ISIS' Chemical Weaponry

Well, the AP came through...

Iraqi forces discovered a mustard chemical warfare agent in eastern Mosul alongside a cache of Russian surface-to-surface missiles.

Iraqi and U.S. officials have repeatedly warned of Islamic State group efforts to develop chemical weapons. When Iraqi forces retook Mosul University earlier this month, they found chemistry labs they believed had been converted into makeshift chemical weapons labs.

ISIS' chemical weapons facility was set up in the Nineveh ruins — an ancient site just over 2 kilometers (1.2 miles) from the Tigris, but removed from the city's dense neighborhoods — to keep it a secret from Mosul residents who might be passing information to Iraqi forces and the U.S.-led coalition.

Iraqi forces showed journalists a tank of the chemical agent and a warehouse of more than a dozen surface-to-surface rockets bearing Russian inscriptions.

The number of casualties due to IS chemical weapons is a small fraction compared to the hundreds of civilians killed in car and suicide bombings carried out by the group. Experts say that is largely due to the low grade of the weapons and the group's lack of access to efficient delivery systems.

The types of rockets found at the site suggest the Islamic State group was attempting to weaponize the chemical agent, the facility was being used up until just one or two weeks ago.

Audie Murphy Day

                         

For those of us born betwixt the Fall of the Wall and 911, we kinda grew up with Great Satan unbound. Until Operation Iraqi Freedom, for older Americans - battles and history were old school stuff that would probably never happen again.

As "Rock of The Marne" blitzed through the largest Arab army in history in 20 days, her combat power was unparalled:

"An infantry division in name only, fielding 270 Abrams M1 tanks with mobile infantry that could be hastily formed into adhoc battle groups to handle a variety of missions"

Thunder Running into downtown Baghdad, even phoning up the Iraqi Minister of Misinformation at Palestine Hotel to request "Parking for 88 tanks" seemed like the debut of audacious American war fighting.

Actually - "Rock of the Marne" was following in the footsteps of their spiritual great grandfathers

"On 26 January 1945, 2d Lt. Murphy commanded Company B, which was attacked by 6 tanks and waves of infantry. 2d Lt. Murphy ordered his men to withdraw to prepared positions in a woods, while he remained forward at his command post and continued to give fire directions to the artillery by telephone. 

"Behind him, to his right, 1 of our tank destroyers received a direct hit and began to burn. Its crew withdrew to the woods. 

"2d Lt. Murphy continued to direct artillery fire which killed large numbers of the advancing enemy infantry. With the enemy tanks abreast of his position, 2d Lt. Murphy climbed on the burning tank destroyer, which was in danger of blowing up at any moment, and employed its .50 caliber machinegun against the enemy.

"He was alone and exposed to German fire from 3 sides, but his deadly fire killed dozens of Germans and caused their infantry attack to waver. The enemy tanks, losing infantry support, began to fall back. For an hour the Germans tried every available weapon to eliminate 2d Lt. Murphy, but he continued to hold his position and wiped out a squad which was trying to creep up unnoticed on his right flank.

"Germans reached as close as 10 yards, only to be mowed down by his fire. He received a leg wound, but ignored it and continued the single-handed fight until his ammunition was exhausted. He then made his way to his company, refused medical attention, and organized the company in a counterattack which forced the Germans to withdraw.

"His directing of artillery fire wiped out many of the enemy; he killed or wounded about 50. 2d Lt. Murphy's indomitable courage and his refusal to give an inch of ground saved his company from possible encirclement and destruction, and enabled it to hold the woods which had been the enemy's objective.

"The President of the United States of America has awarded in the name of The Congress the MEDAL OF HONOR to LIEUTENANT AUDIE L. MURPHY, UNITED STATES ARMY

Today is the anniversary of Lt Murphy's heroic achievement - Americans everywhere should get on their knees and thank God Almighty for raising up this laughing race of free men.

