The battle for mountainous Al-Qalamoun-a rugged region between the Syrian capital and Homs, the country’s third largest city-will be as significant in military terms when it comes, say diplomats and analysts, as the struggle in the spring for Qusair, a strategic town in sight of Lebanon, that was retaken by the Syrian army thanks to Hezbollah, whose fighters were in the vanguard of the assault.
The offensive will again pit Hezbollah fighters directly against jihadists and militant You Know Whatists. The al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra and Islamist militias Ahrar al-Sham and Liwa al-Islam have been reinforcing towns and villages in the region to prepare for the expected Hezbollah assault. Some reports claim that as many as 20,000 rebel fighters have poured into the region, some being redeployed from Damascus suburbs.
A grueling confrontation in Al-Qalamoun-an area 50 miles long and 25 miles broad that runs from the rural outskirts of the Syrian capital to the Lebanese border-could see Saudi Arabia accelerate its arming of certain rebel groups that the administration considers dangerous to the West, adding to strained relations between Washington and Riyadh.
The Al-Qalamoun region is seen as vital both by Syrian forces and the rebels. Controlling Al-Qalamoun would allow the Assad regime to secure land links between Damascus and Homs and interdict arms supplies from Lebanese Sunni supporters for the rebels coming through the border around the town of Arsal.
For the regime, consolidating its hold on Homs is a priority, as it represents a central link between Syria’s interior cities and the Mediterranean coast north of Latakia, a stronghold of President Assad’s minority Alawite sect.
Hezbollah officials have been briefing Lebanese media outlets on an upcoming Al-Qalamoun offensive as part of an effort to manage and prepare their own followers, many of whom in the south of Lebanon have begun to express doubts about the wisdom of becoming further embroiled in their neighbor’s raging civil war.
“This isn’t going to be a two-week battle like Qusair,” says a British military adviser to the Lebanese army. “The region is mountainous and the offensive will extend into the spring and there’ll be more chance of violent spillover into Lebanon.”
The year is 2016, and two of the U.S. Navy’s latest ships are backing a key ally in the tinderbox of the South China Sea. They’re facing down the Chinese Navy halfway across the world with the latest weapons and systems the United States can get its hands on. But is it enough?
The result isn’t good. After a quick clash with China, the burning and flooded remains of naval vessels sent under-prepared into the fight is a harrowing lesson to be cautious about how we equip the U.S. military
Today, we’re sending the Littoral Combat Ship into the fray — a new class of warships developed following the 9/11 attacks.The LCS was designed to fight close to shore, a characteristic that opens the vessel up to more missions — and challenges — than most Navy ships. Versatile and agile, LCS' are lightly armed, and rely on swappable “mission modules” to increase firepower and other special capabilities such as surface warfare, minesweeping and anti-submarine warfare.A normal LCS has a rapid-fire 57-millimeter gun, a pair of 30-millimeter cannons and heavy machine guns. The ship also has Rolling Airframe anti-aircraft missiles to defend against enemy jets and incoming missiles.Compared to larger surface ships, the LCS lacks firepower — something critics of the LCS have seized upon. These critics contend the LCS should have a larger gun, longer-range self-defense missiles, and anti-ship missiles capable of taking on enemy vessels its own size.It’s 2016 and China and the Philippines both claim the shoal as part of their territory and things get uglier. Two ships of the Philippine Navy, the patrol craft BRP Emilio Jacinto and BRP Artemio Ricarde, have arrived. The potential for a shooting war is very high.Great Satan is backing up her Filipino allies: two LCSs, USS Freedom and USS Fort Worth, are both about thirty miles south of the Emilio Jacinto and Artemio Ricarde. The USS Halsey, an Arleigh Burke-class guided missile destroyer, is behind them at an equal distance.Philippine Navy have comparatively crude sensors — basically amounting to eyeballs and navigational radars — and are having a difficult time identifying all of the ship traffic in and around the shoal. There are a lot of surface contacts; some are fishing boats, and some may be… something else.An MQ-4C Triton identifies plenty of Chinese fishing boats, but also a wolf in the fold: a Chinese Jianghu-class destroyer named the Changde. Twenty miles to the west is the Qinzhou, a new Type 056 corvette.At 09:46:31, Changde opens fire on the Emilio Jacinto with its 100-millimeter deck gun. Emilio Jacinto immediately returns fire with her 76-millimeter gun and