Pacific Flat Tops

Ahoy!

In the Pacific Rim - more than China is getting totally hot for air craft carriers.

Usually classified as amphibious ships or helicopter destroyers/cruisers, they had mostly escaped serious scrutiny in the mainstream consciousness. Until the past few weeks, that is, when a series of events thrust these vessels into global news headlines.

Australia

Australia is currently building two 27,800-ton Canberra-class Landing Helicopter Docks (LHDs) under Joint Project 2048. The ships, HMAS Canberra (LHD-02) and HMAS Adelaide (LHD-01) are based on the Spanish Navy’s Juan Carlos I built by Spain’s Navantia. The design was the winner of a competition with France’s Direction des Constructions Navales (DCN), which offered a larger version of the Mistral class design.

The HMAS Canberra is currently being completed at BAE Systems – Maritime in Melburne after having been initially laid down in Spain and transported by sea to Australia. She will enter service with the Royal Australian Navy in 2014 while her sister ship will join her two years later. The LHDs will replace the HMAS Tobruk and the Kanimbla-class ships in mainly conducting amphibious operations with a secondary HADR brief.

The Canberra class vessels boast a length of 230.82 metres (757.3 ft), with a maximum beam of 32 metres (105 ft) and maximum draught of 7.08 metres (23.2 ft). Maximum speed is 20 knots, and the LHDs will sport four Rafael Typhoon 25 mm remote weapons systems, six 12.7 mm machine guns, an AN/SLQ-25 Nixie towed torpedo decoy, and a Nulka missile decoy.

The LHDs will be able to carry 1,046 soldiers and their equipment. Two vehicle decks (one for light vehicles, the other for heavy vehicles and tanks) can accommodate up to 110 vehicles. Each ship has a well deck for landing craft, while the flight deck has landing spots for six NH90-class helicopters or four CH-47 Chinook-class helicopters to operate simultaneously. The ships are equipped with a 13° ski jump retained from the Juan Carlos I design, although Australia has no plans to operate fixed-wing aircraft from these ships. The standard air group will typically be a mix of MRH-90 transport helicopters and S-70B Seahawk anti-submarine helicopters. The hangar can accommodate up to 18 helicopters, but eight will be the standard complement.

Nippon

Of all the nations deploying flattops in the Asia-Pacific, undoubtedly the most controversial has been Japan’s. Suspicion runs deep in the region about Japan’s true intentions despite its pacifist postwar constitution specifically banning the nation from deploying offensive weapons, fuelled by lingering anger over what is perceived as Japan’s failure to fully atone for its actions in World War II. With this in mind, the outcry that accompanied each launch of a Japanese flattop, classified as Helicopter-Destroyers (DDH) by the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF), is always predictable. But that hasn’t stopped Japan from being the Asia-Pacific nation with the most flight deck-equipped ships, with four in service or being built.

The JMSDF commissioned the Hyuga and her sister Ise in 2009 and 2011 respectively. Displacing 13,950 tons standard and 19,000 tons fully loaded, the ships are equipped with enhanced command-and-control capabilities, allowing them to serve as flagships for the JMSDF. The ships' primary mission is to function as an anti-submarine warfare carrier, and four landing spots for helicopters are provided for on the flight deck, although a maximum of 11 can be carried. The irregular plan form of the flight deck and the location of the forward Phalanx Close-In Weapon System would preclude the Hyuga-class from operating fixed-wing aircraft without a substantial flight deck redesign. The normal helicopter complement is three Sikorsky SH-60K Seahawk antisubmarine helicopters and a single Agusta-Westland MCH-101 Merlin airborne mine countermeasures helicopter; however this can vary depending on the mission.

The JS Hyuga was heavily involved in the HADR effort after the devastating earthquake and tsunami that struck Japan in March 2011. In June 2013, she became the first JMSDF ship to operate the Boeing MV-22B Osprey tiltrotor aircraft during the Dawn Blitz exercise with the U.S. Marine Corps off the coast of California.

On August 6, 2013, Japan followed up with the launch of the JS Izumo, the lead ship of an even larger DDH design. Displacing 19,500 ton empty and 27,000 tons fully loaded, the Izumo and her as-yet unnamed sister will be the largest ships in the JMSDF inventory. Like the Hyuga and Ise before her, the Izumo will also be tasked primarily with anti-submarine warfare. The flight deck has five helicopter landing spots that allow simultaneous landings or take-offs, with a maximum complement of 14 helicopters theoretically possible.

