explains "Death To America"

Rahbar-e enghelab!

Persia's illegit Supreme Leader for Life did a bit of 'splaining on his own web site about "Death to America"

The slogan "Death to America" is not aimed at the American people, but rather American policies.

Ayatollah Ali Khamenei discussed the slogan while meeting with Iranian students ahead of the anniversary of the takeover of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran on Nov. 4, 1979. Militant students stormed the compound and took 52 Americans hostage for 444 days.

Khamenei says the "aim of the slogan is not death to American people. The slogan means death to U.S. policies and arrogance." The slogan has "strong support" In Iran, he said.

Khamenei and hard-liners in the Iranian government remain deeply suspicious of the United States and view its policies a threat to the country.

He reiterated his warning that the U.S. is not to be trusted despite the nuclear deal reached with the U.S., Britain, France, Russia, China and Germany. The agreement promises Tehran relief from crippling economic sanctions in exchange for curbs on its nuclear program.

Khamenei also expressed his apparent belief that the U.S. "will not hesitate" if given a chance to destroy Iran.

"The nature of the U.S. attitude is continuation of the same hostile aims from the past, and the nation will not forget this," Khamenei said.

However, anti-American sentiment is rife in Iran. As every year, ahead of the anniversary, the Tehran municipality displays anti-American posters and billboards along the Iranian capital's main squares and key streets.

One such billboard this year — at Tehran's Vali-e asr Square — represents a mock-up of the historic and Pulitzer Prize-winning 1945 "Raising the Flag at Iwo Jima" photo by Associated Press photographer Joe Rosenthal, one of the iconic images from World War II. Except in the billboard, the hands of the Marines are stained red from blood and instead of rocks and stones, the U.S. troops are standing on a pile of corpses.

The Coming Indo - Pakistan War

Nishan E Haider!

The Indian subcontinent — home to both India and Pakistan — remains among the most dangerous corners of the world, and continues to pose a deep threat to global stability and the current world order. Their 1,800-mile border is the only place in the world where two hostile, nuclear-armed states face off every day. And the risk of nuclear conflict has only continued to rise in the past few years, to the point that it is now a very real possibility.

India and Pakistan have fought three wars since they gained independence in 1947, including one that ended in 1971 with Pakistan losing approximately half its territory (present-day Bangladesh). Today, the disputed Line of Control that divides the disputed Kashmir region remains a particularly tense flash point. Both the Kargil crisis of 1999 and the 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament by Pakistan-supported militants brought both nations once again to the brink of war. Yet unlike earlier major wars, these two crises occurred after both India and Pakistan became nuclear-armed states. Quick and forceful diplomatic intervention played a pivotal role in preventing a larger conflict from erupting during each crisis.

These stakes are even higher, and more dangerous, today.

 

Since 2004, India has been developing a new military doctrine called Cold Start, a limited war option designed largely to deter Islamabad from sponsoring irregular attacks against New Delhi. It involves rapid conventional retaliation after any such attack, launching a number of quick armored assaults into Pakistan and rapidly securing limited objectives that hypothetically remain below Pakistan’s nuclear threshold. In accordance with this doctrine, the Indian military is meant to mobilize half a million troops in less than 72 hours.

The problem is, unlike its neighbors India and China, Pakistan has not renounced the first use of nuclear weapons. Instead, Pakistani leaders have stated that they may have to use nuclear weapons first in order to defend against a conventional attack from India. Therefore, both to counter Cold Start and help to offset India’s growing conventional superiority, Pakistan has accelerated its nuclear weapons program — and begun to field short-range, low yield tactical nuclear weapons (TNW). Some observers now judge this nuclear program to be the fastest growing in the world. Pakistan will reportedly have enough fissile material by 2020 to build more than 200 nuclear warheads — more than the United Kingdom plans to have by that time.

 

It is not simply the pace of the buildup that should cause concern. Pakistan’s arsenal of short-range tactical nuclear weapons is a game-changer in other ways. Pakistan clearly intends to use these weapons — on its own soil if necessary — to counter Cold Start’s plan for sudden Indian armored thrusts into Pakistan. The introduction of these weapons has altered the long-standing geometry between the two nuclear powers, and increases risk of escalation to a nuclear exchange in a crisis.