scores a lucky hit, starting a minor fire on Changde. A gunfight rages for more than three minutes, during which time Changde is struck several times.Emilio Jacinto reports she is under missile attack from the west. That would make the attacker the corvette Qinzhou. Without air defense radars and advanced weapons, Emilio Jacinto is a sitting duck. Seconds later, she is hit by several Chinese YJ-83 “Eagle Strike” anti-ship missiles, screaming in less than 30 feet above the ocean.Emilio Jacinto disappears from the command screen.Another brace of YJ-83s streaks towards BRP Artemio Ricarde. Despite the roughly 60-mile distance, Halsey attempts to intervene, launching SM-6 surface to air missiles to knock down the Chinese missiles. But the distance is too much and Artemio Ricarde is struck. The damage is catastrophic.Freedom and Fort Worth are steaming north at flank speed to engage Qinzhou and the wounded Changde, now fleeing north away from the battle zone. It’s a gamble because littoral combat ships are not well protected against anti-ship missiles, having only their 57-millimeter guns and Rolling Airframe missile launcher mounts. Qinzhou is out of anti-ship missiles. Changde might still have all of her missiles, but she’s also taken serious damage trading shots with Emilio Jacinto.Moving at more than 40 knots, Fort Worth and Freedom begin closing the gap. Qinzhou and Changde both turn to face Fort Worth. Apparently they want to fight. I’ll oblige them. Both LCSs are under orders to engage the enemy as soon as they come close enough to fire their Griffin surface to surface missiles. Between the two of them, they have 30 Griffins.At four miles, Fort Worth opens up on Qinzhou with its 57-millimeter gun. Qinzhou immediately returns fire with its 76-millimeter gun, lightly damaging Fort Worth. Unfortunately, Fort Worth’s Rolling Airframe missile launcher is destroyed early on, meaning it is out of active anti-missile defenses. Then the Griffin missile launcher is put out of action, meaning Fort Worth’s sole armament is a single 57-millimeter gun. Within moments, she too is destroyed.Fort Worth is hurt, with a bad fire and severe flooding. She's defenseless at this range. It’s time to leave. Fort Worth turns to race south at maximum speed, but it continues to be pummeled by Qinzhou’s 76-millimeter gun. Laser rangefinders, gun directing radar, 30-millimeter Bushmaster guns all knocked out…the damage reports keep coming in.Fort Worth is doomed.As if that weren’t bad enough, Halsey detects two anti-ship missiles launched to the south, halfway between it and Fort Worth and right in the vicinity of the Scarborough Shoal. Could it be a submarine? Whatever they are, they’re moving at 520 knots. The two mystery missiles streak north, towards Fort Worth. Not good. Halsey again tries to intervene, launching a salvo of four SM-6 air defense missiles that within moments are traveling at 2,400 knots. Will they reach the threats in time?
Suddenly, it no longer matters. Fort Worth capsizes.The only thing left for Freedom to do is attack. Freedom has the only anti-ship missiles within a thousand miles. Halsey has none except for a MH-60R Seahawk helicopter armed with Hellfire air-to-surface missiles, but I’m afraid of losing it to Qinzhou’s air defenses. If Freedom wants out, it has to fight its way out.
At 5.7 miles, Freedom reports there is light damage and major flooding on the already wounded Changde. She opens fire with the 57-millimeter gun, quickly scoring several hits. Changde’s gun must be damaged, because it is not opening fire. Changde takes a lot of hits but is not going down, likely because of the small size of the 57-millimeter shell. Freedom is charging ahead at more than 40 knots, blazing away with its gun.At a distance of three miles, the Griffin missiles launch. It’s about time, because the 57-millimeter gun jams. Changde already has a medium-sized fire and major flooding. Several Griffins malfunction but most score hits on Changde. Still, they don’t do any appreciable damage to the already damaged ship; Griffin missiles have a warhead that weighs as much as two laptop computers. The next largest anti-ship missile in the American inventory, Harpoon, has a warhead that weighs 488 pounds. But there aren’t any Harpoons within hundreds of miles.Finally, with the last of Freedom’s missiles expended, Changde goes down. But Quinzhou, the Type 056 corvette, has arrived at the shoal and engages Freedom with her 76-millimeter gun. Due to the short range of the 57-millimeter gun, Freedom can’t return fire. A serious dilemma: at the edge of the range envelope of the Chinese gun, do I run and get away, or do I close with the enemy and destroy him?At this point Halsey’s Hellfire-armed helicopter is at risk of being shot down, No choice except to sortee to save Freedom. It can’t sink Quinzhou, but it might inflict enough damage that would allow Freedom to get away.
