Ah, you know how it goes - a few texts here and there - a bit of flirtatious sexting - a chance encounter and it's time to put out or get shut out.
Not unlike the Cold War betwixt Hatred's Kingdom and the equally tolerance and gay free combat cleric Barbie haters of Preacher Command.
As best understood, all the sectarian chiz, provocative proxilicious puissance and heated talk amidst certain mindsets in the ME devolves to all that shialicious sunnitastic jazz. Iran see's herself as the Supreme Leader (hey they call him that for nothing ya know!) protector, arms patron and Guidance Councillor for all the earth's shias.
At the same incredible instant - the original He Man Women Hater Royals of Wahabbi Arabia are the Official Custodians for all the world's sunnis.
Like hanging out in sucking range on the event horizon of a really bad about to happen event, The Saudi Persian Cold War may very climax with a real live war!
Saudi Arabia is generally perceived by Iran as possibly the
greatest obstacle to its ambitions in the Middle East, in that Iran has
been trying to export its Shi'te Islamic revolution both culturally and
militarily throughout the Middle East.
Saudi Arabia tried to do everything it could, both politically and
militarily, to stop a recent Shi'ite uprisings in Bahrain -- an island
off the coast of Saudi Arabia that is predominately Shi'ite but ruled by
Sunnis -- which Iran has been claiming belongs to Iran, and which is
separated from Saudi Arabia by only a small causeway a few miles long.
The Saudis are concerned that the Shi'ite uprising in Bahrain might
embolden Saudi Arabia's own minority Shi'ite population -- located by
the oil fields, far from Riyadh, Mecca and Medina -- thereby increasing
Iran's influence over the Arabian Peninsula.
Iran might soon start a war in Middle East as the only way to show that
Tehran still has influence in region and can threaten whoever opposes
its plans. If Bashar al-Assad is removed from power in Syria, Iran could
be concerned that the world might perceive Iran as isolated; it could
therefore want to make the point that even if Syria might be lost for
now, Iran can still take control of Iraq, and fight proxy wars by means
of its proxy group, Hezbollah. To Iran, the main enemy that stands in
its way is Saudi Arabia, which has already fought Iran's influence in
Lebanon, Syria, Bahrain and Iraq.
As Saudi Arabia is the first new superpower in the Arab world ( don't laugh LOLZ), Iran has designer designs on replacing it.
Saudi Arabia be freaking that Great Satan is unAssing Iraq (to be fair - tons of Great Satan's combat cats and gear are sweetly loitering in Kuwait) and corrupt Royalty in Ray Bans might well assume that
even though they were able to stymie Iran's influ in Bahrain -
Iran will
nevertheless manage to try to take control of the oil-rich region by
way of Iraq. The Saudis have desperately been trying to find strategic
ways to prevent such a scenario.
Hold up!! Ebberdobby knows that in sunny sunny climes straddling the Nile and Indus - open warfare enjoyed by the faithful versus the faithful is uncool. Warfare should be conducted by the faithful upon the heads of the infidels - right?
Please. Ancient Aegypt"s General Nasser rained blistering agent WMD on hapless Yemenis xforming them into shrieking living blisters for the rest of their mercilifully short lives. And the m"Hammedist world pretty much just stared in silence at their fingernails as if they were the most interesting thing in the world!
Not to LOL too much - yet the horrible Iran Iraq left 2 million dead and failed to change the borders an inch.
Soooo how do thangs stack up in a match up betwixt Saudiland and Persia?
Iran's military accelerated its missile program (11K can be fired per minute!!) as a way to compensate
for its inability to match the air power of potential rivals. As a
result, Iran now possesses various models of various types (ballistic,
cruise, et cetera) of missiles, most of which can reach well into Saudi
Arabia and some of which are accurate enough to be used against military
bases of various types. These missiles could also hit facilities of the
Saudi oil and gas industry, as well as desalination plants, potentially
dealing severe damage to the Saudi economy.
