The Inevitable War

Is China just doing ye olde autocratic bayonet probing - or is she hot for a conflict?

On July 12 an international tribunal at The Hague found that China possessed neither an historic claim over disputed islands in the South China Sea nor a legal basis for sovereign claims over its waters. On the same day Beijing landed civilian aircraft on two of the three reefs—Subi and Mischief—that China has turned into armed islands. This gives China three working runways in the disputed Spratly Islands the nearest of which is 600 miles from China.

Notwithstanding Chinese President Xi Jinping’s 2015 statement to 44 that the manmade islands would not be militarized, continued construction of hardened hangars demonstrates Beijing’s intent to deploy combat aircraft to the islands. The CSIS Asia Maritime Transparency website shows what the islands will look like when People’s Liberation Army Air Force fighter aircraft arrive.

The administration’s response to the international court’s decision wholly ignored the military character of China’s actions to date in the South China Sea: “The decision today by the Tribunal in the Philippines-China arbitration is an important contribution,” said State Department spokesman Rear Admiral John Kirby, (USN, ret.), “to the shared goal of a peaceful resolution to disputes in the South China Sea.” RADM Kirby is right that China prefers a peaceful resolution to the islands dispute. Beijing would like to resolve the matter by threats, rather than the use of force. This is not a solution that the U.S. government should embrace. Still, Kirby’s statement is entirely consistent with long-standing U.S. policy.

Since 40's administration U.S. policy has sought to make China a stakeholder in the liberal international order. This means that China would have a stake in such characteristics of the current system as freedom of navigation in international waters, respect for international agreements it had ratified, the rule of law, as well as for other states’ sovereignty—to name a few. To encourage Chinese rulers to identify their nation’s own interest with that of the international order, senior-level officials from both countries have been meeting together since the Nixon administration. With U.S. support China joined the World Trade Organization in 2001.

 In 2016 the People’s Liberation Army Navy participated for the second time in the large naval exercise that the U.S. conducts with other Pacific Rim states. The list of U.S. overtures is a long one.

No joyful music has followed them. Quite the opposite. Encapsulating China’s view of its relations with other states, Beijing’s foreign minister at the time, Yang Jiechi, told other Asian senior officials at a 2010 meeting in Hanoi when the subject of China’s claims in the South China Sea was raised that, “China is a big country and other countries are small countries, and that’s a fact.”

China’s brand of exceptionalism reinforces Minister Yang’s blunt assertion that might makes right. The qualification “with Chinese characteristics” has become a commonplace in international lingo. The press and scholarly publications have reported on ‘a global order with Chinese characteristics.’ Ditto foreign aid, environmental law, nuclear deals, and commercial practices. The list of accepted international practices “with Chinese characteristics” is long, showing that China’s exceptionalism lies neither in adherence to principle, nor to law, nor accepted norms of international behavior, but rather in deflection from these.

U.S. policy toward China has failed spectacularly. China’s actions show that it sees us as a strategic competitor. We have chosen to see China as a large market that can be cajoled into joining us as a defender of international security and economic stability. U.S. policy makers hoped that the large volume of trade between China and the U.S. and the accompanying economic progress in the former would remold Chinese rulers to look, think, and act more like us. The evidence does not support this roseate hope.

The next U.S. administration needs to understand that our fate as a great power is inseparable from America’s continued role as a great Pacific power. This does not mean aggressive policies or military confrontation. It does mean active diplomacy with the nations on China’s periphery who fear its hegemony. It means credible combat power to foreshorten China’s mis-behavior and militarized ambitions, including consistent, reliable, and frequent U.S. Navy freedom of navigation operations in the international waters of the South China Sea. No less important, it means increasing the U.S. naval advantage over China by building substantially more attack submarines, and exploiting this asymmetric advantage by deploying them to the South and East China Seas.

For now an expression coined during the current U.S. administration, “strategic patience,” governs Washington’s policy toward China. On Beijing’s sometimes longer-range strategic horizon are more artificial islands, more confrontations with neighbors in the South and East China Seas, larger and more technologically capable fleets, and a not unfounded hope that U.S. seapower will continue its slow but steady retreat. Bound by enormous trade flows the leaders of both states are willing to let the clock keep ticking.

But international relations are less predictable than precision watches. Over the weekend of August 6-7, Beijing sent 18 Chinese maritime law enforcement ships and 350 fishing boats into the contiguous zone around the Senkaku Islands that Tokyo claims. Another 100 fishing boats are just outside this zone, and well within Japan’s Exclusive Economic Zone.