Quinzhou and Freedom are now locked in a gun battle and only one is going to sail away. Freedom has a rapid firing gun and likely better fire control, but Quinzhou’s shells are larger.
Freedom catches fire. The ship begins flooding. Her gun is destroyed, pulling away, speed 41 knots, and praying Halsey’s helicopter arrives in time to cover her withdraw.
Warfare is tragic and unpredictable. Any difference in training, maintenance or secret capabilities of both navies — things we wouldn’t know until the shooting starts — could have decisively impacted the scenario.
The LCS is the Navy’s handyman, capable of doing all sorts of jobs with its mission module system. Like all handymen, it has its toolboxes to get the job done. And few handymen are really, really good at everything you might expect them to do. With all the potential missions for the Littoral Combat Ship and a limited pool of money, what do we expect it to do really well?One things for certain: the handyman’s hammer is too small
Twenty-first-century conflict is migrating away from small mountain villages, farming areas, and frontier valleys of places like Afghanistan into sprawling cities like Mumbai or Mogadishu, where ubiquitous technology is enabling groups to establish networks of influence that are eroding the ability of governments to retain and exercise power and defend their citizens.Pic - "City Combat and Coin"
4 trends that“drive most aspects of future life on the planet, including conflict”—rapid population growth, accelerating urbanization, littoralization (the tendency for populations to cluster on coastlines), and increasing connectedness (the way technology is driving social networks). These crowded, urban, coastal, and hyper-connected environments act as powerful catalysts enabling non-state actors to wield enormous power that in some cases can topple governments.
“Feral cities”—sprawling urban centers like Kingston, Jamaica, San Pedro Sula in Honduras, Mogadishu, and Mumbai—where population growth is straining the capacity of infrastructure and government, allowing alternative licit and illicit networks to compete for influence, power, and sometimes outright control.
Non state actor outers exploit or “nest” within these complex urban environments, leveraging the areas’ fragility and weakness to pursue their own ends—from the way a group of Pakistani terrorists infiltrated and violently shut down large parts of Mumbai in November 2008, to the way Somali militias operate in Mogadishu, to how a transnational criminal network operates out of Kingston, Jamaica, to how protestors in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, and Syria are challenging decades of oppression and dictatorship.
If what is happening in these hyper-connected, crowded, coastal cities represents a “new normal,” then the implications for Great Satan’s role in the world could be profound. Security thinkers need “to start treating the city as a unit of analysis in its own right,” taking into account how a city’s “subsystems and sub-districts fit together, as well as how that city nests within, and interacts with, regional and transnational flows and networks.”
In “On War in the Urban, Networked Littoral” (a play on Carl von Clausewitz’s 1832 classic, On War), Kilcullen outlines in disturbing detail how military forces engaging in these environments will face challenges on land, along the coastal waterways, in the air, and in cyberspace. Operating in these spaces is something most people in the U.S. military would rather ignore in favor of more classic conventional engagements, but Kilcullen suggests that military leaders adopt a more mobile, improvisational, expeditionary mentality, concluding, “It’s time to drag ourselves—body and mind—out of the mountains.”
“Germany has huge potential to deliver more usable firepower to the (NATO) alliance. When we look around Europe, I don’t think there would be many of our European allies who fear Germany from a military point of view or as a security threat.”Pic - "Die Bundeswehr ist eine Armee im Einsatz, Leibchen!!
“(It is about) a willingness to pick up the burdens that go with having a globally important economy… Germany recognising that it can’t continue to be the dominant economy in Europe without also significantly increasing its military capability,”
Hammond says he want Berlin to “significantly increase its military capability” and praised the “huge strides” the country had already taken to end conscription and create smaller, more professional armed forces.
“I detect a determination that Germany’s role in NATO should continue to normalise. It intends to become a more significant player.”
