Houthi Proxies

Most diplopolititary cats understand Yemen is Persia's Southern Horn of the that infamous Shia Crescent

 Iran is attempting to enhance the quantity and quality of her proxy armies’ rockets and missiles. 

Yemen’s Houthi rebels tested a new rocket last Thursday, marking the fourth new projectile they unveiled this year. Dubbed the Somoud, or “steadfastness,” the projectile’s launch was broadcast late last week across Arab and Iranian media. While observers were quick to point fingers at Tehran, based on its established track record of arming the Houthis, the rebels themselves are developing their own rocket capabilities, and the Somoud may be one of them.

According to official Iranian media, the Somoud is 4 meters long, 555 millimeters in diameter, and can reportedly travel 38 kilometers while carrying a 300-kilogram conventional warhead. However, the Somoud is more of a crude weapon than has been reported. Indeed, it lacks a guidance system and is therefore a rocket, not a missile. Moreover, when describing the Somoud, some articles have erroneously used a picture of the Tochka, a single-stage solid-fueled short range ballistic missile (SRBM). While the Houthis possess (and have used) the Soviet-made SRBM, the Somoud falls far short of its size, range, and capability.

A closer look reveals that the Somoud resembles the Houthis’ Zelzal-3 (“earthquake”) rocket, which first appeared in Yemen this summer.

 Based on a recent flight-test video, the Somoud seems to share the Zelzal-3’s short body and single conical warhead, albeit with minor differences in the shape of its fins and nozzle. This raises questions as to whether the Somoud is an attempt to introduce older munitions under a new name and with a fresh coat of paint.

Whether the Somoud is new or not, the Houthis remain lethal despite a coalition blockade intended to prevent Iranian arms from reaching Yemen. However, some still appear to be getting through. Secretary of State John Kerry stated last month that the U.S. was “deeply troubled by … missiles that had come from Iran that are being positioned on the Saudi border.”

It is unclear which specific types of missiles he was referencing. To date, the documented Iranian missiles used by the Houthis in Yemen include Konkurs and Toofan anti-tank missiles. Indeed, coalition forces interdicted a shipment from Iran to Yemen in September 2015 containing those weapons.

The Houthis’ firing of an anti-ship missile at a UAE logistics vessel near the Bab al-Mandeb strait earlier this week further raises additional concerns over whether Iran is transferring its existing asymmetric naval capabilities to its proxy on the Red Sea.

Reports indicate that the weapon used was likely either a C-802 or C-801 anti-ship missile. The latter was purchased by the Yemeni Navy prior to the current civil war. Iran received the former from China, reverse-engineered it, and has equipped Hezbollah with the projectile.

The  lawlessness of Yemen, along with the abundance of old Soviet and North Korean weapons, makes it easy for the Houthis to construct rockets like the Somoud. Thus, the Houthis’ ability to maintain the stalemate against the Saudi-led coalition may depend more on their own “steadfastness” than any munitions carrying that name.

NATO Threat

One meme that American hyperpuissance haters always rail about is that NATO is threatening Russia.

 The theory behind this realist view is that Russia is too weak to threaten the United States as an expansionist power, so instead of extending NATO’s eastern frontiers and supporting the right of eastern European states to join alliances of their choosing, Washington should have backed off and respected Russia’s need for a “modest security zone” against “NATO’s increasingly menacing incursions.”

 The reality is that NATO has never been an existential threat to post-Soviet Russia. If Carpenter thinks it is absurd for the United States and its allies to fear Russia because it’s too weak to be the expansionist competitor that it was during the Cold War, then it’s doubly absurd for Russia to fear NATO. 

Most of its members’ defense spending fell during the 2000s, while their armed forces deteriorated to such an extent that only now are they scrambling to raise defense spending and shore up their capabilities.

 For most of the 2000s, the United States’ focus was trained on the Middle East, where Russia was often cooperative and the two shared some overlapping interests. Crimea’s annexation in 2014 stemmed from the possibility that Ukraine’s government after Viktor Yanukovych’s ouster might sign an association agreement with the EU, whereas the protests in Kiev leading to his removal from power weren’t remotely related to NATO. 