Royal Saudi Air Force would have no choice but to eliminate Iran's many
missiles as quickly as possible. The Saudis would not necessarily know
which of the missile sites are home to the high-priority missiles of
higher accuracy, thus forcing them to attempt to neutralize them all. If
the Iranians are smart, they have prepared (or will prepare) dummy
missile sites, which can serve as decoys. The Serbs did this to great
effect in 1999 during the attacks on their country by NATO. In any
case, the Saudi planes will have to make numerous sorties against
Iranian targets (real or dummy), exposing themselves to attack from
Iran's fighters and air defenses.
All the while, the Iranians would
launch as many missiles as possible, potentially eliminating much of the
Saudi air force on the ground, and/or at least rendering bases unusable
and forcing the Saudis to withdraw to bases further to the west. Saudi
Arabia's ships, leaving port to avoid incoming missiles, would actually
be in greater danger than if they remained in port, but at least they
might be able to take the fight to the Iranians.
Would war unite much of the Iranian population in nationalistic enthusiasm,
or the dissent of recent years erupt again? If the Saudis
struck first, the former scenario is more likely. As for the Saudis,
King Abdullah is in his late 80s, Crown Prince Sultan is only slightly
younger and in poor health, and the line of succession becomes
contentious after that. The Kingdom's restive Shi'a primarily live in
oil-producing regions near Bahrain, and they (like most Saudis, only
more so) do not share their government's enmity towards Iran.
Indiscriminate Iranian strikes could change that, and this may or may
not figure into Teheran's calculations. The upshot of all of this is
that a war between Iran and Saudi Arabia could be a fairly even contest,
one in which interested third parties might want to play a decisive
role.
Third parties! Like a menage a troi l'guerre?
It has scarcely gone unnoticed
inside the kingdom that, at least in regard to
Iran, Riyadh has been speaking almost in concert
with Little Satan - an embarrassing situation that
official announcements can neither hide nor
satisfactorily justify. Intelligence reports
indicate that Saudi Arabia has granted flyover rights for a Little Satan attack on Iran and will help
refuel returning aircraft.
Pic - “The Gulf states now see themselves as mutual powers in the region who can increasingly stand up for themselves. They survived the Arab Spring without too much trouble — except for Bahrain — and have come out of it more confident and more willing to go head to head with Iran.”
"Got your skinny girls! Here at the Western World"
Such a delightful little ditty from paw paw"s Box St Collective could somewhat dubiously function as a seductive soundtrack for the magnetic pull the woman worshiping Western World sweetly enjoys.
As a birth control method for protecting western hemisphere's hot attraction for enemy influence, muscle or just uncool colonialism since way back in the last millennium - Monroe Doctrine serves as Great Satan"s Diplopolititary demarche'.
"We owe it, therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing
between the United States and those powers to declare that we should
consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion
of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety."
Old school worries, right? Maybe not! Check Preacher Command's web of relations in Western Hemi - in partic - south of the border
What about non state actor outer terrorist groups from the ME?
It is something of a truism of American politics that policymakers in
Washington pay only sporadic attention to the happenings in their own
geopolitical backyard. The relatively low profile of Latin America in
our national security policymaking is deeply counterintuitive, given the
region's proximity to the U.S. homeland. It is also potentially
dangerous, because its political environment—marked by large ungoverned
areas —has created a
fertile operating environment for a range of radical groups, including
those from the greater Middle East.
Hiz"B"Allah, however, is far and away the most prominent. Its presence in
the region stretches back to the 1980s, when operatives—taking advantage
of weak regional governance and with support from Iran—began to expand
the organization's already-substantial international drug-trafficking and smuggling activities from Lebanon's Beka'a Valley to the "Tri-Border Region" at the intersection of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay
To ward off its international isolation and undermine US influence
in the region, Iran, with its Hezbollah proxy in tow, has made a major
diplomatic and economic push into the Western Hemisphere.
Hugo Chávez in Venezuela and other radical anti-American populists
have made common cause with Iran and Hezbollah in waging asymmetric
warfare against the United States.
HbA’s criminality in the region has multiplied as it has
established deeper relations with transnational criminal organizations.