These are troubling and uncertain times for Saudi diplomacy. A string of regional upsets and friction with Great Satan has cast the kingdom into rocky, uncharted waters. 44’s support of the Ikwhan in Egypt and its response to the use of chemical weapons in Syria elicited outrage and accusations of unreliability and even betrayal from Riyadh. Then came the slight warming in U.S.-Iranian relations—highlighted by the unprecedented phone call between 44 and Persia's Preacher Command. That mild rapprochement brought to the fore an old specter: an U.S.-Iranian breakthrough that marginalizes the Gulf states and erodes their long-standing position as beneficiaries of U.S.-Iranian hostility.
The Gulf is being shut out of regional negotiations. Great Satan was duped on Syria and Iran. The Gulf needs to adopt a more muscular, unilateral approach to safeguard its own interests, and it should cultivate new security patrons to compensate for U.S. capriciousness, perfidy, and retreat from the region.
What does this latest round of hand-wringing, protest, and introspection really mean in terms of new directions in Saudi foreign policy?
If history is any guide, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf more generally, will continue to pursue policies that align with the broad contours of U.S. strategy—but with a creeping preference for hedging and unilateralism that will, in some cases, clash with U.S. interests. It is in the Gulf’s domestic landscape that the sharpest breaks between Saudi and U.S. views are emerging: regional tensions have enabled a harsh security campaign against a wide range of dissidents, the rise of sectarianism, and the troubling use of censorship.
Ddrones are just one of three principal Great Satan counterterrorism tools, and not necessarily the most important. Special Operations forces are now relying on a more balanced mix of tactics: Launching raids and developing partner forces offer more versatility than drone strikes and will probably become the wave of the future as America’s big wars wind down
Raids have several advantages over drones. The targets can be interrogated for further intelligence, laptops and other physical evidence can be scooped up, and perhaps most important, the capture can result in what operators call a “judicial finish,” with the terrorist tried and convicted in a court of law.
Of course, Special Operations forces, along with the CIA, will still use drones when a threat is deemed so imminent that taking out a suspect is the best way to stop an attack on vital U.S. interests. That was the case in August when a barrage of drone strikes pummeled the nether provinces of Yemen to foil a reported plot on oil terminals and ports by the most active terrorist group today, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.
Somalia is a good example: Special Operations troops have worked with a variety of partners to retake the country from al-Shabab, restoring government there for the first time in two decades and creating a network of allies to push al-Qaeda out of East Africa. Amid a wider peace enforcement operation, U.S. troops have helped train forces from Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya and Djibouti. High-end Ugandan units played a key role in pushing al-Shabab out of Mogadishu, and SEAL-trained Kenyan boat units and infantry conducted a joint operation to retake the port city of Kismayo from al-Shabab, thus denying the terrorist group a key revenue source.
Partner forces also reportedly played a role in the raid two weekends ago.
The partnering approach may not be easy, and it does take years to produce results, but it is the most sustainable security solution around. The United States still needs to develop credible means of measuring the effectiveness of this approach, but don’t be surprised if it becomes the future of America’s fight against terrorism.
Great Satan's nuclear forces must have three characteristics. They must be credible to our adversaries. They must invite stability, meaning any adversary must conclude the use of such weapons cannot be undertaken successfully. And our nuclear deterrent must hold at risk an adversary’s forces so they cannot remain in a sanctuary, freely able to threaten the US.
Practically, what does this mean? Credible means that the American nuclear force must be invulnerable to any future change in technology. Nothing can change the current ability of 450 separate ICBM silos and 50 launch control facilities to withstand an attack. No sane Russian planner would contemplate trying to simultaneously destroy all of these targets.
But a technology “surprise” could make the U.S. submarine force vulnerable. Adm. Jonathan Greenert, chief of naval operations and a former submariner, in the July 2012 issue of the naval magazine Proceedings, said that an ability to find ships at sea was a capability on the horizon that most worried him. Over time our submarines at sea could be attrited without our being able to determine who was taking them out. A too limited or small force is an invitation to the Russians and Chinese to "come get us".
Having all three legs of our triad means we have technology insurance -- if there are problems with any one of our legs, the other two can do the job while we repair the first. Bombers are recallable and subs cannot now be found. The ICBMs remain highly stabilizing in that they cannot be attacked with stealth. They require such a high number of attacking warheads to take them out that we leave an adversary with two choices: invite Armageddon or do nothing with nuclear weapons.