 If Putin’s apologists think that annexing Ukraine made Russia “safer” from NATO than it was five years ago, particularly now that Russia has reinvigorated NATO’s raison d'être and unleashed growth in European defense spending while prompting the United States to up its presence in eastern Europe, then they are no brilliant grand strategist.

 Instead, Putin is a shortsighted opportunist who deploys anti-American rhetoric, portrays Russia as a “victim,” and uses Russia’s military modernization to solidify his domestic power. 

Realists in the United States who malign NATO offer him intellectual respectability that masks the true aims of his belligerent foreign policy.

  And even though it is true that Russia is vastly weaker than the United States, Russia has invested heavily in capabilities that have allowed it to dismember neighboring states, interfere in European states’ internal political processes, and harass allied states with aggressive maneuvers such as aerial near-misses, all while using its energy portfolio to coerce and blackmail European customers.

 And Realists expects people to believe that Russia’s sudden “fear” of NATO in 2014 was the cause of its invasion of Ukraine?
 

Operation Odyssey Lightning

Libya - the gift that keeps on giving...

 The Pentagon’s war in Libya appears to be escalating with a surge in reported strikes. And the U.S. Marine Corps — which has played an outsized role in the war — may no longer be alone in attacking the Islamic State faction in and around the eastern city of Sirte.

 On Oct. 2, U.S. forces conducted 20 different missions and blew up more than six dozen individual targets, according to an official press release from the Pentagon’s main command for operations in Africa. By that point, American pilots had conducted more than 200 air strikes since the campaign began on Aug. 1. 

Marine aviators based aboard Wasp have blasted the Islamic State in Libya since the beginning of the mission, dubbed Odyssey Lightning. Though the Air Force’s drones were involved in the strikes early on, the Pentagon’s released information almost solely concerns the leathernecks’ operations.

However, it is highly unlikely that the Marines could have flown all of the Oct. 2 missions by themselves. 

Publicly available photographs from Odyssey Lightning show AV-8B Harrier jump jets carrying only two bombs on each sortie. Pictures similarly show AH-1W Cobra gunship helicopters heading toward the Sirte area armed with only two missiles.

A typical Marine Expeditionary Unit, such as the one aboard Wasp, has six AV-8s and four AH-1s. Assuming each carried two weapons at a time and the crews only needed one bomb or missile to destroy each target, these jets and choppers would have each needed to fly nearly four individual missions on Oct. 2.

And on Oct. 3, American pilots hit more than two dozen new targets. Again, the Marines would have had to put each of their aircraft in the air at least once to meet that demand.

As of Sept. 15, the destroyer USS Carney escorting Wasp had not contributed directly to the strikes, according to an email from the U.S. Africa Command public affairs office. It is more likely that Air Force fighter-bombers and drones, flying from bases in Europe, helped out on at least some of these missions.

 Flying from the United Kingdom, the flying branch’s F-15E Strike Eagles make regular trips to Africa and the Middle East. The Pentagon declined to confirm or deny whether F-15s participated in the recent Libya strikes. 

Back in Libya, the Pentagon has adopted a similarly obtuse method of grouping strikes regardless of the total number of targets American aviators attack.

This means the official tally of strikes for two separate days might be the same even if the attacks on one day destroyed exponentially more Islamic State vehicles, facilities or nebulous “fighting positions.”

And upon closer inspection of the reports, it seems clear that Washington is stepping up air strikes in Libya and committing more American troops to the mission.

The War With Russia

All the talk of developing a new cold war with Russia and maybe a few hot ones tends to remind everyone - starting a war is pretty easy. 

After that - all bets are off... 

The United States could easily annihilate Syrian and even Russian air defenses—and airpower—inside Syria. Moscow—even with the fearsome capabilities of its S-400 air and missile defense system—is not able to defeat the U.S. Air Force’s fleet of stealthy Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptors, which are able to fly inside zones protected by those system and defeat them. In fact, defeating advanced air defenses is one of the Raptor’s primary missions. Nor would Russian Su-30SM or Su-35S Flankers survive long against the Raptor, which was specifically designed to counter advanced next-generation Soviet fighters that ultimately never materialized.