China does not respect international law. Japan and the U.S. do. American policy has done nothing to resolve this fundamental difference, and the possibility increases daily that the growing weight of opposed interests could lead to accidents or actual hostilities. The U.S. should change its policy toward China so that instead of persuading its leaders to be more like us, our objective is to convince China through diplomacy, military strength, and increased presence, that a conflict with us is not in their interest.

Iran In South America

Three years ago, as the Administration began to pave the way for a rapprochement with Iran, the State Department offered soothing reassurances to Congress that the Iranian regime’s influence in the Western Hemisphere was "waning"—reporting that Tehran's efforts in the region had been “undermined” by robust “sanctions” that had been imposed on the Islamic Republic. 

This assessment appears to have been premature at best, wishful thinking at worst. 

This Sunday, Iran’s Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif embarked on a six-nation tour in seemingly far away Latin America “to expand political and economic relations between the two sides”. But, is it so far away given Iran's stated aspirations which seem to be increasingly backed by words and deeds? Just as the foreign minister was arriving in Havana, back home the regime was announcing the establishment of the Shiite Liberation Army under the command of Major General Qasem Soleimani of the Quds Force. Though it's likely the force will be deployed largely in the Arab territories, the announcement took pains to note that Iran was prepared to deploy its forces to distant lands, “Anywhere where there is a fight, we organize and supply the army from the people of these areas.”  

Indeed, things appear to be moving along. Last month, the English language edition of Asharq Al-Awsat reported on Iranian intelligence and military efforts to recruit young men in Peru, train them in Iran, and return them to Peru. A Hezbollah movement has now been established in the country. 

According to the same report, Peruvian authorities recently arrested several suspects with links to Hezbollah who were “trying to enter the country to execute suspected operations.” This activity was forewarned earlier in March when Admiral Kurt Tidd of the US Southern Command reminded Congress of the symbiotic relationship that exists between Iran and its principal terrorist surrogate, remarking that Hezbollah maintains a substantial network of supporters and sympathizers throughout the hemisphere with the capacity to support and launch terrorist attacks.  

The number of Iranian supported operatives in the hemisphere is unknown. However, a 2012 report by the Clarion Project cited a former Iranian official with knowledge of the country’s terror network who claimed that “more than 40,000 of the regime’s security, intelligence and propaganda forces” have been successfully placed in the region. According to another source cited in the article, the Quds Force has established command and control centers in two Latin American countries.

On another front, in April, Iran’s Army Commander Major General Ataollah Salehi announced his country intends to deploy warships to the Americas. Speaking at a ceremony in Bandar Abbas to welcome Iran’s 38^th fleet, Salehi announced: "We intend to take a longer stride in marine voyages and even go towards friendly states in Latin America.” Iran, he added, intends to conduct joint operations with friends in the region and is capable of establishing a “mighty presence” there. 

Salehi cautioned patience noting that this year's priority was to equip Iran’s navy with state-of-the-art weapons and equipment—an effort, no doubt, that will be aided by the lifting of sanctions, unfreezing of assets, and $2 billion in US cash payments into the mullah's coffers. 

One can safely assume Iran’s warships will soon be ready to sail from the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Mexico and beyond.

The Sirens Of Isolation

Many Americans would like to detach themselves from a violent, chaotic Middle East. So would many Israelis, for that matter.

Yet, tuning out and turning off is not a realistic option for the indispensable nation

The Eastern Mediterranean is in extraordinary flux. Many of the transformations under way are negative. Iran’s policy of nuclear hedging is giving impetus to the spread of nuclear weapons to multiple countries. ISIS achieved substantial economic and political power in Iraq and Syria and retains formidable ability to conduct and inspire terrorism abroad, despite its recent loss of ground in Iraq. Islamist extremist groups are fighting across the Middle East to upend political institutions, challenging the nation-state as such. The Syrian refugee crisis is aggravating the region’s epidemic of Arab political instability and straining European immigration policies.

The desire to disengage from the Middle East is an especially strong element of the general American isolationist impulse. After decades of leading the democratic world in the Cold War and in multiple wars since 9/11, many Americans would like relief from world affairs. They would prefer to have nothing to do with foreign wars, with lands that breed jihadists, stagnate in corruption, or have populations that reject modernity or hate the United States. The preference is easy to understand, but it’s not realistic. 

The issue is not whether isolationism is desirable; it is whether it’s possible. To put the question more precisely: Can Americans preserve their security, prosperity, and civil liberties without maintaining an active role in the world — and specifically in the Middle East and its environs? The answer is no. As Americans try to “pivot” away from the region’s problems, those problems, history teaches us, will follow after them and likely worsen.