Sensitive sources within various governments has identified at least two
parallel yet collaborative terrorist networks growing at an alarming
rate in Latin America.
The stakes are clear. In a May 2011 visit to Bolivia, Iranian Defense
Brigadier General Ahmad Vahidi proclaimed that in the event of any military confrontation between Iran and the United States, “The strong
Iran is ready for enemy-crushing and tough response in case of any
illogical and violent behavior by the U.S.”
There is every reason
to believe that such a response would utilize every weapon in Iran’s
arsenal, including Hezbollah. But we do not have to wait until an
outbreak of military hostilities between the United States and Iran to
confront Hezbollah’s continuing efforts to consolidate its presence and
expand its influence in the Western Hemisphere.
The United States and
responsible governments in Latin America need to act now, precisely so
that we do not have to respond later
Pic - "If Washington does not transition from monitoring to acting against Iranian advances in Latin America, it may find itself confronting a grave and growing threat that it can neither diminish nor evade."
WoW - the Watchers Council
- it's the oldest, longest running cyber comte d'guere ensembe in
existence - started online in 1912 by Sirs Jacky Fisher and Winston
Churchill themselves - an eclective collective of cats both cruel and
benign with
their ability to put steel on target (figuratively - natch) on a wide
variety of topictry across American, Allied, Frenemy and Enemy concerns,
memes, delights and discourse.
Every week these cats hook up each other with hot hits and big phazed
cookies to peruse and then vote on their individual fancy catchers.
Without further adieu - (or a don't) here are this weeks winners
Council Winners
Non-Council Winners
See you next week! And don’t forget to follow us on Facebook and Twitter
So, what all would the world look like if Great Satan were to unAss her hot hyperpuissant gig as global leader in order to focus all her energies on solving probs at home?
And yo, what about the chiz the declinationists are always going on about? Is Great Satan really in decline?
New York Times
best-selling author and one of Great Satan"s most more bigger brainiacs and most influential strategic
thinkers, paints a vivid, alarming pic of what all the world might look
like if the Great Satan were to truly to let her uh, influence wane like hoochie number 7 at Last Call.
"Much of the current pessimism is misplaced, if America were indeed to commit “preemptive superpower
suicide,” the world would see the return of war among rising nations as
they jostle for power; the retreat of democracy around the world as
Vladimir Putin’s Russia and authoritarian China acquire more clout; and
the weakening of the global free-market economy, which the United States
created and has supported for more than sixty years. We’ve seen this
before—in the breakdown of the Roman Empire and the collapse of the
European order in World War I."
See -
The present world order—characterized by an unprecedented number of
democratic nations; a greater global prosperity, even with the current crisis,
than the world has ever known; and a long peace among great powers—reflects
American principles and preferences, and was built and preserved by American
power in all its political, economic, and military dimensions. If American
power declines, this world order will decline with it. It will be replaced by
some other kind of order, reflecting the desires and the qualities of other
world powers.
Or perhaps it will simply collapse, as the European world order
collapsed in the first half of the twentieth century. The belief, held by many,
that even with diminished American power “the underlying foundations of theliberal international order will survive and thrive,” as the political
scientist G. John Ikenberry has argued, is a pleasant illusion. American
decline, if it is real, will mean a different world for everyone.
But how real is it? Much of the commentary on American decline these days rests
on rather loose analysis, on impressions that the United States has lost its
way, that it has abandoned the virtues that made it successful in the past,
that it lacks the will to address the problems it faces.
The perception of decline today is certainly understandable, given the dismal
economic situation since 2008 and the nation’s large fiscal deficits, which,
combined with the continuing growth of the Chinese, Indian, Brazilian, Turkish,
and other economies, seem to portend a significant and irreversible shift in
global economic power. Some of the pessimism is also due to the belief that the
United States has lost favor, and therefore influence, in much of the world,
because of its various responses to the attacks of September 11. The detainment
facilities at Guantánamo, the use of torture against suspected terrorists, and the
widely condemned invasion of Iraq in 2003 have all tarnished the American
“brand” and put a dent in America’s “soft power”—its ability to attract others
to its point of view.
