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Arab Sprang springs along - washing away the old school dictators and Presidents for Life - yet what about corrupt Royalty in Ray Bans?
Are the monarchies immune?
Not anymore! Le Monde has a great Le Piece about Le Monarchies in Le Turf betwixt Suez and Indus
Arab monarchies. This may seem contradictory. After all, no kingdom fell during the Arab Spring, and indeed a common refrain in the western press has been that, compared to their republican counterparts, the autocratic monarchies of the region have proven exceptionally resilient in the face of social unrest.
The reasoning encompasses two arguments: these royal regimes enjoy a deeply rooted sense of cultural legitimacy that resonates throughout their societies. Unlike other authoritarian leaderships, they retain traditional acceptance with the public given their presence before or during anti-colonial struggles. Also, they are more adaptable, having a very flexible set of institutional tools with which to manipulate politics that go beyond mere repression.
However, the monarchies are running on borrowed time, and most are in worst straits than a decade ago. In Bahrain, for example, a mass uprising was stopped only through the combined efforts of the national security forces and the Gulf Cooperation Council’s military intervention. Morocco faced serious protests as well. There, the promise of constitutional revisions temporarily quieted public anger, but by accepting integration without meaningful political reform, the Islamist Justice and Development Party — the face of parliamentary opposition — now risk losing credibility like the rest of the political class. Moreover, the urban-rural divide is no longer salient; dissent is now everywhere, and demands for change have cut across old class and provincial lines.
Like Morocco, the Saudi monarchy is thickly embedded in society. Blessed by geology, it has used its enormous oil revenues to offset overt opposition with new welfare and development programmes, which has allowed the regime to defer more fundamental structural reforms. The opposite is true in oil-rich Kuwait. There, constant street protests against corruption and royal meddling have undermined the Al-Sabah family and the December 2012 elections were boycotted by the opposition. This tug-of-war between the monarchy and parliament has culminated in a critical juncture: either the regime accepts a prime minister who is a commoner, and thus beyond the emir’s control, or it must shut down parliament and backslide to authoritarianism at a very high cost.
In Jordan, the monarchy has become suffocated by two complementary forces. The Islamists want to preserve the monarchy, because the collapse of monarchical rule would allow Israel to portray the East Bank as the new alternative homeland for all Palestinians and thus justify the annexation of the whole of the West Bank. Yet they also desire constitutional monarchy, with greater political freedoms. The monarchy’s Bedouin tribal bedrock has become restless due to rising unemployment and corruption, which allows them to accuse the regime of favouring the wealthier Palestinian majority.
Vested interests run deep in monarchies, because dynastic families develop resilient connections to influential social and political groups that provide support in exchange for patronage, such as merchants, businessmen, farmers, tribes, and the ulama. Drastic reforms that replace absolute monarchy with real parliamentary governance would undercut not just royals but their commoner clients too.
Second, the post-colonial and post-cold war history of the region shows that monarchs have an aversion to transforming their executive power into moral authority; they will only consider constitutional monarchism after exhausting all other options and strategies. So without a concerted popular challenge, kingships have no incentive to bring anything more than cosmetic reforms to the bargaining table.
Once championed as moderate and adaptable regimes, the Arab monarchies now risk squandering a golden opportunity. Though they would have to surrender much power in a democratic transition, their institutions also have much to contribute in helping unify their societies during times of crisis and spare future conflict and instability.
Pic - "Ever notice 2013 kinda looks like 1913?"
Whale, despite two of the most biggest brains in the biz - looks awfully awful clear that 44 will pick Surge Hater Sen Hagel as Great Satan's next Def Sec.
Most likely a Def Sec Hagel will not mind if Defense gets all hollowed out - unlike Uncle Leon - who laid it out to play it out “It would guarantee that we hollow out our force and inflict severe damage on our national defense."
Yet despite a lack lustre resume' (truly - is there a Hagel Bill or Hagel Doctrine we can admire or LOL?) - Sen Hagel wouldn't be that great
What's striking about the case for Hagel is its absence. His backers can cite no significant legislation for which Hagel was responsible in his two terms in the Senate. They can quote no memorable speeches that Hagel delivered and can cite no profound passages from the book he authored. They can summarize no perceptive Hagelian analysis of defense or foreign policy, and can appeal to no acts of management or leadership by the man they'd have as our next secretary of defense.