Why is isolation not an option? The region’s wealth will necessarily influence interests around the world; and so will its pathologies. The West cannot be indifferent to the conquest of a country with large oil reserves (and therefore large revenues), which helps explain why 41 organized a war to free Kuwait from Iraqi forces in 1991. Imagine if ISIS or al-Qaeda were to take power in Saudi Arabia and control its bank accounts; no amount of “homeland security” could then neutralize the resulting terrorist danger. 

Similarly, even though America and other Western countries tried to stay out of Syria’s civil war, the conflict’s ill effects reached them in the form of terrorist murders and millions of refugees. Neither the Middle East nor any other large region can be quarantined. Nuclear or biological weapons developed there could strike anywhere, and cyber attacks launched from there could infect computers anywhere. Isolation is impossible in the world of Internet, easy travel, and miniature means of mass destruction. 

Then there’s the question of who will protect freedom of navigation on the seas. Since the sun set on the British Empire, the United States has been instrumental in keeping the world’s seas open to commerce. No other country or alliance is ready and able to substitute. Without open sea lines of communication, much of the world’s trade would cease to flow. If, in hopes of disengaging from the Middle East or cutting its defense budget, the United States were to relinquish this essential role, the harm to the global economy, including America’s economy, would be catastrophic. In other words, disengagement from the Middle East would not isolate the United States; it would simply forfeit America’s ability to shape events. 

This is not an argument for any particular kind of engagement — it does not, for example, militate for U.S. ground troops to be deployed to Syria. 

But it is an argument against believing that non-intervention would spare America from paying a price for what happens in the region.

Invasion Dress Rehearsal

Tokyo delivered a humiliating public protest to Beijing for the intrusion of a vast Chinese “fishing fleet” escorted by more than a dozen coast guard and other law-enforcement vessels in or near waters of the disputed Senkaku islands. 

Was the latest intrusion a dress rehearsal for war? 

The various scenarios for war in the East China Sea, and possibly in the South China Sea, usually fall into two main categories. There is the “accidental” fight scenario. A Chinese destroyer’s radar locks onto a Japanese warship. The Japanese captain fires back in self-defense and the incident spirals out of control.

That is one scenario. Another, possibly more realistic, is the “swarm” scenario: Several hundred “fishing boats” sail from ports in Zhejiang province for the Senkaku, where they overwhelm the Japanese Coast Guard by their sheer numbers. 

This time, the fishing boats land some 200 or so commandoes disguised as fishermen or “settlers.” The Senkakus are not garrisoned by Japanese troops, so no shots are fired. The Chinese side says it is not using force, merely taking possession of what it claims to be its sovereign territory.

Tokyo feels obliged to respond, although the Chinese landing force is too large to dislodge by ordinary policing methods, such as those that have been used in the past when a handful of activists – Chinese and Japanese – tried to land on the disputed islands and plant their flags. 

That would put Japan in the position of being the first party to fire shots, possibly landing elements of the Western Infantry Regiment, which was created and trained specifically to recapture islands. Meanwhile, Tokyo hurriedly consults with Washington seeking assurance that it will honor its commitments to defend Japan.

On more than one occasion, including in remarks from President Barack Obama himself, the United States has stated that the Senkaku come under the provisions of the joint security treaty as they are administered by Japan.

In the most recent incident, the estimated 230 Chinese fishing vessels escorted by Chinese law enforcement vessels made no effort to land anyone, though the Japanese Coast Guard shadowing the vessels kept a sharp eye out for any sign of it. 

China boasts the world’s largest fishing fleet, but it is a matter of debate among security analysts as to extent to which China’s fishing fleet constitutes a paramilitary force, or as they sometimes say, a “maritime militia.” Somehow, a swarm of Chinese Fishing boats always seem to materialize on cue in disputes in the East and South China Sea. 

The use of fishing boats, not to mention the nominally civilian coast guard, tends to blur the distinctions between what is civilian and what is military. In any conflict, the Japan and the U.S. would have to deal with ostensibly civilian boats that could flood the battlefield turning it into a confusing melee.

“China’s fishing fleet is being encouraged to fish in disputed waters . . . and are being encouraged to do so for geopolitical as well as commercial reasons,” says Alan Duport, a security analyst at the University of New South Wales. 

Swarm tactics have been used often in the South China Sea. Hundreds of boats converged in the Gulf of Tonkin in 2014 in the dispute over the oil-drilling rig that the Chinese erected in Vietnam’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).

Assassins

The world awoke to the importance of a 39-year-old Syrian called Taha Falaha when he fell prey to a missile fired from an American drone. Better known by his nom de guerre Abu Mohammed al-Adnani, he was the deputy leader of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (Isil) and the author of a string of blood-curdling statements.