There have been the difficult wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan, which many argue proved the limits of military power, stretched
the United States beyond its capacities, and weakened the nation at its core.
Some compare the United States to the British Empire at the end of the
nineteenth century, with the Iraq and Afghanistan wars serving as the
equivalent of Britain’s difficult and demoralizing Boer War.
With this broad perception of decline as the backdrop, every failure of the
United States to get its way in the world tends to reinforce the impression.
Arabs and Israelis refuse to make peace, despite American entreaties. Iran andNorth Korea defy American demands that they cease their nuclear weapons
programs. China refuses to let its currency rise. Ferment in the Arab world
spins out of America’s control. Every day, it seems, brings more evidence that
the time has passed when the United States could lead the world and get others
to do its bidding.
Some of the arguments for America’s relative decline these days would be more
potent if they had not appeared only in the wake of the financial crisis of
2008. Just as one swallow does not make a spring, one recession, or even a
severe economic crisis, need not mean the beginning of the end of a great
power. The United States suffered deep and prolonged economic crises in the
1890s, the 1930s, and the 1970s. In each case, it rebounded in the following
decade and actually ended up in a stronger position relative to other powers
than before the crisis. The 1910s, the 1940s, and the 1980s were all high
points of American global power and influence.
Less than a decade ago, most observers spoke not of America’s decline but of
its enduring primacy. In 2002, the historian Paul Kennedy, who in the late
1980s had written a much-discussed book on “the rise and fall of the greatpowers,” America included, declared that never in history had there been such a
great “disparity of power” as between the United States and the rest of the
world. Ikenberry agreed that “no other great power” had held “such formidableadvantages in military, economic, technological, cultural, or politicalcapabilities.... The preeminence of American power” was “unprecedented.”
In
2004, the pundit Fareed Zakaria described the United States as enjoying a“comprehensive uni-polarity” unlike anything seen since Rome. But a mere four
years later Zakaria was writing about the “post-American world” and “the rise
of the rest,” and Kennedy was discoursing again upon the inevitability of
American decline. Did the fundamentals of America’s relative power shift so
dramatically in just a few short years?
The answer is no.
In economic terms, and
even despite the current years of recession and slow growth, America’s position
in the world has not changed. Its share of the world’s GDP has held remarkably
steady, not only over the past decade but over the past four decades. In 1969,
the United States produced roughly a quarter of the world’s economic output.
Today it still produces roughly a quarter, and it remains not only the largest
but also the richest economy in the world.
Military capacity matters, too, as early nineteenth-century China learned and
Chinese leaders know today. As Yan Xuetong recently noted, “military strength
underpins hegemony.” Here the United States remains unmatched. It is far and
away the most powerful nation the world has ever known, and there has been no
decline in America’s relative military capacity—at least not yet. Americans
currently spend less than $600 billion a year on defense, more than the rest of
the other great powers combined.
America’s actual superiority in military capability means American
land and air forces are equipped with the most advanced weaponry, and are the
most experienced in actual combat. They would defeat any competitor in a
head-to-head battle. American naval power remains predominant in every region
of the world.
In sum: it may be more than good fortune that has allowed the United States in
the past to come through crises and emerge stronger and healthier than other
nations while its various competitors have faltered. And it may be more than
just wishful thinking to believe that it may do so again.
he underlying assumption of such a course is that the present world order will
more or less persist without American power, or at least with much less of it;
or that others can pick up the slack; or simply that the benefits of the world
order are permanent and require no special exertion by anyone. Unfortunately,
the present world order—with its widespread freedoms, its general prosperity,
and its absence of great power conflict—is as fragile as it is unique.
Preserving it has been a struggle in every decade, and will remain a struggle
in the decades to come. Preserving the present world order requires constant American
leadership and constant American commitment.
Pic - "An American world order is worth preserving, and America dare not decline."
For those of us born betwixt the Fall of the Wall and 911, we kinda grew up with Great Satan unbound. Until Operation Iraqi Freedom, for older Americans - battles and history were old school stuff that would probably never happen again.