The fact is that those legislative achievements, intellectual insights, or management triumphs don't exist.
No one would care if the president wanted to send Hagel off to openly and aggressively make the case for Obama's foreign policy as ambassador to Luxembourg. But the secretary of defense has real responsibilities. Even his nomination has real consequences. In fact, nominating a person who is clearly soft on Iran would send exactly the wrong message to Tehran.
In the three weeks since Chuck Hagel’s name emerged as 44’s likely choice as the next secretary of defense, there's been a
lively, if lopsided, debate about his qualifications for the job. The
debate’s been lopsided because the arguments for Hagel have been so startlingly weak. It’s not just that those arguing for Hagel form an unusually motley crew, even by the standards of the anti-Little Satan swamp in which many of them frolic.
They can quote no memorable speeches that Hagel delivered and can cite
no profound passages from the book he authored. They can summarize no
perceptive Hagelian analysis of defense or foreign policy, and can
appeal to no acts of management or leadership by the man they'd have as
our next secretary of defense.
Dislike of hawks, neocons, or friends of Little Satan isn't really a good
reason to select Chuck Hagel. And there's something comical about many
of the defenses of Hagel. His defenders rise up in high dudgeon
to condemn Hagel's critics as smear merchants for criticizing Hagel as
anti-Little Satan and soft on Iran—and then, if they're among the honest Hagel
defenders, they praise Hagel for being anti-Little Satan and soft on Iran.
Pic - "If Persia"s Preacher Command is hot for Hagel, then..."
WoW - the Watchers Council - it's the oldest, longest running cyber comte d'guere ensembe in existence - started online in 1912 by Sirs Jacky Fisher and Winston Churchill themselves - an eclective collective of cats both cruel and benign with their ability to put steel on target (figuratively - natch) on a wide variety of topictry across American, Allied, Frenemy and Enemy concerns, memes, delights and discourse.
Every week these cats hook up each other with hot hits and big phazed cookies to peruse and then vote on their individual fancy catchers.
Thusly sans further adieu (or a don"t)
Council Winners
Non-Council Winners
See you next week! And don’t forget to like us on Facebook and follow us Twitter
Perhaps one of the many charms of funintended consequences is - whale, the funintended consequences.
Like the imminent collapse of the nearly 2 metre (wookie size) illegit Allawicious Dr General President For Life in Damascus
See,
Given that the use of chemical weapons in Syria would likely result in outside intervention, which Assad clearly wishes to avoid, a greater threat might be what happens to his chemical arsenal once his regime collapses and the stockpiles go unprotected.
This could result in chemical weapons or related materiel falling into the hands of a terrorist group that could use them elsewhere in the region. Casualties are unlikely to be on the scale of Halabja or World War I, but such an attack would cause panic among Western publics.
When the regime of Libyan dictator Moammar Gadhafi fell last year, its small declared chemical-weapons stockpile (undergoing destruction at one site) was quickly secured, as were several other small caches that Gadhafi had failed to declare. But thousands of conventional weapons proliferated because of American and European unwillingness to back an external stabilization force.
44's posse, failing to learn the lessons of Libya, is reportedly planning for a light-footprint approach in Syria should the Assad regime fall. Options include relying on small teams of Special Operations Forces, thousands of Jordanian soldiers, or contractor-trained rebel forces to secure the chemical-weapons sites.
Large-scale transportation of Syria's stockpile will be difficult and on-site destruction (as the delayed destruction programs of the U.S., Russia and Libya attest) will take time, likely years. Relying on a ragtag, outsourced force for security over a long period of time would be the height of wishful thinking.
If 44 is serious about ensuring that terrorists don't get their hands on weapons that could be used against American interests or personnel in the region or even on the homeland, the only solution is early and sustained planning to stabilize a post-Assad Syria.
Veiled threats against the Assad regime—after nearly two years of benign neglect toward the chaos in Syria—won't be enough to protect Americans and our allies.