The problem is that the United States cannot know for certain if Moscow will idly stand by while American forces attack Syrian forces. Moreover, it is unclear how many Russian military advisors are embedded with Syrian forces and where those instructors are located. Some Russian advisors are present and operating within the ranks of the Syrian military, and if Washington launches a strike, those forces could be caught in the crossfire. However, Russian rhetoric suggests that Moscow won’t simply allow Bashar al-Assad’s forces to be destroyed. Russian foreign ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova was quoted by the Russian media saying that U.S. intervention against Assad “will lead to terrible, tectonic consequences not only on the territory of this country but also in the region on the whole.”

If the U.S. military does intervene in Syria, and Russian and Syrian forces fight back, American F-22s would likely be able to quickly eliminate the Russian S-400, Pantsir-S1 as well as Russia’s Su-30, Su-35s and Su-34s with relative ease. Conventional U.S. fourth-generation fighters such as the F-15, F-16 and F/A-18 would have to wait until the Russian-built air defenses—which, given the S-400’s nearly 250 mile coverage radius, encompass nearly the entire Syrian landmass—were cleared by stealth aircraft such as the Raptor and the Northrop Grumman B-2 Sprit strategic bomber. It is not clear if the long-range 40N6 is operational, but regardless, actions can have unintended consequences.

Russia might not limit its retaliation to just American and NATO forces in Syria. Given Moscow’s arsenal of Kaliber-NK cruise missiles and long-range bombers and submarines, the Kremlin has options to strike back across a huge geographic range. It is not outside realm of the possible that Russia would hit back at U.S. bases in Qatar, United Arab Emirates or Turkey using long-range precision-guided cruise missiles. The Russian Black Sea fleet and the Caspian Sea flotilla can easily hit such targets. Then there is Moscow’s formidable bomber fleet which can target the continental United States itself.

Thus, while it is easy to start a conflict with Russia and Syria, a shooting war could easily escalate out of control. It might be prudent to exercise restraint before launching a new war—against a nuclear-armed power—that the American people don’t necessarily want to fight. 

That’s especially true in a conflict where the lines are blurry and there are no clear-cut good guys—where even so-called “moderate” rebels backed by the U.S. government are beheading children.

Kashmir!

Kashmir is again engulfed in violence. 

Over the summer, mass protests have demonstrated widespread public disaffection with Indian rule over the disputed territory. In mid-September, an attack by militants against an Indian Army camp claimed 18 lives; the government of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi blamed Pakistan for being behind the attack, a charge that Pakistan has denied. Tensions between the two nuclear-armed neighbors are mounting. An exchange of fire between Indian and Pakistan forces near their border on Thursday, in which Pakistan said two of its soldiers were killed, added to the tensions. Modi, who appeared to be relying on diplomacy rather than the military to press Pakistan, must continue his restraint.

The territory of Kashmir has been divided between India and Pakistan and claimed by both since the two countries claimed their independence in 1947. The Muslim-dominated area joined India, outraging Pakistanis who insist that it is an integral part of their Islamic republic. Indians dismiss the claim, countering that the process of incorporation was proper and that any concession to the Islamic majority could begin the unraveling of India’s multiethnic, multireligious society.

The result has been a history of tension and violence that has too frequently erupted in outright conflict. Two of the three wars fought by India and Pakistan have been over Kashmir; it is claimed that more than 47,000 people have been killed in Kashmir violence, although some human rights groups estimate the number of victims could be two times that figure.

This summer, the region has been on the boil following the killing of a media-savvy Kashmir militant by the Indian army. His death ignited waves of protest, particularly among younger Kashmiris. The Indian response has been heavy-handed: It is estimated that nearly 90 people have been killed, nearly all of them civilians, and another 10,000 people injured.