Expected to be commissioned in 2015, the Izumo’s flight deck does appear to be more easily configurable to operate fixed-wing aircraft than the Hyuga class. Unsurprisingly, the Izumo’s launch has sparked controversy, having been described by the Chinese as an “aircraft-carrier in disguise.” The fact that neither the Izumo nor Hyuga-class ships are equipped with well docks for landing craft would have increased suspicion that they are designed specifically for aircraft operations.

SoKo

South Korea launched the ROKS Dokdo in 2005 and commissioned it two years later. In a move that likely didn’t go down well in Tokyo, it took the Korean name of the islands at the center of a territorial dispute with Japan. A multi-purpose ship capable of handling a variety of missions, the Dokdo displaces 14,000 tons empty and 18,000 tons fully loaded. Three ships of the class were planned; however the third vessel was cancelled by a previous government. The second, the ROKS Marado, was to suffer the same fate, but funding was restored in 2012.

The Dokdo class is capable of carrying up to 720 marines and multiple vehicles, while a well dock allows for amphibious assaults. There are five landing spots on her flight deck able to operate helicopters the size of the Sikorsky S-70 Blackhawk/Seahawk, while the hangar can accommodate a maximum of 15 helicopters of various types. The Dokdo was designed specifically to conduct “Over the Horizon” amphibious operations, whereby amphibious landing operations with high-speed LCACs and helicopters are launched far from the landing beaches to minimize risks to the landing ship. Her versatility has been demonstrated in 2010, when she was part of a task force conducting search and locate operations for the corvette ROKS Cheonan, which had been sunk in a North Korean sneak attack.

It has been acknowledged that the Dokdo’s flight deck has been coated with urethane, which improves the ability of the flight deck to withstand the high temperatures of aircraft operations. However, like the JMSDF’s Hyuga-class, her irregular shaped flight deck and positioning of the forward CIWS would require extensive modification before fixed-wing aircraft could operate off her.

Sooo...

So are these ships aircraft carriers or not? If you (rightly) consider a helicopter an aircraft, then technically the answer is yes. But to describe these ships as aircraft carriers in the traditional sense of carrying fixed-wing aircraft for offensive purposes, things become murkier. The Liaoning and Chakri are undoubtedly intended to carry fixed-wing aircraft from the outset, even if the latter hasn’t done so for a long while now. However, the Canberra and Izumo-class ships, while having a flight deck capable of operating Short Take Off Vertical Landing (STOVL) jets such as the Lockheed-Martin F-35B Joint Strike Fighter, would still require significant modification before they could be operational in that sense.

Another major stumbling block would be that using aircraft carriers in an offensive capacity requires the carrier itself to be escorted with its own battle group. Currently none of these Pacific navies have the warships, they have yet to fully develop the naval doctrine or tactics required, and they don’t have air and ground crews trained to operate in this way. This is all a huge undertaking, requiring years to carry through, even with help from current carrier operators such as the U.S. Navy. Other than China, none of these navies appear to have plans for this in the near future.

Pic - "Asian Carriers By The Numbers!"

WoW!!

WoW - the Watchers Council - it's the oldest, longest running cyber comte d'guere ensembe in existence - started online in 1912 by Sirs Jacky Fisher and Winston Churchill themselves - an eclective collective of cats both cruel and benign with their ability to put steel on target (figuratively - natch) on a wide variety of topictry across American, Allied, Frenemy and Enemy concerns, memes, delights and discourse.

Every week these cats hook up each other with hot hits and big phazed cookies to peruse and then vote on their individual fancy catchers

Thusly sans further adieu (or a don"t)

Council Winners

• *First place with 3 votes! The Razor – Obama’s Leadership Failure
• Second place with 2 2/3 votes – Joshuapundit – The Saudis Look At Dumping Obama And Changing Sponsors
• Third place with 2 votes – The Right Planet-Syria-pocrisy
• Fourth place *t* with 1 vote – Bookworm Room-As a Jew, why am I not more exercised about the use of poison gas in Syria?
• Fourth place *t* with 1 vote – Liberty’s Spirit-The World? is “Offended” by the Use of Chemical Weapons…UPDATED
• Fourth place *t* with 1 vote – The Political Commentator-Obama must have missed Coalition Building 101 at president school!
• Fifth place *t* with 1/3 vote – Simply Jews -The Realpolitik Of “to bomb or not to bomb”: Isn’t There Something Else That Matters?
  
