Assassins

The world awoke to the importance of a 39-year-old Syrian called Taha Falaha when he fell prey to a missile fired from an American drone. Better known by his nom de guerre Abu Mohammed al-Adnani, he was the deputy leader of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (Isil) and the author of a string of blood-curdling statements.

The quiz is - do targeted killings really improve the situation?

 As such, Adnani was probably the most senior casualty that Isil has yet suffered. His death raises a crucial question in counter-terrorism: how much real difference does the elimination of a battle-hardened operative make? Will Isil be weakened by the loss of a man like Adnani, or will his sudden removal by a metaphorical bolt from the blue make no genuine impact?

 Those who have been involved in “targeted killings” have agonised over their effectiveness. Ami Ayalon, who led Israel’s Shin Bet security service from 1995 until 2000, eventually reached the emphatic conclusion that assassinations were not worth the moral price. 

And yet it seems incontestable that Osama bin Laden’s original al-Qaeda network was gravely weakened by the remorseless elimination of one figurehead after another – including bin Laden himself – at the hands of US drones and commando raids after 2009.

If “core al-Qaeda” is a shadow of its former self, then the heavy toll inflicted by Predators and Reapers is a big part of the explanation.

So why do targeted assassinations damage al-Qaeda but have little effect on the likes of Hamas and Hizbollah? The answer lies in the differing nature of these groups. Rather than being a movement firmly grounded in a society, al-Qaeda was a network, built around individuals with charisma and expertise.

 Once those kingpins were toppled by missiles falling from a clear sky, the network around them crumbled. Whatever technical or other expertise the targets had built up over the years proved extremely difficult to replace.

 So the question of whether killing Adnani will weaken Isil depends, at root, on whether the movement is closer to al-Qaeda or Hamas. If the tempo of terrorist attacks in Europe does fall in the aftermath of his killing, that will be important evidence that Isil shares the vulnerability of al-Qaeda.

NATO Blame Game

While the American foreign policy establishment rejects Donald Trump’s daily antics and belligerent behavior, his comments on NATO have attracted new criticism on the purpose and actions of the Alliance.  If claiming NATO is obsolete and questioning the integrity of Article V weren’t enough, then his startling affinity for President Putin and Russian tampering in U.S. elections have caught all eyes, dragging NATO back to the center stage to dodge rotten tomatoes and expansionist insults.

 Just like Trump rallies, the boos from the foreign policy crowd have gained momentum and have gotten louder to the point “a de facto new Cold War” is blamed on NATO and the very existence of the Alliance is questioned.

The claim is that NATO’s expansion eastward, Ukraine and Georgia’s cozying up to the West, and historically neutral Finland and Sweden’s new interest in NATO membership have enticed Russia’s aggressive behavior, culminating in the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea. The underlying claim is made that NATO has betrayed U.S. Secretary of State James Baker’s promise in 1990 to Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev that NATO would not expand an inch eastward. Finally, it is deducted that since NATO was made to combat the Soviet Union and the Soviet Union is no longer around, neither should NATO.

 The first order of business is the out of context claim of the promise made to Gorbachev. Gorbachev himself has stated that no such promise on NATO expansion was made or was even brought up. Furthermore, the promise being quoted pertained only to the eastern part of reunified Germany, which has been obeyed according to Gorbachev himself. Moreover, Russian claims of NATO encirclement hold little weight considering that until its March 2014 invasion of Crimea virtually no permanent NATO troops were stationed in the territory of former Soviet satellite states as is visually depicted in this infographic by the Atlantic Council.

Criticisms of NATO expansion treat the organization as an imperialist power that seeks to re-establish its kingdom and annex neighboring territories. Other than sounding a lot like Russia and expressed in Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova, these same criticisms fail to acknowledge the sovereign choice of nation states to choose which organizations to align themselves with in accordance with their national interests.


It should not surprise anyone that recent and aspiring members would rather be part of a democratic organization, where members have an equal say and where their territory and sovereignty are regarded as important as any other members’ under Article V, rather than to be economically and militarily coerced with overarching influence in their domestic politics by an autocratic and unstable country, as many of Russia’s allies have experienced. Eastern Europe's gravitation towards NATO does not represent NATO's ability to threaten, coerce, and annex these countries but the expression of their national interests. 