Veiled threats certainly won't help Syrians unAss Bashar Assad
Pic - "There would be kind of a vacuum that would lend itself to extremists operating in Syria which is particularly troublesome in light of the large network of chemical warfare, weapon-storage facilities and other related facilities that there are in Syria,"
Really must suck for intolerant elements in l'Strip. Eons past - it seemed way easy to waltz across Little Satan with self detonating homicide bombers sweetly wreaking havoc, misery and queering the mix on Peace Processes.
Until of course wicked Little Satan built the Wall.
And to get around the wall of course begat missile mischief. Which kinda seems 'tarded - after all - shouldn't the intolerant be hap hap happy Little Satan walled themselves off?
Anywrought - Little Satan's Iron Dome thingy denies Rocket Rich Rejectionists the kills they desire to provoke the final Lo Down Ho Down
Why cause?
Because!!
Iron Dome is a missile defence system that can intercept short-range missiles, rockets and even artillery shells, at close range and with only seconds of warning. Originally deployed in early 2011, the system came in for widespread global recognition during the week-long conflict between Israel and Gaza-based Hamas last month.
During the fighting, Hamas and other extremist groups bombarded Israel with hundreds of rockets. And Iron Dome blasted most of them out of the sky.
The exact figures are classified. “Of the roughly 1,500 rockets or short-range missiles fired at us, about a thousand weren’t a threat, anyway. They were heading for the sea or the desert. We ignored those. Of those 500 that were a threat, we shot down over 400 of them.” Some cite the figure of 421 shoot-downs. Other media sources during the conflict reported that Iron Dome launches succeeded roughly 85% of the time.
After a few days of fighting, Little Satan changed her tactical doctrine: Iron Dome used to fire two interceptors at every rocket, in case the first missed. They quickly realized that was a waste. The system was good enough that if it wasn’t possible on the first shot, the second wouldn’t get it, either.
“Quite a few Iranian scientists who had jobs similar to mine have gone to meet their maker. I’d rather avoid the same fate.”
Every day of the conflict, military officers gave his company all of the data collected by Iron Dome computers and military radars for the last 24 hours. Rafael engineers would then work through the night, tweaking the software that controls Iron Dome. They’d turn the new software over to the military officers at the next meeting, then start looking over a fresh 24 hour’s worth of data.
It was exhausting for the relative handful of software engineers. But it worked. “It wasn’t dramatic. But we did a little bit better every day. The more rockets they fired at us, the better we got at shooting them down. By the end of the week, Iron Dome was better than it had been at the start. And it was pretty good, then, too.”
As long as the equipment works, they expect to hit their target every time.
The credit for this real-time evolution in the system goes not only to his company’s engineers, but the incredible co-operation Rafael had from Little Satan's military. We had the right personalities, on both sides, to make this happen.”
To illustrate how good the co-operation was, the engineer recounted how Little Satan added another battery of Iron Dome interceptors to Tel Aviv in the middle of the conflict. The disparate components of a full Iron Dome battery were assembled into a functional system in just two days, by a joint team of civilian engineers and soldiers who worked continuously until it was online. All previous batteries had taken two weeks to assemble and activate.
And they’re still working to improve the system. The engineers know Hamas and other extremist groups will be seeking a way to defeat Iron Dome. “It’s a zero-sum equation for Hamas. If we’re alive, they lose.”
But Iron Dome has already proven its worth. “It gave our politicians something they don’t usually have. Options. We didn’t have to invade Gaza. We made them look powerless just by protecting ourselves. We won by surviving. And all the interceptors we fired cost less than one day of ground fighting in Gaza.”
That’s good news for Little Satan and her neighbours. The whole region is always one lucky shot by Hamas away from a major war — the rockets usually do no damage, but if they did hit something valuable, Little Satan would be compelled to respond with massive force. Iron Dome makes such tragedies less likely.
HAMAS - built on the concept of love of death and dying prob cannot bear to say it out loud - yet Little Satan's Iron Dome saves Palestinian lives too.
Pic - "GRAD, K"Ssam, Fajr 5 - big or small - we nail 'em all"
As the 2nd Joyeuex Anniversaire of Arab Spring sprang by - time to look back at Year Two (as opposed to Year One)
In the heady days of (relatively) peaceful mass mobilizations that brought down dictators in Tunisia and Egypt, the mantra from American observers in 2011 was: "Now comes the hard part." In 2012, it came -- with a vengeance.