45 And NATO

45's core strategic argument is that the United States is overextended. The core reason for this overextension is that the United States has substituted a system of multilateral relationships for a careful analysis of the national interest. In this reading, Washington is entangled in complex relationships that place risks and burdens on the United States to come to the aid of some countries. However, its commitments are not matched by those countries in capability, nor in intent.

Is it Overextension by Alliance?

NATO is the obvious case. The United States has been involved in wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere in the Islamic world. NATO has not provided decisive strategic support to these efforts. Many have provided what support they could or what support they wanted, but that level of support was far below the abilities of NATO members.

The members of the European Union have roughly the same collective gross domestic product as the United States, and a larger population. They also have a substantial industrial base. Europe is well beyond where it was when NATO was founded, when it was incapable of collective defense without the United States. NATO members have taken for granted that Washington will bear the primary burden for defense, measured not only in terms of dollars spent, but also in the development of military capabilities. 

As important, the primary strategic activity of the United States for the past 15 years has been in the Islamic world. Many in NATO objected to the U.S. operation in Iraq, and except for the United Kingdom they provided little or no significant support. Alliance members have no obligation to join in conflicts initiated by the United States outside the area of NATO’s focus. 45 accepts that principle but points out that the organization has been irrelevant to U.S. strategic needs.

Where the alliance engaged, it did so with far too little force to constitute a strategic force. Their reasonable argument that the 28-member alliance makes no commitment to out-of-area engagements not undertaken under Article 5 raises the question of what, then, NATO’s value is to the United States. In sum, NATO lacks significant strategic capabilities, and the alliance is defined in such a way that its members can and do elect to avoid those conflicts that matter most to America.

It is therefore not clear that NATO as currently constituted is of value to the United States. The United States is liable for the defense of Europe. Europe is not liable for defending American interests, which today lie outside of Europe. 45 believes this relationship must be mutually renegotiated.

If the Europeans are unwilling to renegotiate, the United States should exit NATO and develop bilateral relations with countries that are capable and are prepared to work with the United States in areas of its national interest in return for guarantees from Washington.

Similar re-examination of our relationships ought to be carried out globally in regard to allies such as Japan and South Korea to assure that such relationships remain of value to both parties, and that the level of effort and risk reflects that value.

45's Lessons From The Surge

In January 2007, 43 announced that the U.S. would change course in Iraq to reverse the tide of the war. His decision to set in motion the 2007-2008 “Surge” of more than 20,000 additional U.S. troops – armed with a new strategy – pulled Iraq back from the abyss, decimated jihadist and Iranian terror networks, and provided an opportunity for emergence of a state amenable to long-term American interests in the Middle East.

General Jack Keane points out that

45 would do well to ponder that feat. Like 43, he will operate in an environment where Islamic extremists and other anti-U.S. actors are emboldened by the status quo, and where the roadblocks to victory are disheartening and numerous. He should zero in on the following lessons from the Surge:

1. The national interest should always prevail over public opinion and short-term political calculations.

The decision to undertake the Surge was deeply unpopular. Many suggested that the U.S. should simply cuts its losses in Iraq, and leave. But the President would not allow himself to be beholden to the polls. He identified the root of the problem, relied on a clear-eyed view of the national interest to develop a response, let the strategy drive questions over resources, and moved ahead.

2. Recognize when your policy is failing and be willing to change it.

43 acknowledged that his previous approach was inadequate. He did not attempt to sugarcoat the reality of the situation nor did he try to define down America’s security requirements. He took ownership of the policy and defied serious resistance within his own administration to reverse course. That process required wisdom, acceptance of risk, and courage.

3. There is no viable substitute for American military power in certain crises.

It was clear in 2006 that Iraqi forces were incapable of regaining control amidst increasing sectarian violence. Yet we continued to transfer responsibility for security to these forces in order to pull back and eventually withdraw our own forces. A change in strategy proved critical to turning the war around, but it could not have been executed without a significant commitment of U.S. military forces moving out from their bases and stepping into the fight.  

