Wednesday, April 6, 2016

Grand Strategy

Is American Grand Strategy fixing to get kinda Un Grand?

US grand strategy was at its clearest in the years between 1941 (post-Pearl Harbour) and the end of the Cold War, though foreshadowed by US support for Britain and France in World War One. Then Americans felt themselves engaged in a contest with authoritarian great powers seeking world domination.

The classic work The American Way of Strategy, observes that alliances were the key to victory in all three world wars of the twentieth century. Victory wasn’t merely military and technological. Superior economic strength allowed the US and its allies to pursue a strategy of siege warfare against their opponents, starving them into submission.

That period was over by the 1990s. 41 spoke of a new world order. Great-power adversaries were thin on the ground. US strategists were exploring the meaning of unipolarity. Robert Jervis wrote that the US no longer needed a grand strategy, and that it was vain even to attempt to define one in an age of secondary threats.

Alliances were still seen as useful—as long as they became something other than what they had been. NATO was told it could go out-of-area or out of business. Even a NATO that agreed to go out-of-area, though, left Washington frustrated and unhappy. Coordinating NATO’s bombing of Belgrade in 1999 was nothing but a chore for US diplomats—it meant trying to keep 19 countries on board for each individual bombing mission.

After 9/11, the US put its faith in unilateralism and coalitions, not alliances. Neither proved especially successful. But it would be wrong to imagine that their weaknesses made the US think better about its allies. NATO became a political instrument, expanding eastwards, taking on members that added little strength but heaped new responsibilities upon the traditional partners. New members were more like Facebook friends, one critic observed, than genuine security contributors.

44 achieved a partial restoration of alliances as instruments of US foreign policy, especially in Asia as a consequence of the rebalance. But he was also busy recalibrating that foreign policy. With the US itself stepping back from the use of force, US allies typically followed suit. But allies never had the option of withdrawing from their own regions. Eastern Europeans fretted about a more aggressive Russia. Saudi Arabia worried about the regional power balance in a post-US Middle East. And US allies in Asia grew more concerned about China’s rise and the inexorable progress of North Korea’s nuclear program.

In short, in the 25 years since the end of the Cold War, US enthusiasm for alliances has wavered, bringing into question the degree of US attachment to the winning formula of the twentieth century. Meanwhile—and especially in recent years—the concerns of its allies about regional power shifts have grown. The result has been a set of alliances that now sorely need fresh signals of US commitment, not fresh signals of disengagement.

Tuesday, April 5, 2016

PAK Army Vs Punjab

Nishan E Haidor!

Land of the Pure is a magical place where anything can happen! Girls can learn to fly jets only 69 miles a way from where Pakistani Talibani brutally beat girls for promotional vids.

Pakistan's motto could very well be something like "Hey ya'll! Watch this!"

The suicide bomber who killed seventy-two people on Easter Sunday in a park in Lahore, Pakistan has drawn condemnation from around the world. Among the killed were twenty-nine children, and another 370 people were wounded, many of them members of the country’s Christian minority. Far less noted, however, has been the attack’s equally devastating effect on relations between Pakistan’s army and civilian government, which threatens to bring further instability to the country’s Punjab heartland.

At the heart of the crisis are two men, General Raheel Sharif, commander in chief of the Pakistan army, and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, head of the civilian government. For the past eighteen months, the two Sharifs (no relation) have maintained a tenuous political compact: the army—in some consultation with the prime minister—had overall control of Pakistan’s foreign and nuclear policy, as well as its counterterrorism strategy in Karachi, in the south, and along the border with Afghanistan, in the north. In turn, the civilian government could run the economy, and, most significantly, keep control of the prime minister’s home province of Punjab—the most populous region of the country, which includes the city of Lahore. Counterterrorism actions in Punjab were entrusted to the Punjab police rather than the army.

This compact ended hours after the bomb blast on the night of March 27. Almost immediately, the army declared it had taken control of security in the province, dealing a perhaps fatal blow to the already dwindling political prestige Prime Minister Sharif. The army told the media to emphasize that the orders for the Punjab operation were given directly by General Sharif and not the prime minister.