As "Rock of The Marne" blitzed through the largest Arab army in history in 20 days, her combat power was unparalled:
"An infantry division in name only, fielding 270 Abrams M1 tanks with mobile infantry that could be hastily formed into adhoc battle groups to handle a variety of missions"
Thunder Running into downtown Baghdad, even phoning up the Iraqi Minister of Misinformation at Palestine Hotel to request "Parking for 88 tanks" seemed like the debut of audacious American war fighting.
Actually - "Rock of the Marne" was following in the footsteps of their spiritual great grandfathers
"On 26 January 1945, 2d Lt. Murphy commanded Company B, which was attacked by 6 tanks and waves of infantry. 2d Lt. Murphy ordered his men to withdraw to prepared positions in a woods, while he remained forward at his command post and continued to give fire directions to the artillery by telephone.
"Behind him, to his right, 1 of our tank destroyers received a direct hit and began to burn. Its crew withdrew to the woods.
"2d Lt. Murphy continued to direct artillery fire which killed large numbers of the advancing enemy infantry. With the enemy tanks abreast of his position, 2d Lt. Murphy climbed on the burning tank destroyer, which was in danger of blowing up at any moment, and employed its .50 caliber machinegun against the enemy.
"He was alone and exposed to German fire from 3 sides, but his deadly fire killed dozens of Germans and caused their infantry attack to waver. The enemy tanks, losing infantry support, began to fall back. For an hour the Germans tried every available weapon to eliminate 2d Lt. Murphy, but he continued to hold his position and wiped out a squad which was trying to creep up unnoticed on his right flank.
"Germans reached as close as 10 yards, only to be mowed down by his fire. He received a leg wound, but ignored it and continued the single-handed fight until his ammunition was exhausted. He then made his way to his company, refused medical attention, and organized the company in a counterattack which forced the Germans to withdraw.
"His directing of artillery fire wiped out many of the enemy; he killed or wounded about 50. 2d Lt. Murphy's indomitable courage and his refusal to give an inch of ground saved his company from possible encirclement and destruction, and enabled it to hold the woods which had been the enemy's objective.
"The President of the United States of America, authorized by Act of Congress, March 3, 1863, has awarded in the name of The Congress the MEDAL OF HONOR to LIEUTENANT AUDIE L. MURPHY, UNITED STATES ARMY
Today is the anniversary of Lt Murphy's heroic achievement - Americans everywhere should get on their knees and thank God Almighty for raising up this laughing race of free men.
Pic - "Our Heroes Live In Our Hearts"
Since 44"s SOTU was more like the 1st of many nat"l TV"d re electile teleprompted maneuvers,
may be it's time to like zoom out and czech on the State of Foreign Entanglements au courant.
Three top cats in Daemoneoconia gave up their assessments of 44 so far
Madame VP Foreign and Defense Policy @AEI.
Any
short analysis of 44's successes and failures in foreign policy must
necessarily be incomplete. Is it enough to weigh his undeniable good judgment
in ordering Navy SEALS to take out Osama bin Laden against his vacillation when
faced with the Arab Spring? His willingness to face reality vis-à-vis Iran
versus his paralyzing missteps in promoting Israeli-Palestinian dialogue?
Surely not.
But
at the heart of what must, by the standards the president set for himself, be
judged a failure, is what seems to be 44's worst sin: The president's
foreign policy lacks a guiding set of principles. Why surge troops into
Afghanistan only to draw them down before the mission is complete? Why condemn
Muammar al-Qaddafi in Libya for his crimes against his own people and remain
almost indifferent to the same crimes when committed by Bashar al-Assad in
Syria? Why knock off a dozen al Qaeda terrorists from the air, and release
another group from Guantánamo?
The
answer, of course, is politics. Politics matters to any sane politician; but
when politics suffers no competition from principle, the nation's foreign
policy is rudderless. It is
why our allies mistrust us, our adversaries underestimate us, and why we no
longer seek to shape a better world, but instead to retreat from it.