• Fifth place *t* with 1/3 vote – Nice Deb –Nobel Peace Prize Winning Citizen of the World President Willing to Go It Alone On Bombing Syria

Non-Council Winners

• First place with 3 votes! – The Elder Of Ziyon- Bashar Assad’s grandfather’s amazing 1936 letter to France submitted by Simply Jews
• Second place with 2 votes – Michael Yon –Syria Outrage Is Not a Strategy submitted by The Glittering Eye
• Third place *t* with 1 1/3 votes – The Diplomad 2.0 –From Cowboy to Mau-Mau Diplomacy submitted by Joshuapundit
• Third place *t* with 1 1/3 votes -David Gerstman/Le·gal In·sur·rec·tion – Is There no Limit to the Administration’s Cynicism Regarding Israel? submitted by The Watcher
• Fourth place with 1 vote – Sister Toldjah – Photo of the Day: @AnthonyWeiner poses with “The Big Salami” - submitted by Rhymes With Right
• Fifth place *t* with 2/3 votes - Via Meadia –The President’s Decision submitted by Liberty’s Spirit
• Fifth place *t* with 2/3 vote - American Thinker –Mideast Nuclear Holocaust submitted by The Political Commentator
• Fifth place *t* with 2/3 vote -PJ Media/Barry Rubin –Turning Point: Obama and Israel, the Next Three Years submitted by Bookworm Room
• Fifth place *t* with 2/3 vote -Douglas Ernst –Will Nobel Peace Prize winner Obama spark a world war with a strike on Syria? - submitted by The Colossus of Rhodey
• Sixth place *t* with 1/3 vote -Air Force Magazine –2nd Coming of Counterinsurgency submitted by GrEaT sAtAn”S gIrLfRiEnD

See you next week! And don’t forget to like us on Facebook and follow us on Twitter 

Outlaw!

One of several charmless charms that boring assetted, inappropriate handwringers oft time weep about is how Great Satan has danged near ruined the entire world with go any where, any time and do any thing bona fides...

Oh! You didn't know? See, Great Satan is THE Rouge Nation - an international gangsta outlaw! 

It is America’s obligation, we are told, to show the world that such behavior cannot be tolerated, or else no one would take America seriously. But what is the actual American record of humanitarian intervention? Has it been humane? Or has it inadvertently caused even more chaos in the name of preventing it?

Consider Iraq: a few hundred thousand dead Iraqis, millions displaced within Iraqi territory, thousands killed and tens of thousands of American and allied soldiers injured. Today, the country lies in ruins, and has de facto split into three parts—Shia, Sunni and Kurdish. Daily terrorist attacks rock the country and claim numerous lives. In view of all this, 44 claimed that Great Satan had fulfilled her gig in Iraq and was time to leave her to her own fate.

The second such humanitarian intervention, supposedly led to save lives from an evil dictator, was Libya. UN data ranked this country, up until the intervention, as one of the five developing most rapidly and successfully. As a direct result of the U.S. and allied intervention, it is now reduced to rubble; its leader murdered by desperadoes. Lest we forget, the weapons delivered to the rebels found their way into the hands of radical Islamists in the wider Middle East, including Syria. Once again, Americans supposedly finished their humanitarian mission and the country is in shambles

The moral seems obvious: American good intentions in a variety of Arab countries lead not to peace, stability and prosperity, but instead create new, colossal problems that begin with state collapse and end in chaos and conflict. By now, it’s blatantly obvious to everyone outside the administration that 44 himself does not particularly like or understand foreign policy and has no clear idea of America’s role and place in the world.

Unfortunately, the same holds true for his foreign-policy team.

Pic - "Look into the abyss long enough and the abyss will start looking back"

Drones Gone Wild! (V)



This brief break from all Syria all the time is brought to ye courtesy of the cool kids at that Belfer place - pacifically the one and only Jacqueline L. Hazelton and she like totally delivers a hot PDFing all about Drones Gone Wild! 

The drone debate continues hot and heavy. Critical issues range from the morality of targeting choices and concerns about unintended casualties and anti-Americanism to matters of legal and bureaucratic oversight. These are pressing questions; the United States’ use of drones as a weapon of war is on the rise, and other countries are interested in acquiring them.

Less often raised are first-order questions, or examinations of first principles. These questions consider the fundamental nature of a concept or a tool.3 This article poses basic questions about the use of drone strikes as tools of the state. My goal is to spark further analysis of drone strikes as an instrument in the US foreign policy tool kit. I ask how drones compare to other weapons and what they may be able to achieve tactically and strategically, militarily and politically. These are also questions worth considering in the context of how other states’ acquisition of armed drones could affect the United States. In addition, I identify major unanswered empirical questions about the outcome of drone strikes. There is still a lack of empirical evidence about the effects of drone strikes, partly due to the secrecy of US drone programs and partly due to their relative novelty. But even without that research, it is possible to consider the utility of drones in attempts to increase US security.