Transitions to democracy in Eastern Europe after 1989 were pretty quick and pretty successful. Latin American and East Asian transitions in the 1980s and 1990s had long and troubled backgrounds, but once democratic systems were established, most of them turned out to be stable and peaceful. Why should the Arab world be different?
Unlike in those other parts of the world, many of the countries in the Middle East lack long histories of political unity: Libya, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen are all relatively recent creations; their borders are artificial and their populations are divided along sectarian, ethnic, and regional lines.
A majority, or at least a plurality, of people in these countries now say "Islam is the solution" to their problems -- and they are opposed by an equally vehement minority. This year has shown just how potent a recipe for conflict this mix of ideological conflict and divided societies can be.
With centralized state authority weakened, these countries have become the playing fields of regional rivalry. Local actors invite the foreigners in, looking to them for money, guns and political support. Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Qatar are all playing in Syria and Iraq. Saudi Arabia and Iran both support factions in Lebanon. The Saudis are still the monopoly players in Yemen and Bahrain, though they warn darkly of Iranian meddling in both countries. Needless to say, such proxy wars are Kryptonite for the authority of the central state.
Egypt and Tunisia do not suffer from weak states and divided societies, and thus still have the best chance of all the Arab Spring countries to forge stable democracies. This year's developments, nonetheless, threw a wrench in both countries' plans, as the heady unity of opposition to the old regime gave way to bruising battles over the country's future. Those battles have mostly been political, electoral, and rhetorical -- though there have been troubling episodes of violence in both countries. The ideological battle lines in these states are exceptionally stark: The core question for both is what role Islam will play in the new order -- and so far the Islamists are winning.
And Great Satan's role?
If the keys to stability and democratic development in the Arab world are related to state building and an ideological argument within Islamist movements, then there is not much that the United States can do to help these processes along. Washington demonstrated in Iraq that it is more skillful at destroying states than at building them. Even if we wanted to,has even less to contribute to the intra-Islamist debate among Brotherhood and Salafi trends on the appropriateness of democracy.
Au contraire mon frer!
Great Satan must be the loud, proud voice for advocating periodical transparent elections, egalitarianism, a nat'l treasury under public scrutiny, a free uncensored press, a military under civie control and independent judiciaries under elected gov oversight
Pic - "It's a generational committment bay bee"
Not to be confused with Shadow Gov - which stalks the real gov in the shadows ready to seize command - Shadow Army is more like an enabling enhancement of Great Satan's hyperpuissance
Nom d'guerr'd as the Global Response Staff - Great Satan's Shadow Army has been semi unshadowed by recent event in Lib LibLibya, AFPAK and Yemen
The GRS, as it is known, is designed to stay in the shadows, training teams to work undercover and provide an unobtrusive layer of security for CIA officers in high-risk outposts. Of the 14 CIA employees killed since 2009, five worked for the GRS, all as contractors. They include two killed at Benghazi, as well as three others who were within the blast radius on Dec. 31, 2009, when a Jordanian double agent detonated a suicide bomb at a CIA compound in Khost, Afghanistan.
GRS contractors have also been involved in shootouts in which only foreign nationals were killed, including one that triggered a diplomatic crisis. While working for the CIA, Raymond Davis was jailed for weeks in Pakistan last year after killing two men in what he said was an armed robbery attempt in Lahore.
The increasingly conspicuous role of the GRS is part of a broader expansion of the CIA’s paramilitary capabilities over the past 10 years. Beyond hiring former military commandos, the agency has collaborated with Special Operations teams on missions including the raid that killed ObL and has killed thousands of militants and civilians with its fleet of armed drones.
The work is lucrative enough that recruiting is done largely by word of mouth, said one former U.S. intelligence official. Candidates tend to be members of Special Forces units who have recently retired, or veterans of police department SWAT teams.
Most GRS recruits arrive with skills in handling the weapons they will carry, including Glock handguns and M4 rifles. But they undergo additional training so they do not call attention to the presence or movements of the CIA officers they are in position to protect.
Pic - "Shadow War"