Beyond the risks of runaway nuclear escalation, Pakistan’s growing tactical nuclear weapons program also brings a wide array of other destabilizing characteristics to this already unstable mix: the necessity to position these short-range weapons close to the border with India, making them more vulnerable to interdiction; the need to move and disperse these weapons during a crisis, thereby signaling a nuclear threat; and the prospects of local commanders being given decentralized control of the weapons — a “use it or lose it” danger if facing an Indian armored offensive. Furthermore, large numbers of small nuclear weapons scattered at different locations increases the risk that some will fall into the hands of violent extremists. A terrorist group gaining control of a nuclear weapon remains one of the most frightening potential spinoffs of the current arms race.

 

Perhaps the most dangerous scenario that could lead to catastrophe is a replay of the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks. In November 2008, 10 terrorists launched attacks that left 166 people dead before the last of attackers were finally killed by Indian security forces almost 60 hours after the attacks began. By that time, there was strong evidence that the attackers were Pakistani and belonged to a Pakistan-supported militant group. Indian public outrage and humiliation were overwhelming. Only through the combination of diplomatic pressure from the United States and immense restraint exerted by then-Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh was an Indian retaliatory strike averted.

 

A nuclear war between India and Pakistan would dramatically alter the world as we know it. The damage from fallout and blast, the deaths of potentially millions, and the environmental devastation of even a few weapons detonations would suddenly dwarf any other global problem. There are no shortage of conflicts and crises around the world demanding the attention of policymakers in Washington and other capitals. But the stakes of a war between two of the world’s most hostile nuclear powers deserves attention before the next inevitable flare-up. Taking a series of modest steps now to try to avert the worst outcomes from this dangerous pink flamingo hiding in plain sight is an investment well worth making.

 

 

 

Syrian Dogfights!

Suriya al Kubra!

The U.S. Air Force is deploying to Turkey up to a dozen jet fighters specializing in air-to-air combat—apparently to help protect other U.S. and allied jets from Russia’s own warplanes flying over Syria.

Officially, the deployment of F-15C Eagle twin-engine fighters to Incirlik, Turkey—which the Pentagon announced late last week—is meant to “ensure the safety” of America’s NATO allies

That could mean that the single-seat F-15s and the eight air-to-air missiles they routinely carry will help the Turkish air force patrol Turkey’s border with Syria, intercepting Syrian planes and helicopters that periodically stray into Turkish territory.

But more likely, the F-15s will be escorting attack planes and bombers as they strike ISIS militants in close proximity to Syrian regime forces and the Russian warplanes that, since early October, have bombed ISIS and U.S.-backed rebels fighting the Syrian troops.

Russia’s air wing in western Syria is notable for including several Su-30 fighters that are primarily air-to-air fighters. The Su-30s’ arrival in Syria raised eyebrows, as Moscow insists its forces are only fighting ISIS, but ISIS has no aircraft of its own for the Su-30s to engage.

The F-15s the U.S. Air Force is sending to Turkey will be the first American warplanes in the region that are strictly aerial fighters. The other fighters, attack planes and bombers the Pentagon has deployed—including F-22s, F-16s, A-10s and B-1s—carry bombs and air-to-ground missiles and have focused on striking militants on the ground.

In stark contrast, the F-15s only carry air-to-air weaponry, and their pilots train exclusively for shooting down enemy warplanes. It’s worth noting that F-15Cs have never deployed to Afghanistan, nor did they participate in the U.S.-led occupation of Iraq. The war in Syria is different.

The dogfighters are part of a broader escalation of the air war over Syria. In addition to jets in Jordan, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates, and Navy and Marine planes aboard aircraft carriers, the U.S. Air Force recently added A-10 attack jets and rescue planes and helicopters at Incirlik in Turkey.

Incirlik and its growing contingent of warplanes is the key to a new northern strategy in the U.S. campaign against ISIS, yet the Pentagon has not said it will enforce a no-fly zone over northern Syria in order to protect pro-U.S. rebels from Syrian—and Russian—warplanes.