Some of these questions may seem to have obvious answers, but for those who suggest there is broad agreement in the public debate on first-order questions and first principles regarding drone strikes, I offer the contrasting positions of The New Yorker editor David Remnick and retired Air Force General Charles Dunlap. Remnick states, “We are in the same position now, with drones, that we were with nuclear weapons in 1945. For the moment, we are the only ones with this technology that is going to change the morality, psychology, and strategic thinking of warfare for years to come.” Dunlap says, “It’s not particularly new to use long-range strike. David defeated Goliath with a long-range strike with a missile weapon. At Agincourt, the English bowmen destroyed the flower of the French knighthood with long-range strikes . . . and we have had long-range strike bombers for some time. This really is not new conceptually."

This article considers the goal of US drone programs to be greater security for the United States and its friends and allies. 

 Caveat: There are analysts thinking about a future of stand-off, plugged-in warfare. I make a more modest effort to consider what drone strikes may achieve in fundamental political terms as a forceful tool of the state. I also bracket issues of morality, legality, budgeting, and bureaucratic oversight. 

Answering practical questions requires understanding what states can do and want to do with drones, politically and militarily. Investigation into the morality of drone strikes is contingent on what states expect drone strikes to achieve and how those drones are deployed. Striking only targets in the act of mounting an attack on the US homeland, for example, presents different moral questions than so-called “signature strikes” against unidentified individuals judged to be behaving suspiciously.

The first core question is whether drones are a unique weapon and whether they provide distinct advantages or disadvantages over other weapons. I categorize drones as a form of air power based on the following logic and evidence, which I detail expecting disagreement will advance the analysis. Like piloted armed aircraft, armed drones provide information as well as strike capacity. They can achieve a variety of military effects, as other air platforms can. They can kill, disable, support fighters on the ground, destroy, harry, hinder, deny access, observe, and track. Like pilots providing close air support, firing missiles, or dropping bombs, drone operators are expected to respect the laws of war, striking based on clear information, including assessment of potential human costs.

Drones provide several advantages over manned armed flights and sea-based launches. They are claimed to do less collateral damage than either missiles or manned aerial bombing; they can hover overhead for relatively long periods of time to gather information for a strike (up to 14 hours); they can strike quickly, and the missile can be diverted from its original target in an intentional miss.6 They are also less expensive than manned platforms. Unlike other delivery systems, however, they require a permissive environment, which is likely to limit their utility in some theaters.

Drones, like other air and sea platforms, are a form of power projection. They give the United States the ability to mount tactical assaults without necessarily putting US personnel directly in harm’s way, potentially evoking domestic opposition. They also allow the United States to avoid putting its forces in foreign territory, potentially eliciting a nationalistic response. Drones are similar to Special Forces in their direct targeting ability, but they can reach remote locations and, again, do not place US troops directly in peril. Nevertheless, drone strikes do require cooperation by individuals and states on the ground. The United States needs, for example, basing rights, agreements to host launch and recovery personnel and search-and-rescue teams, and overflight permissions.

A significant concern raised in the public debate is that drones make killing too easy. This is a critical issue that connects to questions about US grand strategy and whether drones encourage imperial overreach. But because the United States uses a variety of tools to conduct targeted killings—from the Special Forces raid on Osama bin Laden’s Pakistani compound to the missile strike on Dora Farms, where Saddam Hussein and his sons were believed to be sheltering early in the Iraq War—I suggest there is more to gain analytically by first focusing on understanding the tactic, that is, what targeted killing may and may not achieve as a foreign policy tool, then addressing concerns specific to the platform.

The second core question pertains to the strategic utility of drone strikes for a state. What political goals can drone strikes achieve? In considering this question, I use a theoretical prism that identifies the fundamental political goals of the state’s use of force to defend, deter, compel, and, sometimes, swagger.

It is possible to consider targeted killings, specifically those conducted by drones, as an element in a defensive strategy. This strategy would be intended to ward off attack and reduce possible damage by killing leaders and facilitators plotting violence against the United States, and disrupting their operations. It is also possible to argue targeted killings deter future attacks by denying armed groups the capability to conduct those attacks, and punishing those planning violence against the United States and its interests. The deterrence-by-denial argument requires consideration not only of targeted killings but also drone strikes to directly degrade targeted groups’ capabilities in other ways (e.g., cause equipment and supply shortages, operational and strategic paralysis, and disruption of operations). Drone strikes in this analysis might also deter cooperation with a group based on fear or doubt about the group’s likely success.  

It is harder to argue that targeted killings might exercise a compelling effect by threatening greater pain if the targeted organization does not change its behavior.