In fact, the army has no political, constitutional, or legal cover for going into Punjab. That would require the government to invite the army in. But over the past few days, as hundreds of arrests have taken place in Punjab, General Sharif and Nawaz Sharif have not met or apparently conferred with one another, adding to the uncertainty. Ashen-faced government ministers, brought on TV after the bombings, and even the prime minister himself, in his own speech, did not mention that the army had begun an operation in Punjab. For a country at war with extremists it was clear that there was no coordination or even a common strategy.

The army has moved decisively over the past eighteen months to crush the Pakistani Taliban and the multiple Taliban factions that operated in Karachi, in the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and in the tribal belt adjacent to Afghanistan. Yet it is Punjab, where there are an estimated sixty Islamic extremist groups and over 20,000 madrassas or religious schools—some of which produce militants and spew extremist ideologies—that has become the central hub of terrorism in Pakistan.

Since the 1980s, many of Pakistan’s extremist groups have been sponsored and trained by the army’s intelligence services to fight for control of Indian Kashmir or, on occasion, to attack other Indian targets. Such support from the military has now mostly ended. But the real test of General Sharif’s determination to root out terrorism from Pakistan has always been in Punjab. Is the army now willing to turn on its former extremist allies and crush them, in what is now a very complex situation?

Several of the most deadly groups in Punjab are now trying to overthrow the state, among them Jamaat-ul-Ahrar, the group behind the Lahore park bombing. Jamaat-ul-Ahrar is openly sectarian and has targeted the army and Christians in particular. But Punjab also hosts dozens of anti-India extremist groups that have been supported by the army in the past. These include the well-trained and heavily-armed Lashkar-e-Tayabba (LT), which was responsible for the 2008 Mumbai attacks and which is listed by the UN and the US as a terrorist group.

Money Shot!

Now that the army has unilaterally taken control of security in Punjab, the crucial question is whether it will be selective in the terrorist groups it decides to go after, or whether it will observe a genuine “no favorites” policy, as General Sharif has long promised. Adding to the challenge, the army itself recruits much of its half-million-strong manpower from Punjab. The generals are getting wary that if Islamic extremists continue to fester in Punjab, their soldiers will also get infected with the bug. 

Monday, April 4, 2016

Return of Mookie

A familiar face re-emerged on the Iraqi scene this week.

Firebrand cleric Muqtada al-Sadr -- perhaps best known for leading a Shiite insurgency against Western forces following the 2003 invasion of Iraq -- began a sit-in Sunday inside Baghdad's well-fortified Green Zone in protest of the Iraqi government's inability to deliver on long-delayed Cabinet reforms promised by Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi.

Although al-Sadr's Mahdi Army militia was officially disbanded in 2008, the group -- much like its founder -- never truly went away, but rather repurposed itself to provide social services and security to its Shiite constituency in the suburbs of Baghdad and southern Iraq. The Mahdi Army also morphed into a political force in the years that followed, and in 2014 the Sadrist Al-Ahrar bloc secured 34 seats in the Iraqi parliament.

That same year presented al-Sadr with yet another political opportunity. That summer, the Sunni militant organization known as the Islamic State group spread out across much of northern Iraq, conquering many of the cities and provinces in its path. For al-Sadr and his disciples, the prospect of a revanchist Sunni army marching on Baghdad created an opening for greater influence in national politics. Al-Sadr rebranded the Mahdi Army as the "Peace Companies," and he deployed his armed loyalists to protect Shiite holy sites and communities from ISIS's Sunni insurgents.

While this certainly wouldn't be the first time that the popular cleric has wrapped himself in the Iraqi flag, al-Sadr has gone out of his way in recent weeks to pose first and foremost as an Iraqi federalist.

Late last month, tens of thousands of al-Sadr supporters rallied in Baghdad demanding that the government follow through on reform measures promised last year following a wave of summertime protests. The Sadrists waved Iraqi national flags, and called on the prime minister to make good on his promises to end corruption and improve basic services. Al-Sadr recently moved to Baghdad from the holy city of Najaf to be closer to the political action in the capital, and his armed Peace Companies have worked with the government-sanctioned Popular Mobilization Forces in their campaign against ISIS.