Such a zone could compel F-15s and other U.S. planes to directly confront Russian planes, even though—in theory—both air forces are attacking ISIS. Russia and the United States do make efforts to steer their jets away away from possible collisions, but otherwise do not collaborate in their separate air wars in Syria.

Instead, American and Russian pilots and air controllers keep wary eyes on each other as they conduct independent and occasionally conflicting bombing raids.

And now the United States will have fighter jets in Syria whose main job could be to watch out for Russians.

6th Fleet and Middle East Security

In the Middle East, ships on the sea can be as important boots on the ground

Whatever else was accomplished, the congressional hearings on Benghazi last month were a reminder that the administration’s Libyan expedition failed. Libya has been in turmoil since the beginning of the Libyan civil war in 2011. American airstrikes and a no-fly zone helped a mix of moderate and Islamist groups topple Moammar Qaddafi’s brutal regime in 2011, but the country is no more stable. Libya descended into civil war again in 2014, with the internationally recognized government fighting for control of the country against Ansar al-Sharia and the Islamist New General National Congress. The situation is much worse today. As of October 2015, the Islamic State (IS) has taken military control of the area around Sirte, Qaddafi’s birthplace. Sirte lies along the Libyan coastline, positioned between the major ports of Tripoli and Benghazi. The Islamic State now has full control of a strategically positioned coastal area in an unstable country that has become a proxy battlefield for Middle Eastern powers, and through which millions of refugees from Africa might be allowed to pass on their way to Europe.

The Islamic State’s model has been to foment instability through acts of extreme violence. This gives it breathing room to expand by pitting potential adversaries against each other and complicating any external intervention in its operating region. Having access to the Mediterranean greatly expands the Islamic State’s potential options for destabilization. European merchant shipping is vulnerable to attack. Small boats, crewed by IS militants armed with rocket-propelled grenades and simple missiles, could easily destroy and harass civilian trade ships traveling through the Mediterranean or sailing to or from the Suez Canal. Europe’s inability to handle the maritime humanitarian aspects of the refugee crisis has demonstrated its numerical and operational naval deficiencies. And while these refugees are not attacking European ships, Islamic State terrorists placed on refugee transports from Africa could destroy ships in harbors or infiltrate the European continent more thoroughly, exporting terror into Europe.

Thus far, Europeans have demonstrated neither the will nor the capabilities to protect maritime assets throughout the Mediterranean. Several decades ago, the U.S. would have had more than adequate capabilities to carry out these missions. American naval power was concentrated in the U.S. Navy’s Sixth Fleet. In the 1980s, the Sixth Fleet comprised two supercarriers, multiple escorting destroyers, cruisers, frigates, submarines, and an amphibious ready group with helicopters and several thousand embarked Marines. Even with the resources that the fleet continuously allocated to the Soviet threat, U.S. naval forces in the Mediterranean could have easily carried out maritime-security missions against an adversary like IS.

Post–Cold War downsizing and a de-emphasis on maritime security have shrunk the Navy to its smallest size since before World War I. Although ships have become more capable, fewer ships are responsible for a much broader area than ever before. The Sixth Fleet’s area of responsibility now extends north along the European coastline, and south down the Western African coast. It consists of a collection of four Arleigh Burke–class destroyers, shore-based maritime-patrol aircraft such as the P-3 Orion and P-8 Poseidon, and several small surface and logistics assets. The Arleigh Burke destroyers are part of the president’s “phased adaptive missile defense strategy.” They were not intended for maritime-security operations.

Despite a dearth of resources, the current U.S. Sixth Fleet could likely protect merchant shipping from IS in an uncontested operating environment. Unfortunately, the Mediterranean is now a contested operating area. Russian intervention in Syria, which added air power to existing naval power, represents a clear challenge to America and NATO in the Mediterranean. Putin has reopened Russia’s naval base at Tartus, allowing Russian surface combatants to operate in the eastern Mediterranean indefinitely. Russian air cover could extend to that region with proper tanker support, giving the Russian navy a definitive combat advantage over the thinly stretched and unsupported U.S. Sixth Fleet. The refugee crisis compounds this situation, because it presents a dual humanitarian issue and security threat. Thus, after a hiatus of almost two decades, the Mediterranean is again a contested operational zone. The reestablishment of the Sixth Fleet would bolster American capabilities in the region. It would send a clear message to the Russians and deny IS access to the inland sea. This means keeping an aircraft carrier strike group (CSG) on station in the Mediterranean. A CSG would provide U.S. commanders in Europe and the Mediterranean with the full power of the carrier air wing, along with its various destroyer, cruiser, and submarine escorts.