Successful compellence requires displaying to the adversary the will and capability to cause terrible pain if the adversary does not change its behavior. The ethical and legal context of drone use by the United States make it unlikely at first glance that policymakers would choose to use drone strikes to cause pain to an adversary by deliberately targeting innocents. In terms of causing pain to the adversary directly, the death or threat of death to a plotter is an organization’s cost of doing business, not a taste of suffering to come if it does not change its behavior.

There are several other possible strategic effects of drone strikes. Swaggering, here displaying US military power and its seemingly effortless global reach, arguably demonstrates resolve, a quality that has been underlined as an element of US counterterrorism policy.14 Drone strikes can also be seen as the straightforward use of brute force to destroy those who would threaten the United States or its allies. In addition, they are an alliance tool supporting other states, such as Yemen and Pakistan.

It is an open question whether all drone strikes can be expected to have the same political effects at all times and in all places. If a drone strike was politically ineffective in Yemen in 2002, there is reason to investigate whether it will be politically effective in Yemen, Pakistan, or Somalia today, or in Mali, Syria, or the Philippines tomorrow. This possibility suggests the importance of considering drone strikes in their political context. This context may include, for example, theaters where the United States is at war, theaters in which it is not, theaters in which the United States has national or international permission to strike, theaters in which it does not, and so on. A matrix of types of targets and expected effects would be useful. There may also be interactions among these factors that shape the political effects of drone strikes.

The questions and theoretical answers posited here require empirical investigation. Many good minds are already at work, and more evidence should become available as time passes and, perhaps, as the United States makes its drone programs more transparent. Critical questions include whether drone strikes or targeted killings prevent or drive attacks on the US homeland; whether they reduce or increase attacks on US forces and interests elsewhere; whether they buttress client states, provoke upheaval, or hasten a client’s fall; and whether drone strikes increase radicalization and also anti-Americanism, or other forms of terrorism.

These questions are not unique to drones. They bear directly on the need for a counterterrorism strategy that begins by identifying critical US interests and threats, then systematically sorts through a realistic consideration of ends, ways, and means. This analysis requires answering first-order questions and identifying first principles while fostering rigorous research into the actual effects of drone strikes on US and international security.

Pic - "We must not pretend the killings are anything but a flawed short-term expedient that at best reduces the threat -- but by no means eliminates it"

Syrian Setup?

As Batman (or maybe it was Captain Picard) once saged about the charms of conspiracy - "When a machination is real - no one ever suspects. When it's not - everyone does"

 

Not unlike GsGf's Unofficial Official Counter you know what ism cat. Author of several must read things with paper all in them like "Secret History of the Iraq War", "Chechin Jihad" and the one that really proved psychic - "Target: America" has dropped another semi sorta kinda unsourced HE round with all the unsubtle subtlety of wearing a thong to church.

 

Essentially, was Bashar set up via WMD?

 

Check, The al Qaeda loving Jabhat al Nousra is bizzy setting up a mini caliphate of sorts in the northen bits of ye olde Suriya al Kubra complete with cruel girl hating 7th century mindsets. 

And check - the tiny tiny Damascus Front held by the hopefully sec sec secular Free Syrian Army has been nigh imposs to unAss - even after not one but two Regime Army brigade level attacks. And Check - using any means necessary to clear it makes sense to use WMD instead of infantry wave assaults.

 

Yet...  





There is a growing volume of new evidence from numerous sources in the Middle East — mostly affiliated with the Syrian opposition and its sponsors and supporters — which makes a very strong case, based on solid circumstantial evidence, that the August 21, 2013, chemical strike in the Damascus suburbs was indeed a pre-meditated provocation by the Syrian opposition.

The extent of US foreknowledge of this provocation needs further investigation because available data puts the “horror” of 44's White House in a different and disturbing light.

On August 13-14, 2013, Western-sponsored opposition forces in Turkey started advance preparations for a major and irregular military surge. Initial meetings between senior opposition military commanders and representatives of Qatari, Turkish, and US Intelligence [“Mukhabarat Amriki”] took place at the converted Turkish military garrison in Antakya, Hatay Province, used as the command center and headquarters of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and their foreign sponsors. Very senior opposition commanders who had arrived from Istanbul briefed the regional commanders of an imminent escalation in the fighting due to “a war-changing development” which would, in turn, lead to a US-led bombing of Syria.

The opposition forces had to quickly prepare their forces for exploiting the US-led bombing in order to march on Damascus and topple the Bashar al-Assad Government, the senior commanders explained. The Qatari and Turkish intelligence officials assured the Syrian regional commanders that they would be provided with plenty of weapons for the coming offensive.