Russia’s abrasive influence, which is promulgated through state-sponsored cyber attacks, large and sudden military exercises, media disinformation campaigns, and sponsorship of far right and fascist groups in Europe have even impelled traditionally neutral countries, such as Finland and Sweden, to align themselves closer to NATO. When Russia practices nuclear strikes against Sweden, brazenly threatens Denmark with nuclear force, and identifies NATO as its chief threat in its military doctrine, all unilateral actions, it should not surprise anyone that NATO takes defensive measures like establishing a missile defense shield in Romania.  
Donald Trump’s newly inspired NATO critics rightly point out that Europe has yet to pull its weight within NATO. 

However, the acknowledgment of a Russian sphere of influence or Novorossiya and the audacious claim by Trump and Gingrich, legitimized by foreign policy critics – that the U.S. should somehow question its Article V ironclad commitment to collective defense of all allies because of defense spending or a countries proximity to Russia – undercuts the very norms that have kept Europe and the world at peace for so long. 

To insinuate that the world should accept a Russian invasion of the Baltics based on geopolitical considerations is a spitting image of the naiveté the world practiced in the lead up to World War II.  Our promise to never repeat that mistake is one of the most basic takeaways from the most devastating war the world has ever seen.  

In the heat of a chaotic and violent world, which no single entity, not even NATO, seems to have a remedy for, it is easy to point the finger at the largest military alliance for the tension that exists. However, NATO is part of the reason these regional wars and conflicts have not escalated into World Wars as they have in the past. The fact that the majority of Europe and North America are together and willing to come to the defense of each other despite differences in interests or opinions, is the underlying fabric that keeps the world’s pants on.  

NATO should not be intimidated by the argument, former National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski described as, “the argument that if we respond symmetrically to unilateral actions by the other side, it is us who is somehow provocative and precipitating a war. On the contrary. Not doing so is the most likely way of precipitating a war.” 

NATO should instead be emboldened and invigorated in its purpose and legitimacy as an alliance.

Fall Weiß

At dawn on September 1st, Luftwaffe struck at Polish airfields destroying most of the planes before they could get off the ground. With control of the skies assured wicked Wehrmacht began the systematic destruction of railroads and the few communications nodes. From the very outset the Poles mobilization plan was seriously compromised. Before the day ended, chaos reigned at Polish Army HQ.

The first phase of the campaign, fought on the frontiers was over by September 5th and the morning of the 7th found reconnaissance elements of Army Group South’s 10th Army just 36 miles southwest of Warsaw. Meanwhile, also on September 5th, vBock’s Army Group North had cut across the corridor and turned southeast for Warsaw. Units of the 3rd Army reached the banks of the River Narew on September 7th, just 25 miles north of Warsaw. The fast moving armored panzer 'Schwerpunkts' of blitzing attacks left the immobile Polish armies cut up, surrounded and out of supply.

Meanwhile the closing of the inner ring at Warsaw witnessed some tough fighting as the Polish Poznan Army, bypassed in the first week of the war, charged heading and attacked toward Warsaw to the southeast. The German 8th and 10th Armies were put to the test as they were forced to turn some divisions completely around to meet the desperate Polish assault. In the end the gallant attack fell short and by September 19th the Poznan Army surrendered some 100,000 men and Poland’s last intact army.

As this was occurring the second, more deeper envelopment led by General Heinz Guderian’s panzers took the city of Brest-Litovsk on September 17th, and continued past the city where they made contact with the 10th Army spearhead at Wlodowa 30 miles to the south.

The war, for all practical purposes was over by September 17th. Lvov surrendered on the 19th. Warsaw held out until September 27th, gave up the ghost and the last organized resistance ended October 6th with the surrender of 17,000 Polish soldiers at Kock.

The campaign had lasted less than two months and ended in the destruction of the Polish Army and the fourth partition of Poland. German losses were surprisingly heavy considering the brevity of the campaign.

Deutsch casualties total some 48,000 of which 16,000 were killed. Fully one quarter of the panzers the German committed to battle were lost to Polish anti-panzer guns.  Luftwaffe was forced to trash  550 aircraft.