Then, on Sept. 18, a group of militants attacked an Indian army camp, killing 18 soldiers before the attackers themselves were killed. This was the bloodiest incident involving the Indian security forces in over a decade. Indian investigators have concluded that the militants were members of Jaish-e-Mohammed, an outlawed militant group based in Pakistan. The Pakistan government has denied any involvement in the assault.

Indian politicians, along with many independent security experts and analysts, have long believed that Pakistan provides considerable backing for the Islamic militants who attack India with regularity. They charge that parts of the Pakistan government see such groups as providing an equalizer in their country’s struggle to claim Kashmir. The terror groups are sufficiently distant from the government of Pakistan to give Islamabad plausible deniability about their operations. Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal then ensures that India will not be tempted to strike back against the groups, which generally operate from bases within Pakistan.

Unfortunately, India’s tolerance is growing short. The ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) is demanding a strong response to the Sept. 18 attack, and believes that Pakistan is also behind the unrest that descended over the region during the summer. But while Pakistan may well be supporting the militants, it is a mistake to underestimate the groundswell of opposition to Indian rule in Kashmir and the anger at the killing of the militant during the summer. While Hindus prefer remaining in India, an overwhelming majority of Muslims in Kashmir — from 75 to 95 percent, according to one poll — would rather join Pakistan.

Modi is certain that Pakistan is behind the attacks, but he knows well that escalating the violence will only court more risks. He also knows that Pakistan is the weaker of the two countries militarily, and that an Indian attack could force Islamabad to make good on its threat to employ its nuclear weapons to even the score. He is also aware that Pakistan is a fragile state and a confrontation could undermine the government there, bringing an even more militant administration to power or, worse, creating chaos that might imperil the command and control of nuclear weapons or materials.

A final concern for Modi is China, which has close ties with Pakistan, competes with India and has no desire to see its partner humiliated or destabilized. India and China have fought their own war and continue to dispute territory. Any move against Pakistan could quickly escalate to a two-front conflict.

To his credit, Modi is ignoring the hardliners and emphasizing diplomacy in his government’s response to the violence. While promising that India would not be intimidated by terrorism, he also said that he would focus on isolating Pakistan for its support of militants. Indian External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj told the United Nations General Assembly: “We need to forget our prejudices and join hands together to script an effective strategy against terror. And if any nation refuses to join this global strategy, then we must isolate it.”

Pakistan’s ambassador to the U.N., Maleeha Lodhi, called the Indian statement “a litany of falsehoods and baseless allegations.” Unfortunately, however, there is growing international support for India’s assertions. The Modi government has fanned the flames in Kashmir with its repressive response to protests, but much of the violence is not homegrown. India’s restraint is to be applauded and must continue. 

Yet the rest of the world must ensure that this restraint is not misinterpreted and the backers of Kashmiri violence pay a price for their support of terrorism

Javelin

The U.S.-made FGM-148 Javelin is one of the premier portable anti-tank missile systems in the world. It’s also an expensive piece of kit, with each missile typically costing more than the targets it eliminates.

Still, the infrared guided Javelin has proven itself in combat in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria and has reliable shtick that should work on virtually any tank out there—it hits them on the weak top armor. It’s also exposes its crew to less danger than the typical guided missile system.

 Because it’s such a lightweight system, it may end up being a first responder on the ground to emergencies that could be described as “massive, unexpected tank invasions”—a scenario the U.S. military could have faced during Operation Desert Shield, when it deployed light infantry to defend Saudi Arabia, and currently fears in the Baltics.

 The Javelin is so effective that who the United States sells or gives Javelins to has become a political issue on more than one occasion. Within the U.S. military, the Javelin also looks set to transition from being purely an infantry system to being mounted on vehicles. 

The Javelin doesn’t look as sleek and deadly as its name would have you think—it resembles a clunky dumbbell slightly over one meter in length. Fortunately, you don’t need good looks to blow up a tank.

Check it -

The Javelin’s Command Launch Unit—CLU—has a sophisticated infrared sensor with multiple viewing modes, including 4x optical zoom, a 4x green-lit thermal view, and a 12x narrow-vision zoom activated for targeting. The seeker in the missile even provides a fourth 9x thermal viewing mode. The CLU can therefore serve as a handy scanning device for the infantry.