Exec Director @ FPI
As 44 seeks reelection, he will likely tout the country's
counterterrorism successes under his watch and, in a sop to his base, his
ending of the war in Iraq and his efforts to wind down the war in Afghanistan.
Although voters in 2012 will be focused primarily on the state of the economy,
they should consider who is best suited to defend the country and advance
America's interests as commander chief when choosing whether to reelect 44 or bring in 45.
44th admin does have achievements to point to in the war against al
Qaeda and affiliated groups -- the killing of Osama bin Laden by U.S. Navy
SEALs chief among them. But the war on terror must remain a focus for the next
president, whoever it is. 44, by deemphasizing the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan in favor of deniable covert efforts, has put the country at risk of
being drawn back into both theaters because of his unwillingness to finish the
job begun by his predecessor.
So
too is the situation with rogue regimes that threaten America and its allies. The
West's confrontation with Iran is nearing a critical juncture as Iran
approaches a nuclear weapons capability. Syria, Iran's closest ally, is wracked
by what many observers now describe as a civil war. The broader Middle East is
in turmoil in the wake of last year's momentous developments. North Korea, under the new leadership of Kim
Jong Un, still challenges the stability of East Asia.
Meanwhile,
rising and resurgent powers such as China and Russia continue to undermine
American interests. 44 has rightfully begun to devote more American
diplomatic and military attention to Asia to deal with China's rise, but has
pursued a wrongheaded "reset" policy with Russia that does not reflect the true
nature of the Russian government, now facing its own popular uprising. On each
of these issues, the 44th admin has refused to take assertive action,
instead managing on the margins.
In
his first three years in office, 44 has made several correct tactical
decisions, but he seems to lack an appreciation of America's unique role in the
world and a coherent vision for the use of U.S. power and influence. What the
country needs from its next president is a leader who can shape world events
rather than be shaped by them. There is little to indicate that this is 44's interest or aptitude.
Senior Cat @ Brookings Institution
On
the accomplishment side of the ledger, credit 44 with a very smart
policy in Asia. By taking advantage of China overplaying its hand in the South
China Sea and generally unnerving most of the region, 44's administration has
reconfirmed the central role of the United States in East Asia. The opening of
a new base in Australia is a powerful symbol of America's enduring strategic
presence in the region. The opening with Burma obviously has both strategic
motives and strategic implications.
He
also has a fairly good record in responding to the Arab Awakening. 44's
administration has fortunately ignored the "realists'" call for standing by the
collapsing dictatorships in the Middle East. (How people can call themselves "realists"
when advocating such hopelessly unrealistic policies is a source of
wonderment.) In Egypt, especially, while the reaction to events has sometimes
been slow, the administration has generally moved in the right direction. 44
deserves particular credit for not joining in the general panic at the
electoral success of the Muslim Brotherhood. The operation in Libya was a
success. The growing international pressure on Basha al-Assad in Syria is
encouraging -- but eventually the United States will have to do more.
More
generally, 44 has made steady moves in support of democracy. After treating
it like a dirty word in its first year and a half, the administration has
returned to a pro-democracy posture not only in the Middle East, but also in
Russia and Asia. Given that the political evolution of countries in these
regions will have a direct bearing on the international strategic situation and
on the nature of world order in the coming years, this has been an eminently
"realistic" approach.
As
for setbacks, topping the list is44's failure to work out an agreement with
Iraq to maintain a U.S. troop presence beyond the end of 2011. This has been a
disaster and may prove to be one of the gravest errors of 44's first term,
for which either he or his successor will pay a high price. If Iraq unravels
into sectarian warfare, it could easily suck other regional powers into the
conflict -- especially Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. Just as importantly, it would set back
democratic progress in the region. Iraq is almost as much an anchor in the Arab
world as Egypt. The decision to give up on the admittedly difficult
negotiations with the Iraqis was clearly motivated by White House's desire to
run on "ending" the war in Iraq. This was as unnecessary as it was unwise.
The
decision to allow deep cuts in defense spending -- rather than addressing
entitlements -- is equally irresponsible. Here the 44th admin and
Congress are both to blame. But 44's team has compounded the problem by
elaborating a budget-driven defense strategy that is not commensurate with
American strategic goals and interests. It is ironic that 44 is adopting
Donald Rumsfeld's defense strategy -- high tech, light footprint.