4. Military action is a critical component – not the totality – of a successful anti-Islamic extremist campaign.

With the Surge, the strategy shifted from handing tasks off to Iraqis to securing the population. Capturing and killing terrorists remained a vital priority, but the mission required a non-military track that included political reconciliation and economic development. This effort, advanced in coordination with military operations, gave us a chance to make sustainable security gains on the ground.

5. Securing the peace demands continued effort.

The Surge was not the ultimate solution to Iraq’s problems. The subsequent Iraq tragedy lies in U.S. policymakers’ failure to capitalize on success and chart a viable plan for the next phase of the war. Then-General David Petraeus cautioned in 2008 that the progress in Iraq – decreasing violence, a weakened al Qaeda, and positive movements toward a long-term political solution – remained fragile and would require a concerted U.S. effort to sustain. 44 largely neglected the mission in Iraq for a variety of reasons, which helped lead to our enemies’ resurgence.

The incoming administration will face a world even more dangerous and complex than the one that we faced in 2007. Yet some of the lessons from the Surge are enduring—and pertinent.
45 now has an opportunity to apply them in attempting to restore American national security

Flipping The Syrian Script

In the week after his inauguration, 45 will have an unusual opportunity to put his new diplomatic designs to the test in, of all places, Astana, the remote capital of Kazakhstan.

If this sounds like a Borat joke, it isn't. Astana is where Russia is convening a deadly serious new round of Syrian peace talks, to which it ostentatiously invited the incoming administration.

45's team has not yet publicly responded to this invitation, but it should seize the chance to work with Russia and others on the intractable Syria problem, in a way that long eluded 44's team. If the Astana conference is too soon for serious input from Washington, a follow-up, UN-sponsored February 8 meeting in Geneva will provide a perfect second chance.

There is nothing new, or necessarily bad, about trying to work with Russia on Syria. 44 and Secretary of State Kerry tried that for the past four years. They failed, with the limited exception of the 2013 deal to rid the Assad regime of most (though not all) of its chemical weapons. For 45 to renew this effort would make eminent good sense -- provided that this time it offers a realistic prospect of achieving positive American objectives, rather than simply buying time for the negative Russian one of keeping Assad in power at any price (see "45 and the Middle East: Between Hope and Apprehension," Fikra Forum).

That prospect exists if new realties on the ground, and new diplomatic approaches, are properly exploited. There is reason to believe that 45 intends to do exactly that, based on a careful reading of his enigmatic January 16 interview in the Times of London and Germany's Bild newspaper. There, he proposed a deal on Russia sanctions in which "a lot of people are gonna benefit." He mentioned that nuclear arms reductions would be "a part of it," but also referred to the "terrible humanitarian situation" in Syria.

Alleviating this humanitarian catastrophe should be the first objective of a new U.S. approach.

And that means going to Astana with three clear, urgent priorities: shoring up the promising but still shaky Syrian ceasefire; ensuring better, more impartial delivery of emergency humanitarian relief; and insisting on protection for the remaining areas held by the relatively moderate opposition, primarily in the northern province of Idlib and the southern province of Deraa. This would prevent those areas from becoming, in the words of one senior Western humanitarian aid official, "the great new killing fields of the region" -- and precipitating a new, uncontrollable flood of desperate refugees into Jordan, Turkey, Europe, and perhaps beyond.

The second U.S. objective should be to coordinate a faster but more precise offensive against Islamic State and al-Qaeda terrorists inside Syria. This could mean much more than just an isolated Russian airstrike. Rather, it could include an agreement to deconflict all forces arrayed against these designated terrorist groups: not just Americans and Russians, but also regime and Free Syrian Army rebel units, Turkish and Kurdish forces, and more. That, in turn, could facilitate two major U.S. objectives: liberating the Islamic State's self-declared capital in Raqqa sooner rather than later, and preempting direct clashes between Washington's Kurdish and Turkish friends, at least on Syrian soil.

A third, longer-term objective in Astana should be to at least begin the process of distinguishing legitimate actors and interests in Syria from Iranian, Hezbollah, and other foreign sectarian militias there (see "Preventing the Radicalization of Syria," Fikra Forum). The United States should urge conference participants to demand the eventual withdrawal of the latter actors, perhaps keeping open an option for international peacekeepers by common consent. Even if such a declaration has no immediate practical effect, it would help reassure American friends inside Syria and beyond, and possibly set the stage for future steps to separate Russian and regime interests from those of Iran and its dangerous proxies.