Indeed, unprecedented weapons distribution started in all opposition camps in Hatay Province on August 21-23, 2013. In the Reyhanli area alone, opposition forces received well in excess of 400 tons of weapons, mainly anti-aircraft weaponry from shoulder-fired missiles to ammunition for light-guns and machineguns. The weapons were distributed from store-houses controlled by Qatari and Turkish Intelligence under the tight supervision of US Intelligence.

These weapons were loaded on more than 20 trailer-trucks which crossed into northern Syria and distributed the weapons to several depots. Follow-up weapon shipments, also several hundred tons, took place over the weekend of August 24-25, 2013, and included mainly sophisticated anti-tank guided missiles and rockets. Opposition officials in Hatay said that these weapon shipments were “the biggest” they had received “since the beginning of the turmoil more than two years ago”. The deliveries from Hatay went to all the rebel forces operating in the Idlib-to-Aleppo area, including the al-Qaida affiliated jihadists (who constitute the largest rebel forces in the area).

Several senior officials from both the Syrian opposition and sponsoring Arab states stressed that these weapon deliveries were specifically in anticipation for exploiting the impact of imminent bombing of Syria by the US and the Western allies. The latest strategy formulation and coordination meetings took place on August 26, 2013. The political coordination meeting took place in Istanbul and was attended by US Amb. Robert Ford.

More important were the military and operational coordination meetings at the Antakya garrison. Senior Turkish, Qatari, and US Intelligence officials attended in addition to the Syrian senior (opposition) commanders. The Syrians were informed that bombing would start in a few days.

“The opposition was told in clear terms that action to deter further use of chemical weapons by the Assad regime could come as early as in the next few days,” a Syrian participant in the meeting said. Another Syrian participant said that he was convinced US bombing was scheduled to begin on Thursday, August 29, 2013. Several participants — both Syrian and Arab — stressed that the assurances of forthcoming bombing were most explicit even as formally 44 is still undecided.

The descriptions of these meetings raise the question of the extent of foreknowledge of US Intelligence, and therefore, the White House. All the sources consulted — both Syrian and Arab — stressed that officials of the “Mukhabarat Amriki” actively participated in the meetings and briefings in Turkey. Therefore, at the very least, they should have known that the opposition leaders were anticipating “a war-changing development”: that is, a dramatic event which would provoke a US-led military intervention.

The mere fact that weapon storage sites under the tight supervision of US Intelligence were opened up and about a thousand tons of high-quality weapons were distributed to the opposition indicates that US Intelligence anticipated such a provocation and the opportunity for the Syrian opposition to exploit the impact of the ensuing US and allied bombing. Hence, even if the White House did not know in advance of the chemical provocation, they should have concluded, or at the very least suspected, that the chemical attack was most likely the “war-changing development” anticipated by the opposition leaders as provocation of US-led bombing. Under such circumstances, the White House should have refrained from rushing head-on to accuse Assad’s Damascus and threaten retaliation, thus making the Obama White House at the very least complicit after the act.

Meanwhile, additional data from Damascus about the actual chemical attack increases the doubts about Washington’s version of events. Immediately after the attack, three hospitals of Doctors Without Borders (MSF: médecins sans frontières) in the greater Damascus area treated more than 3,600 Syrians affected by the chemical attack, and 355 of them died. MSF performed tests on the vast majority of those treated.

MSF director of operations Bart Janssens summed up the findings: “MSF can neither scientifically confirm the cause of these symptoms nor establish who is responsible for the attack. However, the reported symptoms of the patients, in addition to the epidemiological pattern of the events — characterized by the massive influx of patients in a short period of time, the origin of the patients, and the contamination of medical and first aid workers — strongly indicate mass exposure to a neurotoxic agent.” Simply put, even after testing some 3,600 patients, MSF failed to confirm that sarin was the cause of the injuries. According to MSF, the cause could have been nerve agents like sarin, concentrated riot control gas, or even high-concentration pesticides. Moreover, opposition reports that there was distinct stench during the attack suggest that it could have come from the “kitchen sarin” used by jihadist groups (as distinct from the odorless military-type sarin) or improvised agents like pesticides.

Some of the evidence touted by the White House is questionable at best.

A small incident in Beirut raises big questions. A day after the chemical attack, Lebanese fixers working for the “Mukhabarat Amriki” succeeded to convince a Syrian male who claimed to have been injured in the chemical attack to seek medical aid in Beirut in return for a hefty sum that would effectively settle him for life. The man was put into an ambulance and transferred overnight to the Farhat Hospital in Jib Janine, Beirut. The Obama White House immediately leaked friendly media that “the Lebanese Red Cross announced that test results found traces of sarin gas in his blood.” However, this was news to Lebanese intelligence and Red Cross officials.