We will find,
as we did in 43's years, 42's years, and in many previous decades,
that drones and missiles can only go so far in preserving American interests.
If not reversed, the deep cuts looming in defense will go a long way to
undermining the U.S. position in the world. They will even undercut the 44th
admin's efforts to make the United States a more reliable player in
Asia, despite its unconvincing protestations to the contrary.
Pic - "In the end, you can’t help but feel American strategy is adrift, with Team 44 presiding over our decline as a world power. Great time for the president to make the case to the contrary — if that’s possible."
Well see, doing Persia's super not so secret tender, sensitive portions of Preacher Command's new clear drive, with an airborne enrichmentus interruptus as indicted in the closing bits of uber snarky chiz aimed at a recent delish "Doing Persia" piece
An attack on Iran is almost certain to unify the Iranian people around
the mullahs and provoke the supreme leader to redouble Iran’s nuclear
pursuits, only deeper underground this time, and without international
inspectors around. Over at the Pentagon, you sometimes hear it put this
way: Bombing Iran is the best way to guarantee exactly what we are
trying to prevent.
Well, the bit about a society suffering under a illegit somewhat unhinged Barbi hating Regime has an effective counter - tuff to think cats would get to crushing on the preachers, Secret Police and Control Freaks even more "thus making regime change hard to
accomplish, if not impossible."
Attacking the new clear stuff may actually be a smokescreen. As darling Amir once fessed up in exclusive commentary: "Why not focus on the man holding the gun Courtney instead of the gun itself"
An air campaign aimed at the new clear sites for starters would be intense - far beyond last millennium's Big Week und Blitz Week action that starting clawing Luftwaffe out of the sky. Even if Great and Little Satan hooked up with RAF and Royal Saudi Air Force for a menage a quad l'guerre d'l' air no guarantees it would nail everything.
Consider instead:
"Given
the likely fallout from even a limited military strike, the question Great Satan should ask her hotself is, Why not take the next step? After
all, Iran's nuclear program is a symptom of a larger illness-- the
revolutionary fundamentalist regime in Tehran."
If associated sites are not
targeted for humanitarian reasons, Iran could still have a nuclear
future. More troubling are, in the words of former Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld, the "known unknowns." There is no question
that covert elements of Iran's nuclear program exist.
After devoting so many
resources to its nuclear program and suffering years of increasingly tough
sanctions, it is entirely reasonable to believe that Tehran maintains at least
a small pilot enrichment facility far away from the scrutiny of the
international community. After all, hiding one from the world's eyes would not
be difficult; the IAEA has very limited access to the workshops where Iran
produces the components for and assembles its centrifuges and thus cannot
precisely track the size and scope of Iran's enrichment activities.
Further, Iran's capability to enrich uranium is a
technical skill that cannot be bombed out of existence. Nor can the progress it
has made on weaponization. Those aspects of the program would likely survive a
limited bombing campaign along the lines advocated by Kroenig.
To be sure, a limited strike is not pointless. Kroenig's
support seems in part an effort to avoid the consequences skeptics of military
action often highlight, such as Iran responding militarily or with operations
via its terrorist proxies. He argues that the United States "could first
make clear that it is interested only in destroying Iran's nuclear program, not
in overthrowing the government" to moderate the Iranian response. But
there, too, he is wrong. Iran has been in confrontation with the international
community over its nuclear program for years.
Whether a limited military strike
or regime destabilization operation, Iran's leaders would almost certainly
believe they would have to respond to such a challenge to maintain their
credibility in the region, employing missiles, proxies, and/or their own
terrorist operatives.
After all, Iran has been killing Americans for years --
most recently, U.S. troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. And, as the Iranian plot
last year to assassinate the Saudi ambassador on American soil revealed, Tehran
seems to be in no mood to modulate its behavior. It is dubious that the Iran's
supreme leader and the Revolutionary Guard Corps would, or even could, accept a
limited strike without retaliating.