It was not a cheap victory by any means but it did confirm to the generals of  Wehrmacht that the military machine that they had built was indeed the best in the world and worthy of their confidence.

Reaction around the world on 1 Sept 1939?

France - mobilized her military and demanded Deutschland withdraw from Poland.

Great Britain - mobilized her army and RAF (the Navy was mobilized the day before) and demanded Germany withdraw from Poland.

Italy - Announced no military plans or initiatives.

Russia - warned concern for civilian population of Russian descent and fear of Polish bandits would warrant armed intervention. She also mobilized her military.

Great Satan - Demanded a halt of indescriminate bombing of towns and civilians.

Finland, Norway, Sweden and the Swiss - announced neutrality

Deutschland - "Determined to eliminate insecurity and perpetual civil war from the borders of the Reich"

Poland - appealed to Great Britain and France to intervene in honour of the Mutual Assistance Treaty of 1939.

1 September is the day an old world order was violently overturned, chock full of lessons, promises and harbingers that echo still today.

Syria Stuck

Have you ever wondered why the Syrian conflict has dragged on for so long?

At the core of the struggle is that local Syrian actors have so far been unable and unwilling to agree on an acceptable and sustainable way to end their conflict.

And as attested to by the recent back-and-forth struggle over the fate of Aleppo -- Syria’s second largest city -- none of those actors seem powerful enough to best the others. None can restore the old order, and none can create a new order -- not even with the help of outside powers. 

So what about those outside powers?   

There’s a tendency to blame the United States in the main for failing to act more assertively. But there are any number of other participants -- Russia, Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia -- who instead of showing a willingness to work together, show little beyond narrow self-interest when it comes to addressing the two central questions that define the Syrian civil war: what to do about Bashar Assad, and how to deal with the Islamic State.

Civil wars usually end in one of a few well-defined ways: one party gains a decisive advantage; all sides exhaust themselves and are open to compromise; or outside powers intercede to tip the balance. 

None of these outcomes is possible in Syria right now, and the outside powers only seem to complicate matters. All have different agendas, and some of those agendas align better with the others than with Washington’s priorities. Indeed, the administration of President Barack Obama seems like the odd man out -- committed to the defeat of ISIS and to a vision of Syria that does not appeal to its counterparts. 

 Without an unlikely congruence among the outside actors, the conflict will go on, to America’s disadvantage.

Russia is perhaps the most dynamic of the outside players. President Vladimir Putin’s military intervention, launched in September 2015, clearly reflects his desire to enhance Russia’s influence and leverage on the international stage while blocking American wishes and securing the Assad regime’s place in whatever arrangements are to outline the new Syria.   

Russia’s role in the siege of Aleppo makes it pretty clear that Moscow is both supporting the Assad regime’s efforts to regain control over the city and at the same time trying to persuade the Americans that in exchange for restraining Assad, Washington should align with Moscow in striking radical Islamist groups such as Fatah al-Sham -- formerly Jabhat al-Nusra -- long a Russian core priority.   

Moscow is also backing Kurdish forces in the struggle for Aleppo -- an indication that Moscow understands that the Kurds may well expand their territorial ambitions in northern Syria. In short, Russia has a game plan for Syria, and it’s not one that envisions a unified country under the control of the Sunni majority without Assad or at least an Alawite successor.

Iran seems even more determined to oppose any solution that doesn’t involve a key role for Assad’s regime. Tehran laid the groundwork for Assad’s forces to move on Aleppo by deploying units of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and mobilizing Shiite militias.

For now, Russian and Iranian goals have aligned to play a major role in keeping Assad in power. That Russia is now flying bombing runs against Assad's opponents from Iranian airbases drives home that point. We don’t know whether Tehran believes a military victory for Assad in Aleppo and beyond is possible. But what is evident is that Iran relies on the presence of a friendly Alawite regime in Syria, and views it as vital to strategic Iranian priorities: to the need to maintain its ties to Lebanon; not to see its window into the Arab-Israeli conflict closed; and to avoid encirclement by its Sunnis neighbors. Tehran is even more set on keeping Assad in power over part of Syria than is Moscow.