According to senior intelligence officials, “Red Cross Operations Director George Kettaneh told [them] that the injured Syrian fled the hospital before doctors were able to test for traces of toxic gas in his blood.” Apparently, the patient declared that he had recovered from his nausea and no longer needed medical treatment. The Lebanese security forces are still searching for the Syrian patient and his honorarium.

On August 24, 2013, Syrian Commando forces acted on intelligence about the possible perpetrators of the chemical attack and raided a cluster of rebel tunnels in the Damascus suburb of Jobar. Canisters of toxic material were hit in the fierce fire-fight as several Syrian soldiers suffered from suffocation and “some of the injured are in a critical condition”.

The Commando eventually seized an opposition warehouse containing barrels full of chemicals required for mixing “kitchen sarin”, laboratory equipment, as well as a large number of protective masks. The Syrian Commando also captured several improvised explosive devices, RPG rounds, and mortar shells. The same day, at least four HizbAllah fighters operating in Damascus near Ghouta were hit by chemical agents at the very same time the Syrian Commando unit was hit while searching a group of rebel tunnels in Jobar. Both the Syrian and the HizbAllah forces were acting on intelligence information about the real perpetrators of the chemical attack. Damascus told Moscow the Syrian troops were hit by some form of a nerve agent and sent samples (blood, tissues, and soil) and captured equipment to Russia.

Several Syrian leaders, many of whom are not Bashar al-Assad supporters and are even his sworn enemies, are now convinced that the Syrian opposition is responsible for the August 21, 2013, chemical attack in the Damascus area in order to provoke the US and the allies into bombing Assad’s Syria. Most explicit and eloquent is Saleh Muslim, the head of the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) which has been fighting the Syrian Government. Muslim doubts Assad would have used chemical weapons when he was winning the civil war.

“The regime in Syria … has chemical weapons, but they wouldn’t use them around Damascus, five km from the [UN] committee which is investigating chemical weapons. Of course they are not so stupid as to do so,” Muslim told Reuters on August 27, 2013. He believes the attack was “aimed at framing Assad and provoking an international reaction”. Muslim is convinced that “some other sides who want to blame the Syrian regime, who want to show them as guilty and then see action” is responsible for the chemical attack. The US was exploiting the attack to further its own anti-Assad policies and should the UN inspectors find evidence that the rebels were behind the attack, then “everybody would forget it”, Muslim shrugged. “Who is the side who would be punished? Are they are going to punish the Emir of Qatar or the King of Saudi Arabia, or Mr Erdo?an of Turkey?”

And there remain the questions: Given the extent of the involvement of the “Mukhabarat Amriki” in opposition activities, how is that US Intelligence did not know in advance about the opposition’s planned use of chemical weapons in Damascus?

It is a colossal failure.

And if they did know and warned the White House, why then the sanctimonious rush to blame the Assad Administration?

Moreover, how can the Administration continue to support and seek to empower the opposition which had just intentionally killed some 1,300 innocent civilians in order to provoke a US military intervention?

Pic - "Contrary to many media accounts, the war in Syria is not being waged entirely, or even predominantly, by dangerous Islamists and al Qaeda die-hards."

Go Big Or Go Home

Well, that was weird.

Barely a day passed since Great Satan's Sec O State delivered a war speech and then 44 delivered  a bystanderspeech of sorts - almost as if going to Congress would absolve the Commander In Chief of any commanding in chiefing.

Aside from signaling the Persian Syrian Axis to complete as much counterattacks on rebelious rebel enclaves by Sept 9th - it also makes 44 seem decidedly unserious.

Because Washington is not willing to match its rhetoric about wanting to see Assad gone with actions, it instead looks for marginal—even rhetorical—ways to appear as if it is doing something. But that is the worst thing Great Satan could do. It leads to half measures piled on top of half measures, committing us deeper and deeper without coming any closer to reaching any meaningful goal. This is exactly how Great Satan ended up backing into Vietnam.

Put simply, the administration must choose one of two overall strategies: do nothing or pursue an intervention far more decisive than limited strikes.

If Great Satan is going to intervene in Syria, only a very sizable intervention makes sense. We should go big, or stay home. Because of the complex dynamics of intercommunal civil wars more generally and Syria’s specifically, it is going to take a great deal to bring it to an end—let alone an end favorable to American interests. There are options that could work in Syria without committing U.S. ground troops, but they are considerably bigger, and longer term, than the administration currently seems willing to contemplate.