 The thermal viewers on the Javelin needs to be cooled off to function well, which theoretically takes 30 seconds, but might take a bit longer if you’re in Baghdad and it’s a breezy 120 degrees at noon. The system also incorporates multiple safeguards to avert or abort accidental launch.

The CLU, when loaded with a missile, weighs in at 50 pounds (most of the weight comes from the missile), and can be fired from a crouch or even seated position. That’s a lot lighter than the wire-guided TOW or other long-range missiles that typically required a heavy tripod. Still, it’s not exactly something you’d want to run a marathon with.

Once the firer acquires a target, locks the infrared seeker on to it and pulls the trigger, the Javelin missile is ejected out of the CLU without using its rocket motor in a “soft launch” creating relatively little back blast. Missile launch back blast not only makes it easy for opposing forces to spot the launcher after firing, but can make launching while inside a confined space (a building) a deadly risk. So the Javelin’s small backblast is very handy for keeping the operator alive. Still, the launch does blow back some gas, so you don’t want to stand directly behind it.

Afterwards, the Javelin’s gunner must… actually, the gunner could play Candy Crush on their cell phone if they wanted to, because unlike most long-range anti-tank missiles, the Javelin is a fire-and-forget system and requires no further input after lunch. The Javelin crew is free to duck into cover and concealment, rather than being forced to remain fixed in place guiding the missile towards the target, as is necessary with Semi-Automatic Command Line-Of-Sight (SACLOS) systems such as the wire-guided TOW or laser-guided AT-14 Kornet.

After launch, a Javelin shoots forward horizontally for a second before its rocket motor ignites and it climbs up 150 meters into the air, known as a “curveball” shot. It’s quite a sight, as you can see in this video.
The missile’s infrared seeker, benefiting from gyroscopes and gimbels, makes adjustments using thrusters to ensure its trajectory leads it to plunge almost vertically onto the infrared signature it was locked onto.
A Javelin fired in this manner will strike the top armor of an armored vehicle, which is generally much thinner than the frontal or even side armor.

 The Javelin’s 127 millimeter shaped charge warhead is estimated to penetrate the equivalent of 600 to 800 millimeters of Rolled Hardened Armor (RHA), which is not particularly impressive, given that modern tanks now feature composite armor that is extra effective against such warheads. But that doesn’t really matter: it’s still more than enough to penetrate the top armor of anything out there—at least, as long as we don’t consider other defensive system.

One common defense which sometimes does reinforce top armor is explosive-reactive armor (ERA), a layer of explosive bricks covering a tank intended to prematurely detonate the shaped charges used by missiles.
However, the Javelin has a tandem charge warhead designed to defeat ERA using a ‘precursor’ charge at the front of the warhead to take out the local ERA brick, blasting open a gap through which the main warhead can hit the tank’s conventional armor.

The Javelin can also be fired in direct attack mode, useful for hitting targets that are too close for the top attack, or that benefit from top cover, like a bunker or cave entrance. The direct-fire mode could also be effective against low flying helicopters.

One of the Javelin’s few limitations is its range—2.5 kilometers. Though adequate for most combat situations, older missiles like the TOW or Kornet boast ranges of 5 kilometers or more.

More on the Javelin here!

4 Plans For Syria

The administration says the strategy remains to end the war through diplomatic means, but insists it is keeping military options on the table.

Here are four possible options the administration could be weighing.

No-fly zone 
The U.S. military, along with other partners, could impose a no-fly zone over Syria, or a large portion of the country. That would mean no aircraft would be able to fly in the area without permission, or risk being shot down. 

Enforcing a no-fly zone or safe zone would require a number of aircraft to monitor and patrol the skies, take out threats or violators, conduct refueling and search and rescue missions. 
A no-fly zone could also mean preemptively taking out regime systems that could pose potential threats, such as surface-to-air missile systems. 

“You could do it with four or you might need 40 [aircraft],” said Ret. Air Force Lt. Gen. Ralph Jodice, who served as the air component commander for the 2011 NATO operation over Libya. “It depends on the size, it depends on what the potential threat is."