The quiz is - do targeted killings really improve the situation?

 As such, Adnani was probably the most senior casualty that Isil has yet suffered. His death raises a crucial question in counter-terrorism: how much real difference does the elimination of a battle-hardened operative make? Will Isil be weakened by the loss of a man like Adnani, or will his sudden removal by a metaphorical bolt from the blue make no genuine impact?

 Those who have been involved in “targeted killings” have agonised over their effectiveness. Ami Ayalon, who led Israel’s Shin Bet security service from 1995 until 2000, eventually reached the emphatic conclusion that assassinations were not worth the moral price. 

And yet it seems incontestable that Osama bin Laden’s original al-Qaeda network was gravely weakened by the remorseless elimination of one figurehead after another – including bin Laden himself – at the hands of US drones and commando raids after 2009.

If “core al-Qaeda” is a shadow of its former self, then the heavy toll inflicted by Predators and Reapers is a big part of the explanation.

So why do targeted assassinations damage al-Qaeda but have little effect on the likes of Hamas and Hizbollah? The answer lies in the differing nature of these groups. Rather than being a movement firmly grounded in a society, al-Qaeda was a network, built around individuals with charisma and expertise.

 Once those kingpins were toppled by missiles falling from a clear sky, the network around them crumbled. Whatever technical or other expertise the targets had built up over the years proved extremely difficult to replace.

 So the question of whether killing Adnani will weaken Isil depends, at root, on whether the movement is closer to al-Qaeda or Hamas. If the tempo of terrorist attacks in Europe does fall in the aftermath of his killing, that will be important evidence that Isil shares the vulnerability of al-Qaeda.

NATO Blame Game

While the American foreign policy establishment rejects Donald Trump’s daily antics and belligerent behavior, his comments on NATO have attracted new criticism on the purpose and actions of the Alliance.  If claiming NATO is obsolete and questioning the integrity of Article V weren’t enough, then his startling affinity for President Putin and Russian tampering in U.S. elections have caught all eyes, dragging NATO back to the center stage to dodge rotten tomatoes and expansionist insults.

 Just like Trump rallies, the boos from the foreign policy crowd have gained momentum and have gotten louder to the point “a de facto new Cold War” is blamed on NATO and the very existence of the Alliance is questioned.

The claim is that NATO’s expansion eastward, Ukraine and Georgia’s cozying up to the West, and historically neutral Finland and Sweden’s new interest in NATO membership have enticed Russia’s aggressive behavior, culminating in the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea. The underlying claim is made that NATO has betrayed U.S. Secretary of State James Baker’s promise in 1990 to Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev that NATO would not expand an inch eastward. Finally, it is deducted that since NATO was made to combat the Soviet Union and the Soviet Union is no longer around, neither should NATO.

 The first order of business is the out of context claim of the promise made to Gorbachev. Gorbachev himself has stated that no such promise on NATO expansion was made or was even brought up. Furthermore, the promise being quoted pertained only to the eastern part of reunified Germany, which has been obeyed according to Gorbachev himself. Moreover, Russian claims of NATO encirclement hold little weight considering that until its March 2014 invasion of Crimea virtually no permanent NATO troops were stationed in the territory of former Soviet satellite states as is visually depicted in this infographic by the Atlantic Council.

Criticisms of NATO expansion treat the organization as an imperialist power that seeks to re-establish its kingdom and annex neighboring territories. Other than sounding a lot like Russia and expressed in Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova, these same criticisms fail to acknowledge the sovereign choice of nation states to choose which organizations to align themselves with in accordance with their national interests.


It should not surprise anyone that recent and aspiring members would rather be part of a democratic organization, where members have an equal say and where their territory and sovereignty are regarded as important as any other members’ under Article V, rather than to be economically and militarily coerced with overarching influence in their domestic politics by an autocratic and unstable country, as many of Russia’s allies have experienced. Eastern Europe's gravitation towards NATO does not represent NATO's ability to threaten, coerce, and annex these countries but the expression of their national interests. 

Russia’s abrasive influence, which is promulgated through state-sponsored cyber attacks, large and sudden military exercises, media disinformation campaigns, and sponsorship of far right and fascist groups in Europe have even impelled traditionally neutral countries, such as Finland and Sweden, to align themselves closer to NATO. When Russia practices nuclear strikes against Sweden, brazenly threatens Denmark with nuclear force, and identifies NATO as its chief threat in its military doctrine, all unilateral actions, it should not surprise anyone that NATO takes defensive measures like establishing a missile defense shield in Romania.  
Donald Trump’s newly inspired NATO critics rightly point out that Europe has yet to pull its weight within NATO. 