The most promising of these would be to arm and train a professional, conventional Syrian opposition army with heavy weapons and a traditional chain of command along the lines during the Bosnia war (which was relatively low cost, though it was a major effort and took several years to bear fruit). Pursuing this option in Syria would have the added benefit of creating a strong, apolitical institution around which the international community could help the country build a new political process.

What has been sorely lacking so far is the will to choose. It is a hard choice, but that is why we have a president: to make exactly these kinds of hard choices.

The administration needs to pick one goal and develop an integrated strategy to try to achieve it. Then all subsequent decisions related to Syria should be determined by what is in the best interests of advancing that strategy. If the president decides to stay out, then he should stop announcing what is and isn’t acceptable in Syria and develop a strategy to contain the spillover from what is likely to be a long Syrian civil war. In particular, that will mean expending real resources—time, energy, diplomatic clout, and even money or military assets—to shore up all of Syria’s neighbors. If, however, the president decides to intervene, he needs to recognize that there are limited options that may be worth trying, but the more limited the option, the less likely it is to succeed.

As for what to do about Syria’s alleged chemical-weapons use, that answer should also flow from the strategy we choose. If we decide to stay out, then we should stay out—and launching a very limited response, one that could easily draw us into a wider involvement, would be completely contrary to that approach. If we decide to intervene, then we should see this as an opportunity both to inflict real harm on the regime and to justify greater assistance to the opposition, in a way that will have considerable international legitimacy.

The only wrong choice is to treat this moment as somehow unrelated to America’s larger goals and strategy in Syria. Too bad that is what it seems we are going to do

Pic - "Like it or not we are the Global PoPo"

Fall Weiß

At dawn on September 1st, Luftwaffe struck at Polish airfields destroying most of the planes before they could get off the ground. With control of the skies assured wicked Wehrmacht began the systematic destruction of railroads and the few communications nodes. From the very outset the Poles mobilization plan was seriously compromised. Before the day ended, chaos reigned at Polish Army HQ.

The first phase of the campaign, fought on the frontiers was over by September 5th and the morning of the 7th found reconnaissance elements of Army Group South’s 10th Army just 36 miles southwest of Warsaw. Meanwhile, also on September 5th, vBock’s Army Group North had cut across the corridor and turned southeast for Warsaw. Units of the 3rd Army reached the banks of the River Narew on September 7th, just 25 miles north of Warsaw. The fast moving armored panzer 'Schwerpunkts' of blitzing attacks left the immobile Polish armies cut up, surrounded and out of supply.

Meanwhile the closing of the inner ring at Warsaw witnessed some tough fighting as the Polish Poznan Army, bypassed in the first week of the war, charged heading and attacked toward Warsaw to the southeast. The German 8th and 10th Armies were put to the test as they were forced to turn some divisions completely around to meet the desperate Polish assault. In the end the gallant attack fell short and by September 19th the Poznan Army surrendered some 100,000 men and Poland’s last intact army.

As this was occurring the second, more deeper envelopment led by General Heinz Guderian’s panzers took the city of Brest-Litovsk on September 17th, and continued past the city where they made contact with the 10th Army spearhead at Wlodowa 30 miles to the south.

The war, for all practical purposes was over by September 17th. Lvov surrendered on the 19th. Warsaw held out until September 27th, gave up the ghost and the last organized resistance ended October 6th with the surrender of 17,000 Polish soldiers at Kock.

The campaign had lasted less than two months and ended in the destruction of the Polish Army and the fourth partition of Poland. German losses were surprisingly heavy considering the brevity of the campaign.

Deutsch casualties total some 48,000 of which 16,000 were killed. Fully one quarter of the panzers the German committed to battle were lost to Polish anti-panzer guns.  Luftwaffe was forced to trash  550 aircraft.

It was not a cheap victory by any means but it did confirm to the generals of  Wehrmacht that the military machine that they had built was indeed the best in the world and worthy of their confidence.

Reaction around the world on 1 Sept 1939?

France - mobilized her military and demanded Deutschland withdraw from Poland.

Great Britain - mobilized her army and RAF (the Navy was mobilized the day before) and demanded Germany withdraw from Poland.

Italy - Announced no military plans or initiatives.

Russia - warned concern for civilian population of Russian descent and fear of Polish bandits would warrant armed intervention. She also mobilized her military.

Great Satan - Demanded a halt of indescriminate bombing of towns and civilians.

Finland, Norway, Sweden and the Swiss - announced neutrality

Deutschland - "Determined to eliminate insecurity and perpetual civil war from the borders of the Reich"

Poland - appealed to Great Britain and France to intervene in honour of the Mutual Assistance Treaty of 1939.

1 September is the day an old world order was violently overturned, chock full of lessons, promises and harbingers that echo still today.