Critics of establishing a no-fly zone say it is too resource intensive, and that it would take away from the fight against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. 

They also say it could risk bringing the U.S. into war with Russia or Syria, if they were to violate the no-fly zone and spark a confrontation.

But supporters of the zone argue that Russia would not risk war with the U.S. And they say a no-fly zone is better than the current situation, where the Syrian regime and Russian forces are bombing indiscriminately. 

Safe zones
The U.S. military could also impose a safe zone, which would be a designated area where civilians can take refuge from military threats. That could help alleviate the flood of Syrian refugees flowing into surrounding countries and Europe.

Ret. Army Gen. Jack Keane, board chairman at the Institute for the Study of War and a former Army vice chief of staff, recommends forming two separate safe zones for displaced Syrians near the Turkish and Jordanian borders in Syria.

The zones could be protected on the ground by an international coalition of forces from the region, and possibly some from NATO, as well as from the air by U.S. Patriot missile systems in Jordan and Turkey, he told The Hill. The safe zones in effect would be no-fly zones, he said.

David Petraeus, the former CIA director and former head of U.S. Central Command, on Wednesday said "it's not too late" for such no-fly or safe zones.

"You can do that. That is very, very straightforward. Very, very quickly. And you don't even have to enter their airspace. You could do it with cruise missiles, air-launched, sea-launched and others," he said on PBS’s “Charlie Rose.” 

Critics of the idea argue that a safe zone would require a lot of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets to detect violations, and ground forces to protect the zone. 

But Petraeus said the U.S. now has local forces on the ground who could monitor the safe zones.
Michele Flournoy, who is widely expected to be Defense secretary if Hillary Clinton is elected president, also expressed support for the idea of “no-bomb zones” in an interview earlier this year. 

Target Assad’s air force
Another potential option would be grounding the air force of Syrian leader Bashar Assad.

Ret. Air Force Lt. Gen. David Deptula, dean of the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, said this option would be the easiest, cheapest way to get Syria to stop bombing civilians. 

“In a general sense, the simplest, least expensive and most direct way would be to take out [Syria’s] delivery capacity... and that can be done very, very quickly,” said Deptula, who commanded no-fly-zone operations over Iraq in the late 1990s and directed the air campaign over Afghanistan in 2001. 

He said grounding the air force would take far fewer resources than implementing a no-fly zone, and could be done within 24 hours.  

He said this option, however, could cross over into “acts of war” against Syria -- something the administration has wanted to avoid thus far. 

The U.S. military has already identified a number of Syrian military targets to hit, when it prepared for strikes after the regime used chemical weapons against civilians in the town of Ghouta in 2013. President Obama ultimately called off those strikes. 

New weapons for rebels 
Another option could be providing anti-aircraft systems to the rebels fighting the regime. That could help them take down Russian and regime aircraft, particularly low flying military helicopters dropping barrel bombs. 

Those weapons could include man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS) — shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles, which the U.S. has currently kept from the rebels.

The U.S. could use the same process it’s using now to supply vetted groups of Syrian rebels under a covert program with tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided (TOW) anti-tank guided missiles. 
That program “has had a positive impact,” Keane said. 

The administration has had concerns antiaircraft weapons would fall into terrorists’ hands and be smuggled into the U.S. or used against U.S. air assets. However, supporters of supplying MANPADS say their use could be safeguarded, much like the TOW missile program.  

Keane said the anti-aircraft weapons could be supplied by the U.S. as well as allies. 
“It’s still a worthwhile endeavor to attempt to shift the momentum against the Assad regime in an attempt to force a political solution which is not possible now under the current stalemate," he said. 

“It’s still a worthwhile endeavor to attempt to shift the stalemate that currently exists,” he said. 
Reuters recently reported that the U.S.’s Gulf allies are considering providing the anti-regime rebels with MANPADS, with Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman John McCain (R-Ariz.) also expressing support. 

“It’s about time,” he told The Hill on Wednesday. “Because 44 is not going to do it.”