For nearly 70 years of the nuclear age, our adversaries have concluded just that -- do nothing with nuclear forces. Our 500 nuclear assets when presented to an adversary during a crisis quickly leads to their conclusion: "Not today, comrade". Reducing our deterrent to 12 submarines, which CATO recommends, puts our nuclear eggs in very few baskets -- eight submarines at sea and the rest at two naval bases.
In a world of 400 current conflicts involving militias, terror groups, state sponsors of terror, guerilla groups and tribal armies, in some 62 countries, it is remarkable that no central nuclear power has been drawn into using nuclear weapons. That is because our deterrent has worked perfectly for nearly 70 years.
Finally, the U.S. cannot do these things in a vacuum. Unilaterally wiping out some 1000 to 1200 or more American nuclear warheads would be a harsh jolt to the security of the international system. Already Japan, South Korea and our NATO allies have expressed concern they will be forced to adopt nuclear weapons in their respective national arsenals if we diminish our deterrent.
In short, CATO's radical and unwise plan saves very little money; creates huge instabilities; invites attack over time on our remaining deterrent the U.S. nuclear deterrent force; and threatens to divorce our allies in Europe and East Asia from our nuclear umbrella, spurring further nuclear proliferation. On top of which, the threats to our security from nascent nuclear weapons states -- North Korea and Iran -- are where real serious nuclear dangers lie, whether from the surreptitiously delivery of nuclear weapons in an electromagnetic pulse, or EMP, attack on our country or the detonation of an Iranian nuclear device somewhere in an American city. Those are serious threats that much be addressed as well. CATO diverts our attention to the wrong issue -- the U.S. nuclear deterrent.
The central role of our nuclear deterrent triad is to keep any crisis from escalating to a nuclear conflict. That requires a credible, stable and effective deterrent triad. Each successive administration from Eisenhower to the present, through 70 years of nuclear history, has so concluded.
Imagine this scenario: a lightly armed U.S. Navy intelligence-gathering ship cruising off the coast of North Korea is suddenly surrounded by enemy patrol vessels demanding it surrender. Only a few kilometers away a destroyer belonging to the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (hereinafter called the navy) happens to be cruising close enough to offer help.
The prime minister must make a quick and agonizing decision: Does he order the destroyer to the rescue of a friendly vessel in harm's way, thereby violating the constitution, breaking the law and possibly exposing the ship's captain to criminal charges if any North Korean is killed? Or, should he obey the law, restrain the captain and thereby almost certainly destroy the alliance with its main protector beyond repair?
This kind of scenario that lies behind the renewed push to pass necessary changes to the Self-Defense Forces Act to permit it to engage in what's called "collective self-defense." Briefly, it refers to country coming to the aid of an ally when it is under attack and the party is in a position to help out. For years the government has interpreted collective defense as going against the country's war-renouncing constitution.
See, the Great Satan/Nippon Hookup security arrangement is often called an "alliance." It is not; the term alliance is purely a courtesy title. The so-called alliance is in essence a deal. The U.S. promises to defend Japan if attacked, with nuclear weapons if necessary (the nuclear umbrella). In return, Japan agrees to permit American bases on its soil for Americans to use basically as they see fit.
Japan is not obliged to defend the U.S. if she comes under attack. The most commonly mentioned scenario -- intercepting a North Korean intercontinental ballistic missile fired over Japan on the way to the U.S. mainland -- is considered by most observers as far-fetched. The "Pueblo scenario," rendering assistance to U.S. Navy ships if needed, is a far more likely contingency
The main emphasis behind a push to approve collective defense is Japan's rapidly expanding involvement in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (PKO). In the past 20 years, more than 8,000 Self-Defense Force troops have been involved in PKOs in half a dozen countries. Engineering troops are currently stationed in South Sudan, and army medical personnel have helped in earthquake-ravaged Haiti. The navy takes part in anti-piracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden.
The 2007 changes to the Self Defense Forces Act made participating in UN-approved peace operations one of the main missions but did not solve such issues as lending assistance to other nations participating in the joint operations. Japan cannot now come to the assistance, say, of an NGO targeted by terrorists, for example, or to a non-Japanese ship attacked by pirates based in Somalia.
Currently, two special committees have been convened to consider aspects of Japan's security posture looking forward. They are expected to make their recommendations later this year and introduced to the Diet next year. One is the Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security, dealing with the collective defense issue. The other is Advisory Panel on National Security and Defense Capabilities.