Turkey also has clear goals in Syria that depart from America’s. And the recent abortive coup will not make a U.S.-Turkish alignment any easier. The coup attempt will likely undermine the military’s readiness and preparedness and will discourage any major military involvement  against Assad or ISIS. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is focused on limiting Kurdish gains both at home and in Syria. And tensions with Washington over the presence in Pennsylvania of Mr. Erdogan’s archenemy, Fethullah Gulen, and the Obama administration’s support for the Syrian Kurds, will continue. Putin is already moving closer to Iran. Now, the United States should expect little help from Turkey in Syria -- and potentially a lot of trouble.

Saudi Arabia clearly is focused more on trying to weaken Assad rather than striking at ISIS. But Riyadh seems much more concerned with checking Iranian influence closer to home in Yemen than in making major contributions to the fight in Syria. The Saudis argue of course that getting rid of Assad would in fact be a blow to Tehran’s regional influence and reach. But bogged down in their campaign against the Houthis, there’s little the Saudis are prepared to do, outside of funneling money and weapons to Islamist groups battling Assad. Many of those groups are only one step removed from ISIS in their radical aims. Right now, given the numbers of civilians that Riyadh has killed in their airstrikes, Saudi Arabia is more concerned about its image in Yemen than in Syria.  

All of this leaves the United States isolated and alone. Washington’s efforts with Russia, Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia have not paid off in Syria yet.

Washington’s policy is focused on defeating ISIS and al-Nusra in Syria and trying as best it can to work with Moscow to find ways to tamp down the violence and create a stable political transition. Focusing primarily on an anti-ISIS agenda seems to be paying off. But surely Washington would also like to see Assad go. Indeed, as a recent interview I did with the NSC’s top Middle East hand Robert Malley suggests, the administration knows that without a solution to the Assad problem, defeating ISIS and creating anything like a stable state in Syria won’t be possible. Neither Russia nor Iran is willing to do that. 

Nor is the administration -- worried about getting too heavily involved in Syria militarily, confronting Russia, and mucking up the Iranian nuclear accord -- willing to play tough with Tehran and Moscow in order to induce a change in their policy. In other words, Washington won’t place direct U.S. military pressure on Assad or create no-fly zones to limit Russian and Syrian airstrikes.

This leaves the administration betwixt and between a number of powers that are willing to risk much in defense of their interests. More than likely, come January 2017, neither the Assad nor the ISIS files will be closed. Syria will still be a mess, and the next administration will be wrestling with powers in the country that it can neither contain nor influence.

New Masters of Revolutionary Warfare?

Khalifa!

Is the multi nom d'guerre'd ISIS, ISIL, IS, Caliphate crafting a revolution in warfare?

Two years after the fall of Iraq’s second largest city to the Islamic State (also known as ISIS, ISIL, and Daesh), there is still an alarming dissensus concerning their nature, strategy, and goals. Is it a nihilistic terrorist group, an apocalyptic death cult, an insurgency, a terrorist army, a proto-state, or some hybrid of these? Does the group really adopt Islamic principles, or is it a Sunni neo-Ba’athist restoration movement with genocidal proclivities? The confusion is not limited to academics, whose writings about the Islamic State are insightful yet rarely stray from singular research areas like ideology, economics, terrorism, religion, or regional studies. Even the US Special Forces commander tasked with countering the group in late 2014 admitted in a candid moment that he and his command did not understand “this movement.”

To examine the Islamic State’s adaptation of its own revolutionary war doctrine, a review of its original prescriptions is in order. The reasonable definition of People’s War: a form of irregular war that utilizes “peasant armies that are drawn upon for an integrated and protracted politico-military phase strategy of eventual state takeover. A shadow or proto-state is created in parallel to the pre-existing one being targeted for elimination.”