However, the acknowledgment of a Russian sphere of influence or Novorossiya and the audacious claim by Trump and Gingrich, legitimized by foreign policy critics – that the U.S. should somehow question its Article V ironclad commitment to collective defense of all allies because of defense spending or a countries proximity to Russia – undercuts the very norms that have kept Europe and the world at peace for so long. 

To insinuate that the world should accept a Russian invasion of the Baltics based on geopolitical considerations is a spitting image of the naiveté the world practiced in the lead up to World War II.  Our promise to never repeat that mistake is one of the most basic takeaways from the most devastating war the world has ever seen.  

In the heat of a chaotic and violent world, which no single entity, not even NATO, seems to have a remedy for, it is easy to point the finger at the largest military alliance for the tension that exists. However, NATO is part of the reason these regional wars and conflicts have not escalated into World Wars as they have in the past. The fact that the majority of Europe and North America are together and willing to come to the defense of each other despite differences in interests or opinions, is the underlying fabric that keeps the world’s pants on.  

NATO should not be intimidated by the argument, former National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski described as, “the argument that if we respond symmetrically to unilateral actions by the other side, it is us who is somehow provocative and precipitating a war. On the contrary. Not doing so is the most likely way of precipitating a war.” 

NATO should instead be emboldened and invigorated in its purpose and legitimacy as an alliance.

Fall Weiß

At dawn on September 1st, Luftwaffe struck at Polish airfields destroying most of the planes before they could get off the ground. With control of the skies assured wicked Wehrmacht began the systematic destruction of railroads and the few communications nodes. From the very outset the Poles mobilization plan was seriously compromised. Before the day ended, chaos reigned at Polish Army HQ.

The first phase of the campaign, fought on the frontiers was over by September 5th and the morning of the 7th found reconnaissance elements of Army Group South’s 10th Army just 36 miles southwest of Warsaw. Meanwhile, also on September 5th, vBock’s Army Group North had cut across the corridor and turned southeast for Warsaw. Units of the 3rd Army reached the banks of the River Narew on September 7th, just 25 miles north of Warsaw. The fast moving armored panzer 'Schwerpunkts' of blitzing attacks left the immobile Polish armies cut up, surrounded and out of supply.

Meanwhile the closing of the inner ring at Warsaw witnessed some tough fighting as the Polish Poznan Army, bypassed in the first week of the war, charged heading and attacked toward Warsaw to the southeast. The German 8th and 10th Armies were put to the test as they were forced to turn some divisions completely around to meet the desperate Polish assault. In the end the gallant attack fell short and by September 19th the Poznan Army surrendered some 100,000 men and Poland’s last intact army.

As this was occurring the second, more deeper envelopment led by General Heinz Guderian’s panzers took the city of Brest-Litovsk on September 17th, and continued past the city where they made contact with the 10th Army spearhead at Wlodowa 30 miles to the south.

The war, for all practical purposes was over by September 17th. Lvov surrendered on the 19th. Warsaw held out until September 27th, gave up the ghost and the last organized resistance ended October 6th with the surrender of 17,000 Polish soldiers at Kock.

The campaign had lasted less than two months and ended in the destruction of the Polish Army and the fourth partition of Poland. German losses were surprisingly heavy considering the brevity of the campaign.

Deutsch casualties total some 48,000 of which 16,000 were killed. Fully one quarter of the panzers the German committed to battle were lost to Polish anti-panzer guns.  Luftwaffe was forced to trash  550 aircraft.

It was not a cheap victory by any means but it did confirm to the generals of  Wehrmacht that the military machine that they had built was indeed the best in the world and worthy of their confidence.

Reaction around the world on 1 Sept 1939?

France - mobilized her military and demanded Deutschland withdraw from Poland.

Great Britain - mobilized her army and RAF (the Navy was mobilized the day before) and demanded Germany withdraw from Poland.

Italy - Announced no military plans or initiatives.

Russia - warned concern for civilian population of Russian descent and fear of Polish bandits would warrant armed intervention. She also mobilized her military.

Great Satan - Demanded a halt of indescriminate bombing of towns and civilians.

Finland, Norway, Sweden and the Swiss - announced neutrality

Deutschland - "Determined to eliminate insecurity and perpetual civil war from the borders of the Reich"

Poland - appealed to Great Britain and France to intervene in honour of the Mutual Assistance Treaty of 1939.

1 September is the day an old world order was violently overturned, chock full of lessons, promises and harbingers that echo still today.