Why would Russia accept any of this?

For one thing, 45 is prepared to offer the sweetener of selective sanctions relief. Crucially, though, he wouldn't need to offer very much, because Russia has additional reasons to compromise.

First, this deal would defer action against the Assad regime -- which is too weak to retake control of the whole country without outside military support anyway.

Second, Russia really does want to rid Syria of terrorists, which it sees as a threat to its own security. And third, a realistic compromise on Syria would serve Moscow's ability to balance among rival regional players: Sunnis and Shiites, Turks and Kurds, even Arabs and Israelis.

Notably, some Arab players on opposite sides of the war are newly aware of this last important point. On January 9, the pro-regime Syrian daily al-Watan published on op-ed with the sensational headline "Are Iran and Russia Really Selling Syria to Turkey?" -- before concluding with the sensible observation that Moscow "knows it must have a relationship not only with its allies but also with its adversaries." Four days later, the independent Jordanian daily al-Ghad put the case more bluntly: Russia, it opined, now wants "to change its image as the superpower that stood against the Sunnis."

Coming full circle, the Astana venue and participants symbolize this new combination of Russian confidence and potential concessions. Kazakhstan is a pro-Russian but Turkic-majority country, and a predominantly Muslim one that nevertheless just hosted an official visit by none other than Israeli prime minister Binyamin Netanyahu. And the conference will include Iranians, Arabs, Turks, and even a few Kurds, who all continue to voice disparate views on Syria, plus the Assad regime and much of the mainstream opposition, which just rescinded a boycott warning.

And this time, unlike the earlier, equally diverse Geneva conferences on Syria, the United States may come with a realistic proposal that could bring Russia on board. If the 45th administration manages to eke out greater success in this key arena, it should be applauded by all Americans, regardless of political affiliation.

Paper Tiger

Is North Korea a paper tiger?

45'll have tons of issues to deal with, no doubt!

None, however, will come as close on the Richter scale as rising instability on the Korean Peninsula, powered first and foremost by a North Korean nuclear and ballistic-missile program that is advancing in both quality and quantity.

The typical options are on the table: more stringent economic sanctions on Pyongyang’s revenue sources; unconditional dialogue with the North Korean leadership; third-party sanctions on Chinese entities enmeshed in DPRK dealings; and, in the most extreme case, a preemptive U.S. air strike on its nuclear facilities. Interestingly enough, if 45 does in fact take the more forceful route, a new study indicates that any retaliation by the North Korean army on South Korea or U.S. military bases in the region may not be as destructive as originally assessed.

In a scenario where the U.S. Air Force uses military force against North Korea’s nuclear program, Pyongyang’s likeliest course of action in terms of retaliation is a heavy barrage of South Korea. Given the fact that the North boasts several different types of rocket-launch systems—one, the three-hundred-millimeter multiple rocket-launch system, can hit targets anywhere in South Korea—the United States would have to provide advance warning to its allies in Seoul in order for South Korean leadership to prepare for an incoming volley of rocket fire that would claim thousands of civilian lives.

According to the aforementioned study, however, many of the DPRK rocket systems along the DMZ suffer from technical lapses, poorly trained artillery crews, and a concentration of offensive weapons systems that would be highly susceptible to destruction once its location is compromised.

Because the DPRK can’t accurately predict how well its offensive systems would actually perform, Kim Jong-un wouldn’t have much confidence that a bombardment of South Korea’s capital would result in maximum impact. Throughout history, North Korean test launches have failed;  “roughly 25 percent of North Korean shells and rockets fail to detonate on target.”

The more inaccurate those shells are, the less likely Pyongyang will be able to strike fear into the heart of Seoul.