Mao, the first proponent and theorist of this type of warfare, believed that victory was only possible once the population is mobilized to support the guerillas, whose goal is to attack the enemy when advantaged and to shy away from conflict when not. The part time fighters and their supporters are to be indoctrinated in the political philosophy of the movement to motivate them to fight and persevere through a protracted struggle. The campaign progresses through three phases of blended guerilla activities and increasing conventional strength: the building/preservation phase, the expansion phase, and the decisive phase. These periods are fluid and conditions vary from location to location, usually dependent on enemy strength and efforts. The keys to success are developing experienced and disciplined soldiers that bond well with a supportive population, the utilization of a strong influence campaign with propaganda units at the lowest levels, and an integrated set of political goals that are synchronized with military efforts at all levels.

Revolutionary war is more than military action, since those who choose to utilize it blend “military, political, economic, social, and psychological” efforts to achieve their goals. The military objectives are two fold; a slow defeat of the government’s army as well as the use of terror to cripple the existing social organization, which before the conflict served to “restrict or minimize violence among the people.”

Once the violence reaches a certain level, these barriers collapse. Crenshaw noted in her study of revolutionary warfare in Algeria that terrorism almost always acts as a “principal instrument” in this form of political violence. This instrument is “not aimed, as war is, at the annihilation of the enemy’s coercive forces, but seeks to wound him politically and psychologically.” Finally, the movement taxes the population under its influence in order to fund operations and derive legitimacy for the shadow state.

The initial political agenda of the Islamic State movement was ambitious, with a goal of growing from just a few foreign fighters and local hosts to domination of the Iraqi resistance to the occupation. Zarqawi’s group had valuable experience in clandestine operations but had to outpace the reorganizing Ba’athists, rival Islamists, and a fledgling Iraqi government while battling a very capable foreign military coalition. Furthermore, unlike other groups who had various degrees of interest in power sharing with the national government, Zarqawi’s group maintained the revolutionary goal of replacing it with a Salafi influenced state run according to the “prophetic method.”

To accomplish this, the Islamic State’s political efforts were five-fold: it had to frustrate and weaken the growing power of the government and its security forces, recruit from rival resistance groups, foster an exaggerated perception of Sunni alienation, provoke an overreaction from Shia militias, and convince the United States to withdraw from Iraq.

Zarqawi’s small group began its military campaign with a strong notion of neutralizing the tremendous technological capabilities of the United States as observed first hand in Afghanistan in late 2001.[30] Ceding the day to day struggle (sniping and road side bombs) to local insurgent groups, Zarqawi’s group focused on high visibility attacks against symbolic targets using ‘precision guided’ suicide bombers and special operations that produced media attention and popularity among resistance sympathizers.[31] The end result of these actions would discredit the state’s authority and legitimacy, and divide elements of the population against each other.

This type of military strategy is summarized in the book Management of Strategy, written by al Qaeda strategist Abu Bakr Naji, and propagates a controversial and violent method for destroying both the government and society before starting anew.[32] Interestingly, the Islamic State media disputes the notion that this book was influential, writing

It is important to note that contrary to Western media claims, this book never defined the methodology of the mujahidin. The top Islamic State leadership – including Shaykh Abu Musab al Zarqawi – did not recommend al Suri’s book. As for the concise but beneficial 100 page book titled Management of Savagery by an unknown author who only went by the penname Abu Bakr Naji, then when Shaykh al Zarqawi read this book he commented, “it is as if the author knows what I’m planning.” Note: Although Naji’s book describes very precisely the overall strategy of the mujahidin, Naji fell into some errors in his discussions on issues related to the takfir of parties who forcefully resist the Shariah and its laws.

The expertise of jihadists from previous conflicts mixed with one of professional soldiers and intelligence professionals created a potent special operations capability in one other area: assassinations.[35] According to Lia, one al Suri Afghan lecture was titled: “terrorism is a religious duty, and assassination is a Prophetic tradition.”[36] The Islamic State created assassination brigades as early as 2004, in order to target Shia militias whose anti-Sunni activities often drove members to the movement.[37] Special brigades began to proliferate, targeting Iraqi Islamic Party (Muslim Brotherhood) members, communists, Iraqi politicians, judges, municipal employees, senior defense and police officials, poll workers, female spies, and later Sunni Awakening council leaders.