Last month, the United States Army released a remarkable piece of video. It’s from the combat helmet cameras of a Medevac helicopter crew in Afghanistan. It’s shaky and grainy, but it takes us to the frontlines that our troops face every day. And in that video, as the helicopter touches down by a remote village, you see, out of a cloud of dust, an American soldier.
He’s without his helmet, standing in the open, exposing himself to enemy fire, standing watch over a severely wounded soldier. He helps carry that wounded soldier to the helicopter, and places him inside. Then, amidst the whipping wind and deafening roar of the blades, he does something unexpected. He leans in and kisses the wounded soldier on the head – a simple act of compassion and loyalty to a brother in arms. And as the door closes and the helicopter takes off, he turns and goes back the way he came, back into the battle.
In our nation’s history, we have presented our highest military decoration, the Medal of Honor, nearly 3,500 times for actions above and beyond the call of duty. But this may be the first time that we can actually bear witness to a small part of those actions for ourselves. And today we honor the American in that video – the soldier who went back in – Captain William Swenson.
Moments like this, Americans like Will, remind us what our country can be at its best – a nation of citizens who look out for one another; who meet our obligations to one another, not just when it’s easy, but when it’s hard. Especially when it’s hard. Will, you’re an example – to everyone in this city, to our whole country – of the professionalism and patriotism we should strive for – whether we wear the uniform or not.
September morning four years ago. It’s around sunrise. A column of Afghan soldiers and their American advisors are winding their way up a narrow trail towards a village to meet with elders. But just as the first soldier reaches the outskirts of the village, all hell breaks loose.
Almost instantly, three Marines and a Navy corpsman at the front of the column are surrounded. Will and the soldiers in the center of the column are pinned down. Rocket-propelled grenade, mortar, and machine gun fire is pouring in from three sides.
As he returns fire, Will calls for air support. But his initial requests are denied – Will and his team are too close to the village. Then Will learns that his noncommissioned officer, Sergeant First Class Kenneth Westbrook, has been shot in the neck. So Will breaks across 50 meters of open space, bullets biting all around. Lying on his back, he presses a bandage to Kenneth’s wound with one hand and calls for a Medevac with the other, trying to keep his buddy calm.
By this time, the enemy has gotten even closer – just 20 or 30 meters away. Over the radio, they’re demanding the Americans surrender. Will stops treating Kenneth long enough to respond – by lobbing a grenade.
Finally, after more than an hour and a half of fighting, air support arrives. Will directs them to nearby targets. Then it’s time to move. Exposing himself again to enemy fire, Will helps carry Kenneth the length of more than two football fields, down steep terraces, to that helicopter. And then, in the moment captured by those cameras, Will leans in to say goodbye.
But more Americans – and more Afghans – are still out there. So Will does something incredible. He jumps behind the wheel of an unarmored Ford Ranger pickup truck. A Marine gets in the passenger seat. And they drive that truck – a vehicle designed for the highway – straight into the battle.
Twice, they pick up injured Afghan soldiers – bullets whizzing past them, slamming into the pickup truck. Twice they bring them back. When the truck gives out, they grab a Humvee. The Marine by Will’s side has no idea how they survived. But, he says, “by that time it didn’t matter. We [were] not leaving any soldiers behind.”
Finally, a helicopter spots those four missing Americans – hours after they were trapped in the opening ambush. So Will gets in another Humvee, with a crew that includes Dakota Meyer. And together, they drive. Past enemy fighters. Up through the valley. Exposed once more.
When they reach the village, Will jumps out – drawing even more fire, dodging even more bullets. But they reach those Americans, lying where they fell. Will and the others carry them out, one-by-one. They bring their fallen brothers home.
The PLA’s military build-up, while comprehensive in nature, is principally anchored on a projectile-centric strategy that seeks to exploit theater geography, financial asymmetries, and gaps in international law to China’s favor. This strategy relies upon the land-based deployment of large numbers of nuclear capable delivery vehicles (ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and unmanned aerial vehicles) for long-range precision strike missions.
While this approach risks regional instability and international approbation, China’s inability to produce aircraft and ship platforms with effective power projection capabilities leaves the PLA with no incentive to alter the nature of its strategy. Further compounding the problem, the Chinese definition of victory–which is to keep Great Satan from intervening in "its" conflicts and, failing that, to assure the U.S. cannot gain air superiority and effectively project power into the region–means that the factors encouraging the PLA to continue its force modernization program are highly durable.