Even assuming that North Korea’s rocket systems perform the way they are intended, any fire into South Korea would expose Pyongyang’s systems to counter-battery fire. There is little doubt that even a single, coordinated volley of North Korean fire into South Korea would cause immense damage to civilian infrastructure, especially if the South Koreans for some reason are caught by surprise and slow to take defensive measures.

The northern suburbs of Seoul would be at risk of saturation, and the South Korean political leadership would wake up the next morning to a worst-case scenario with what could be tens of thousands of civilian deaths. South Korean and U.S. retaliation, though, would be even more punishing than Pyongyang’s initial volley—the very artillery and rocket systems that Pyongyang has spent decades perfecting would be wiped out in short order.

And, as for Pyongyang’s ballistic-missile inventory? Although the range of the North’s medium-range ballistic missiles can travel anywhere in South Korea, every missile fired during an operation is one less missile that Pyongyang can utilize for deterrence purposes—a problem that would be compounded the longer the skirmish goes on.

None of this is to argue for U.S. military activity against the North. For the United States to pull the trigger, Washington would subject its South Korean allies (and possibly Japan, if the war expands) to such incredible physical destruction that the economic leaps Seoul has produced over the past three decades would be severely jeopardized. Alliance relations between the United States and South Korea would be strained to a breaking point, as the United States inevitably attempts to de-escalate tensions, and the South Koreans itch to use ever-greater uses of force to bring eliminate the military capability of its northern neighbor.

And it should go without saying that nobody would be able to predict Pyongyang’s behavior in the event of hostilities; with his regime’s stability in jeopardy, there is nothing stopping Kim Jong-un from acting irrationally.

But, as war planners in the Defense Department update their strategies and war games throughout the year, this new assessment will give them some comfort that South Korea would survive from a retaliatory North Korean attack. How long it would take for South Korea to rebuild into the economic powerhouse it is today is a whole other story.

44's Drone Legacy

The most convenient stick for certain elements with which to whack 44's foreign policy has always been his use of military drones to kill American enemies in chronically anarchic parts of the Mideast and Somalia.

A president who came into office hoping to put a friendlier face on American empire has made significant use of a global assassination technology that seems disturbingly uncircumscribed, not only by domestic laws and democratic oversight, but even by cost or inconvenience

Drones are to the 21^st century what the atomic bomb was to the 20^th and the crossbow was to the 12^th: a new class of weapon that inspires an emotional nightmare of indiscriminate and rising bloodshed. It is an idea that seems to demand the creation of new taboos.

From the standpoint of innocent non-combatants who might be killed in a drone attack, the horror of the drone is just the same as the horror of ordinary bombing, whether perpetrated by planes or ships or wearers of suicide vests. It can really be of no comfort to the dead to know that their destruction was endorsed by an independent committee, or followed some sort of secret adversarial trial.

But since the legislative branch of the U.S. government has left the use of drones up to the president personally, and since the power to assassinate is hard to delegate even within the executive, drones have had a philosophical tendency to delineate the structure of American empire—to reveal the way in which death flows out into the world from the mind, some would say the whim, of one man. It is, in a sense, a public relations problem, one that Islamists have not been slow to exploit.

It was sheer chance that a constitutional lawyer was president when U.S. military drone technology reached an advanced state of perfectibility. Not that this seems to have made much difference. (When constitutional lawyers were needed to endorse torture, America had no trouble finding some.) Since historians continue to have no scholarly access to alternate realities—put DARPA to work on that one!—we have no way of knowing whether 44’s choices about drones have improved the world or made it worse.

The dead can be enumerated, loosely, although the White House’s estimates of “civilian” deaths are an order of magnitude lower than those of non-government assessors. Critics rightly ask whether we can know who is definitely a “civilian.” Indeed, they take Obama to task for the unintended deaths of rank-and-file combatants who were not personally any threat to the United States.

Politicians always think that history will be kind to them—that once all the records of their dilemmas and options are known, and their sincerity can be judged, they will be forgiven even their objective mistakes. They create diaries and assemble libraries knowing that they are pleading a case for themselves to be argued by others. Probably 44 is no different, privately.