Behind the veneer of nationalism lies an implicit threat, however: reform, or else.

"If al-Abadi's cabinet reshuffle plan stalls or fails to pass in Parliament, he risks open confrontation with al-Sadr," writes Iraq analyst Omar Al-Nidawi. "In the most extreme case, this could mean thousands of al-Sadr's followers storming the Green Zone, but will in any case ... increase in public outrage."

At the heart of al-Sadr's latest move is an effort to maintain access and influence in the Iraqi government. The scion of a prominent clerical dynasty, al-Sadr remains a popular figure among Iraq's Shiite majority, especially among the pious and poor concentrated in the south of the country. But independence from Washington in Baghdad has, consequently, allowed for a greater amount of Iranian influence in Iraqi affairs. The mobilization forces, or Hashd, have grown into a powerful parallel force to the Iraqi military, and al-Sadr's own militia -- while ostensibly aligned with the Hashd -- has engaged in intermittent clashes with rival members of the umbrella organization whose loyalties, some fear, reside in Tehran rather than Baghdad. These very same Iran-backed militias enjoy increasing political support among certain factions of Iraq's splintered Shiite factions, posing a direct threat to al-Sadr's own Shiite powerbase.

Prime Minister al-Abadi finds himself stuck in the middle of this sectarian tug-o-war. While the premier has been pushing for months now to implement a slate of political reforms, he has repeatedly encountered resistance from entrenched factions that have dominated the politics of post-war Iraq. His proposal to replace Cabinet members with a list of technocrats has met equal resistance by pols seeking to maintain access to a patronage system rife with corruption. (Cabinet posts are typically filled through a sectarian quota system.)

With al-Sadr positioned right at his front door, and many more of the cleric's supporters assembled in protest around the capital, al-Abadi has been forced to pull soldiers away from the Iraqi army's critical campaign to retake Mosul, the country's second largest city and the center of Iraq's Sunni heartland.

It is imperative that the Iraqi government regain control of its own territories and, perhaps more importantly, all of its oil infrastructure. The downturn in the global crude market has put a strain on Iraqi coffers, as has the war against ISIS. A confrontation in Baghdad will only further deplete a Mosul campaign already reportedly suffering from desertions and low morale.

Muqtada al-Sadr has never wasted a good Iraqi crisis, and with al-Abadi reportedly rushing to reshuffle his cabinet for an all-important Saturday vote of approval, the shrewd Shiite cleric appears poised for a successful resurgence, and possibly a big political victory.

More on this:

The Unquiet Cleric -- The Economist

The Most Dangerous Man in Iraq, Again -- New Arab

Shia-Centric State Building in Iraq -- Carnegie Endowment

The Worst Job in the Middle East -- RealClearWorld

Sunday, April 3, 2016

WoW!!


WoW - the Watchers Council- it's the oldest, longest running cyber comte d'guere ensembe in existence - started online in 1912 by Sirs Jacky Fisher and Winston Churchill themselves - an eclective collective of cats both cruel and benign with their ability to put steel on target (figuratively - natch) on a wide variety of topictry across American, Allied, Frenemy and Enemy concerns, memes, delights and discourse.

Every week these cats hook up each other with hot hits and big phazed cookies to peruse and then vote on their individual fancy catchers.

Thusly sans further adieu (or a don"t)

Council Winners



Non-Council Winners



See you next week!

Friday, April 1, 2016

Saudi Arabia V Hiz"B'Allah

Laws yes - Chapter LXIX in the Sunni Shia war.

The original Woman Hater Kingdom turns it's unfun sights to the creepy rocket rich Body Part Collector General, the resistance Posse of Allah 

The Saudis branded Hezbollah a terrorist organization earlier this year and then persuaded their Gulf Cooperation Council allies to do the same on March 2. Then Crown Prince Muhammad bin Nayef pressed a summit of Arab interior ministers to join in lambasting Hezbollah in Tunis in early March. The Arab League formally agreed to label Hezbollah a terrorist group at a Foreign Ministerial in Cairo later in the month. Only Iraq and Lebanon abstained.