There are two major external threats to the CCP’s "core interests" that the PLA must be prepared to defend against. A Taiwan contingency is the primary threat, and a Japan contingency is the secondary threat. Taiwan is a threat because its government, under its Republic of China (ROC) constitution, does not recognize the legitimacy of the CCP, and rejects Beijing’s sovereignty claims to Taiwan’s territory. Compounding the problem it represents to the CCP, Taiwan's model of governance is therefore anathema to the CCP’s narrative, which holds that ethnically Chinese people can only be ruled by an authoritarian system. As a result, the PLA views Taiwan as an entity that must be subjugated or "re-unified" by coercion or even war if necessary.
For this reason, the PLA continues to focus on a conflict with Taiwan as the principle driver of its defense planning.
The American alliance with Japan is also key factor in understanding Beijing’s strategic animus toward Tokyo. China’s civilian and military leaders are keenly aware that the security treaty that binds the U.S.-Japan alliance explicitly allows American forces to use bases on Japan for responding to regional contingencies, including Chinese aggression against Taiwan.The hottest shot of all is PLA's Projectile Strategy:
Another goal is to maintain the capacity to intervene in a war or instability on the Korean Peninsula to assure that the outcome of any such events would be strategically favorable (or at least acceptable) to Beijing.
The PLA’s modernization program, while allowing for comprehensive improvements across the force, is concentrated on developing and deploying guided missiles and other unmanned projectiles for power projection missions. In the context of PLA strategy, a projectile is any single-use ordinance delivery weapon, such as a ballistic missile, cruise missile or unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) that is launched into the atmosphere.
The PLA has been investing considerable resources into its reconnaissance infrastructure to achieve the ability to find, track and target its adversaries at stand-off ranges with projectiles.
This evolving "reconnaissance-strike complex" is based on using conventionally armed projectiles as weapons capable of achieving strategic effects previously only available to China through the use of nuclear weapons.
The PLA’s ability to use these nuclear capable, but conventionally armed, delivery vehicles for strategic missions has been enabled by advancements in positioning, guidance and sensor technologies that allow for great precision against land and sea surface targets, potentially even including mobile aircraft carriers.
The really bad news is the state of existing Arab countries, and how most of them have done such a terrible job of managing the societies that they inherited after 1920.Pic - "There is a myth that while we in the wicked Women Worshipping West are all hot for freedom - other cats on earth are not"
The horror map is not the one published in the NYT two weeks ago; it is the existing map and condition of the Arab countries that have spent nearly a century developing themselves and have so little to show for it.
Not a single credible Arab democracy. Not a single Arab land where the consent of the governed actually matters. Not a single Arab society where individual men and women are allowed to use all their God-given human faculties of creativity, ingenuity, individuality, debate, free expression, autonomous analysis and full productivity. Not a single Arab society that can claim to have achieved a reasonably sustainable level of social and economic development, let alone anything approaching equitable development or social justice. Not a single Arab country that has protected and preserved its natural resources, especially arable land and renewable fresh water resources. Not a single Arab country that has allowed its massive, ruling military-security-intelligence sectors to come under any sort of civilian oversight. Not a single Arab country that has spent hundreds of billions of dollars on foreign arms and other imports and found itself able to ensure the security of its own land and people. And not a single Arab country that has developed an education system that harnesses and honors the immense wealth and power of millions of its own young Arab minds, rather than corralling those minds into intellectual sheep pens where the mind’s free choice is inoperative, and life only comprises following orders.
This perverse reality of Arab statehood and independence – not any possible future map – is the ugly reality that should anger us, even shame us. We have endured this for over four generations now, unsurprisingly bringing us to the point today where every single Arab country, without exception, experiences open revolt of its citizens for freedom, dignity and democracy of some sort, demands for real constitutional reforms, or expressions of grievances via social media by citizens in some wealthy oil-producing states who are afraid to speak out because they will go to jail for tweeting their most human sentiments or aspirations.
There is not much to be proud of in the modern era of Arab statehood, and much to fix and rebuild along more rational, humane lines. I don’t much care about lines on a map. I do care about the trajectories of our own national management experiences, which have been mostly disappointing, and in some cases profoundly derelict.