Eliminating enemies creates opportunities for access to the population, and the Islamic State was a frequent experimenter and innovator in the creation and structure of its influence campaign. While Abdullah Azzam’s use of propaganda to mobilize the Sunni ummah to come and fight in Afghanistan during the Soviet era was an inspiration, the Islamic State built on this precedent to integrate all of the lines of effort together: political, social, military, and economic. Ingram divided the strategic logic of the Islamic State’s media strategy into two distinct categories: one pragmatic and the other perceptual. Islamic State’s pragmatic appeals focused on stability, security, and economic means; its perceptual appeals highlight sectarian and ethnic divides while championing the group as the only viable protector of Sunni Muslims from a variety of threats.

An objective review of the evolution of the Islamic State makes it clear that its leaders have honed and largely perfected the synchronization and execution of Mao’s critical elements of revolutionary warfare. 

Mao’s army, once the Japanese invaders were gone, waged a smart campaign against a weak and corrupt regime before achieving success. The Vietnamese communists, facing a much tougher foe, eventually won unification through the use of a largely conventional invasion. 

In this case study, the Islamic State established a new sovereignty in large parts of two adjoining states within a 12-month period against a state supported by a regional power and a global hegemon.

Saudi Schizophrenia

Hijaz!

The original Women Hating Whahabi Kingdom of Arabia is as much as a hot mess as Pakistan.

Actually, way more.

Check it...

The idea has become a commonplace: that Saudi Arabia’s export of the rigid, bigoted, patriarchal, fundamentalist strain of Islam known as Wahhabism has fueled global extremism and contributed to terrorism. As the Islamic State projects its menacing calls for violence into the West, directing or inspiring terrorist attacks in country after country, an old debate over Saudi influence on Islam has taken on new relevance.

In the realm of extremist Islam, the Saudis are “both the arsonists and the firefighters,” said William McCants, a Brookings Institution scholar. “They promote a very toxic form of Islam that draws sharp lines between a small number of true believers and everyone else, Muslim and non-Muslim,” he said, providing ideological fodder for violent jihadists.

Yet at the same time, “they’re our partners in counterterrorism,” said Mr. McCants, one of three dozen academics, government officials and experts on Islam from multiple countries interviewed for this article.

The reach of the Saudis has been stunning, touching nearly every country with a Muslim population, from the Gothenburg Mosque in Sweden to the King Faisal Mosque in Chad, from the King Fahad Mosque in Los Angeles to the Seoul Central Mosque in South Korea.

Not to mention places like, oh you know, Boston, Chattanooga and Riverside Cali.

Support has come from the Saudi government; the royal family; Saudi charities; and Saudi-sponsored organizations including the World Muslim League, the World Assembly of Muslim Youth and the International Islamic Relief Organization, providing the hardware of impressive edifices and the software of preaching and teaching.

And for a small minority in many countries, the exclusionary Saudi version of Sunni Islam, with its denigration of Jews and Christians, as well as of Muslims of Shiite, Sufi and other traditions, may have made some people vulnerable to the lure of Al Qaeda, the Islamic State and other violent jihadist groups.

Exhibit A may be Saudi Arabia itself, which produced not only Osama bin Laden, but also 15 of the 19 hijackers of Sept. 11, 2001; sent more suicide bombers than any other country to Iraq after the 2003 invasion; and has supplied more foreign fighters to the Islamic State, 2,500, than any country other than Tunisia.

Saudi authorities had executed 47 people in a single day on terrorism charges, 45 of them Saudi citizens. These people studied Islam for 10 or 15 years in Saudi Arabia. Is there a problem with the educational system?

When al Qaeda attacks in the kingdom awoke the monarchy to the danger it faced from militancy, Saudi Arabia has acted more aggressively to curtail preachers who call for violence, cut off terrorist financing and cooperate with Western intelligence to foil terrorist plots. 

From 2004 to 2012, 3,500 imams were fired for refusing to renounce extremist views, and another 20,000 went through retraining, according to the Ministry of Islamic Affairs — though the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom expressed skepticism that the training was really “instilling tolerance.”

AWOL

Ello Ebberdobby!

Yours truly has been busier than a one legged fellow at an assets kicking contest - so all apologies for being Absent W/Out Leave!

Be back up with full time fully crunkness here directly