At present, the U.S. has ten operational supercarriers. Only three to six are deployed at any given time, due to maintenance and refit as well as refresher training that precedes deployments. Under the current resupply model, four carriers would be required to maintain a “carrier hub” (a permanent installation, ensuring a constant presence) in the Mediterranean. With the U.S.’s current naval resources and the proliferating number of threats around the world, setting that number of carriers aside for a Mediterranean hub is not feasible. Two options exist. First, the U.S. could build four more aircraft carriers. Despite the darkening international climate, however, this option is unlikely to pass Congress, and for the current U.S. administration, it is out of the question. Second, the U.S. could base a single carrier in the Mediterranean, as it currently does in in Yokosuka, Japan. This would necessitate some gaps in coverage when the carrier needed maintenance or had to be deployed elsewhere, but it would be better than having no carrier at all. The choice to place a carrier in Japan has strengthened American ties with the Japanese and bolstered regional credibility, and the same might occur in the Mediterranean.

A similar approach would produce similar benefits in the Mediterranean. A carrier-capable naval station in Haifa, Israel, would go a long way toward reestablishing the U.S. presence in the Middle East. Haifa is one of Israel’s largest ports, and home to the Israel Defense Force’s navy. A carrier based in Haifa would increase cooperation between the U.S. Navy and the IDF. The U.S. could take advantage of Israel’s extensive small-ship and special-operations capabilities. Israel would benefit from the U.S. Navy’s heavier assets. Such cooperation could easily defend merchant shipping from IS attack and confront Russian attempts at establishing sea control. It would also send a strong signal to friends in the Arab world, Iran, and Russia that the U.S. remains invested in the Middle East.

IS now poses a threat to international commerce and trade because of its position in Libya. Augmentation of the U.S.’s naval assets in the Mediterranean, including the forward deployment of a carrier strike group in the region, would strengthen NATO’s endangered southern flank. It would neutralize IS as a threat at sea, protect the extraction of natural gas in friendly eastern-Mediterranean states’ littoral waters, balance Russia’s effort to replace us as the region’s great power, and protect freedom of navigation in a vital global trade route.

Freedom Of The South China Sea

Ahoy!

After weeks of Hamlet-esque public debate, U.S. defense officials ordered Aegis destroyer USS Lassen to cruise within 12 nautical miles (nm) of Subi Reef on Oct. 27.

The reef is an undersea rock in the South China Sea that Beijing has built into an artificial island in the contested Spratly Islands. It wants it to be considered a real island, with a “territorial sea” surrounding it. That means a 12-nm zone where Chinese domestic law prevails, just like Beijing.

China claims it has the right to do so based on “historic” claims to most of the South China Sea, an area through which $5 trillion dollars worth of trade passes.

By sending a warship within that zone, the U.S. Navy signaled that the United States rejects efforts to rewrite the rules governing the sea and sky. International law clearly states the open sea is no one’s property, and such “freedom-of-navigation” voyages are standard fare elsewhere in the seven seas. And the Lassen’s cruise can’t be a one-time trip without giving China another opportunity to assert its unlawful authority.

The nice thing about the law of the sea is that it’s well written. The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), says coastal states may construct artificial islands within “exclusive economic zones” extending 200 nautical miles off their coasts. Beyond that limit, the law allows no such projects.

Now fire up Google Earth. Subi Reef lies 500 nautical miles from Hainan Island, the nearest Chinese shoreline. It sits far closer to the Philippines — only 230 nautical miles from the island of Palawan. Manila, then, has a better legal claim than Beijing by sheer geographic proximity — but even Philippine land “reclamation” there would be outside the law.

Subi Reef was a submerged atoll before Chinese engineers dredged up the sea floor to create an island, and then topped it off with an airstrip. This manufactured turf has no legal status — yet Beijing is trying to give it legal status by fiat.