The current Saudi campaign dates to last summer when the Crown Prince's spies captured the mastermind of the Khobar Tower attack. Ahmed Ibrahim al-Mughassil is a Saudi Shiite who masterminded the June 25, 1996, attack on an American military barracks in Khobar, Saudi Arabia. Mughassil was detained by the Saudis last August as he was exiting a flight from Tehran to Beirut and was transferred from Lebanon immediately to the kingdom. Nineteen U.S. Air Force personnel were killed at Khobar and 372 were wounded in the attack. The FBI put a $5 million bounty for information leading to his arrest years ago.

Since the Arab League statement listing Hezbollah as terrorists, the Saudis have encouraged their Gulf allies to expel Lebanese emigres accused of having connections to the group. This promises to further polarize the Lebanese community in the Gulf between Shiites and other sects, Sunni and Christian.

Riyadh is likely to start pressing the Europeans to brand Hezbollah as a terror group. The Europeans have long argued that only the military wing of Hezbollah is terrorist and exempted the political party from sanctions. Israel has argued this is a dubious splitting of hairs since the party controls the fighters.

Riyadh has much more clout in Europe than Jerusalem. London and Paris are desperate to keep their lucrative arms sales relationships with Riyadh. They also need Saudi help to fight jihadist terrorism. If Riyadh presses hard, the Europeans will find it difficult to resist.

It's still unclear how far the Kingdom will push its case against Hezbollah. The risk is too much pressure will destabilize Lebanon. The current Saudi leadership is much more risk prone and unpredictable than its predecessors.

King Salman and his top aides want to deliver hard blows to Tehran—and for them, striking Hezbollah is a good way to do it.

Thursday, March 31, 2016

Meltdown

IS, ISIS, ISIL (your choice) and a dirty bomb are hot topics d'jour

The murder of a security guard at a Belgian nuclear facility just two days after the Brussels attacks, coupled with evidence that Islamic State operatives had been watching researchers there, has re-ignited fears about ISIS and nuclear terrorism. Some experts, including ones cited by the New York Times and others, dismiss the possibility that ISIS could make even a crude nuclear bomb. Yet Project on Managing the Atom at Harvard’s Belfer Center, says that the threat is quite real.

 A recent report from the Nuclear Threat Initiative, which notes that the material to make a dirty bomb exists in “tens of thousands of radiological sources located in more than 100 countries around the world.”

In 2013 and 2014, there were 325 incidents of radioactive materials being lost, stolen, or in some way unregulated or uncontrolled, according to the report, which cites estimates from the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation.

What if a dirty bomb isn't the goal? Perhaps those cats are instead looking to do a China Syndrome and create a meltdown at a nuclear power plant instead.

Wednesday, March 30, 2016

Mitsubishi X-2 ATD Stealth Fighter


Tokyo is locked in a regional dogfight with Beijing to maintain control over the skies over the Sea of Japan.

The new Japanese aircraft could be based in part on the technologies being matured on Mitsubishi’s X-2 ATD-X stealth fighter concept demonstrator. The X-2 prototype is set to take to the skies for the first time in days, reports Reuters.

Japan needs to replace her F-15J Eagle air superiority fighters. In Tokyo’s estimation, the F-35—which was not designed primarily for the air-to-air role—won’t be enough to meet her requirements. While Tokyo is buying forty-two F-35s, those planes will replace Japan’s F-4J Kai Phantom II fleet. The plane Japan wanted as its F-15J replacement was the F-22, but U.S. law prohibited the Raptor’s export. “Japan really wanted the F-22 but she got the F-35,” a Japan-based source told Reuters. “This is a source of concern and frustration in Tokyo.”

That is one reason the Japanese are aiming to develop what is being called the F-3—potentially a operational variant of the X-2—as an air superiority fighter. Japan aims to field a new air superiority fighter in the 2030s—roughly at the same time the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy hope to field the F-X and F/A-XX respectively. That means that Japan might be able to leverage such an effort to join a U.S.-led sixth-generation fighter program. Tokyo probably can’t afford to pay for a $50 billion fighter development program on its own.

However, if Tokyo does manage to develop a new sixth-generation fighter on its own, it would mark the revival of Japan as an aerospace colossus. The country’s once-potent aviation industry was all but dismantled following the end of the Second World War.