An artificial island that falls within a country’s exclusive economic zone merits a concentric 500-meter safety zone. That’s next to nothing in navigation and piloting terms. If it falls beyond the zone, like Subi Reef, it merits nothing at all — much less a 12-nautical-mile territorial sea. Indeed, Lassen could have ventured as close to Subi Reef as its skipper dared while still remaining within the law.

Critics of Washington’s enforcement of international law often criticize the United States for not being party to UNCLOS. The reality is that the accord would have no force but for the U.S. Navy’s efforts to challenge and overturn excessive claims to land, sea or sky.

But methods matter. Why send the fleet to contest a complicated legal point? Why not appeal to some international court? The fact is, domestic law provides remedies for wrongful claims. The law of the sea does not. Or, more precisely, a UN tribunal exists to resolve nautical disputes, but seagoing states can refuse to accept its authority — as China has done in a case brought by the Philippines.

That leaves seafaring states mindful of maritime freedom with an unpleasant choice. They can either accept the unacceptable, namely China’s effort to rewrite international law to the detriment of maritime freedom. Or they can resort to self-help. Governments can defy unlawful claims by deploying steel, à la Lassen; by backing up their actions through diplomatic correspondence with the offending government; and by explaining their purposes to important audiences. If resolute enough, stakeholders in the free sea keep excessive claims from calcifying into international custom and — perhaps — law.

Such measures matter because of the nature of international law. Lawmaking isn’t all about drawing up solemn accords. What governments do — or refrain from doing — also helps make law. Fail to object to unlawful claims or deeds over time, and you consent. If enough governments appear to consent, the original law eventually loses its force.

Beijing is banking on it.

The cruise of the Lassen, then, was neither novel nor radical. Such operations constitute longstanding, bipartisan U.S. policy toward freedom of the sea. Indeed, Washington’s Freedom of Navigation Program dates to the first Reagan administration. It’s as old as UNCLOS itself.

So, what’s next?

If the United States is serious about keeping sea routes free, it will have to challenge China’s claims by sending ships and planes into embattled waters and skies as a matter of course, not as a one-time show of force.

By contrast, if this week’s demonstration ends up being a one-off gesture, U.S. leaders will have admitted that one government can unilaterally abridge — or conceivably abolish — laws that underpin the system of maritime trade and commerce over which America presides.

Propaganda Battle

But dispatching ships and planes is not enough. Washington must explain its reason for its challenges to unwarranted claims, and it must do so early and often. It must not let Beijing define what the U.S. Navy is doing, as it has done in the past.

Chinese officials have claimed that the United States is “militarizing” South China Sea quarrels such as the one over Subi Reef. Last month, during his state visit to Washington, President Xi Jinping pledged not to “militarize” China’s artificial islands, even though engineers have built airfields long enough to accommodate combat aircraft of all varieties.

However, Subi Reef’s airstrip will remain demilitarized — until the first warbird touches down. Then it’s militarized. China’s artificial islands are demilitarized the same way Naval Station Newport, Rhode Island, is demilitarized. The navy no longer chooses to base warships at the piers in Newport, which is now a training and education facility. But let a man-of-war show up in Narragansett Bay, and presto! Newport reverts to its militarized status.

China is no stranger to muscle-bound island policies. In 1974, for instance, Chinese forces pummeled South Vietnamese forces in the Paracels — also in the South China Sea — wresting islands from Saigon.

And the pattern has held. In 2001, a Chinese fighter pilot hot-dogging near a U.S. Navy surveillance plane caused a midair collision.

More recently, the cruiser USS Cowpens was harassed in 2013. A ship from China’s navy was responsible. And in 2014, a Chinese jet “jumped” a U.S. Navy P-8 Poseidon surveillance plane flying near Hainan. The Chinese J-11 came within 20 feet of the U.S. aircraft.

Beijing, in short, has been quick to reach for the military instrument over the years. Dispatching vessels to combat Chinese maritime claims is necessary for success in Southeast Asia, but it’s not sufficient. American military spokesmen must arm themselves with basic facts about law and history if they’re to fight — and win — the war of words that’s surely coming.

There’s an even more basic point: navies enforce the law of the sea, and always have. Who else will do it — the Maersk Line? A Carnival cruise?