Given the likely fallout from even a limited military
strike, the question the United States should ask itself is, Why not take the
next step? After all, Iran's nuclear program is a symptom of a larger illness
-- the revolutionary fundamentalist regime in Tehran.
Thanks to internal political developments and sanctions,
the regime is at its weakest point in decades. But the international community
is slowly exhausting the universe of palatable sanctions, and even the pressure
brought to bear on Iran thus far has not caused it to halt its program. A
limited strike against nuclear facilities would not lead to regime change. But
a broader operation might. It would not even need to be a ground invasion aimed
specifically at toppling the government.
But the United States would need to
expand its list of targets beyond the nuclear program to key command and
control elements of the Republican Guard and the intelligence ministry, and
facilities associated with other key government officials. The goal would be to
compromise severely the government's ability to control the Iranian population.
This would require an extended campaign, but since even a limited strike would
take days and Iran would strike back, it would be far better to design a
military operation that has a greater chance of producing a satisfactory
outcome.
Of course, there is no assurance that the Iranian regime
would immediately crumble under such an onslaught.
But once the cost to the
country and the weakness of the current regime became clear, the door would
open for renewed opposition to Iran's current rulers. It is sometimes said that
a strike would lead the population to rally around the regime. But given the
current unpopularity of the government, it seems more likely that the
population would see the regime's inability to forestall the attacks as
evidence that the emperor has no clothes and is leading the country into
needlessly desperate straits. If anything, Iranian nationalism and pride would
stoke even more anger at the current regime.
At a minimum, it would be far better for Iran's rulers to
be distracted by domestic unrest after a massive strike than totally free to
strike out at enemies after a limited one.
Some would argue that if the regime does fall, any
subsequent leader would value the nuclear program just as much, especially considering
Iranian nationalism and citizens' supposed pride in the nuclear program. But as
the economic costs of the program have grown, so, too, has disillusionment with
Iran's isolation. As the Iranian activist Shirin Ebadi told The Wall Street
Journal in April 2011, "Ahmadinejad talks about nuclear energy as national
pride . . . but that's not true. People don't care." The United States, in
concert with its allies, would thus be in a strong position to make clear to
Iran's new leaders that the path to prosperity is predicated upon giving up the
nuclear program.
The 44th administration has avoided the choice between a
military operation and a nuclear Iran by relying on conclusions by the U.S.
intelligence community that Iran has not made the final decision to develop a
weapon. But its faith in receiving that intelligence in a timely and
unambiguous way is, if history is any guide, misplaced. It is correct then
to argue that a military strike should be in the cards.It is wrong to
suggest that a limited strike is the one option that should be on the table.
If strikes are chosen, it would be far better to put the regime at risk than to
leave it wounded but still nuclear capable and ready to fight another day.
Pic - "Between the future and the past tense - Lies the present in the distance... Scoring points for passionate resistence. Between the lines and the highway - Lies the danger and the safety"
Oh, it just breaks your heart you know?
Every since that dementia heimers thing done got a hold of Paw Paw, the tragi comedy of errors has been like totally relentless - with only a few spots of 'what the heck?" type chiz - like the hilarious trying to feed the chickens cat litter (here's a tip - doesn't work bay bee) - to break up the steady wash of stuff that makes one think Time is predator.
Kinda like the headscratcher the white haired Congressional cat sallied forth with in the South Cackalackey DJ contest about the pre911 Buddha blower uppers that often whee laxed by executing girls in a soccer stadium
"Like to point out one thing about the Taliban. The Taliban used to be
our allies when we were fighting the Russians. So Taliban are people who
want — their main goal is to keep foreigners off their land. It’s the
al-Qaeda — you can’t mix the two. The al-Qaeda want to come here to kill
us. The Taliban just says, “We don’t want foreigners.” We need to
understand that, or we can’t resolve this problem in the Middle East. We
are going to spend a lot of lives and a lot of money for a long time to
come."
Uh, wait, you said what now?
Everything in this statement is wrong. Everything. Let’s start with the
most basic point. The Taliban most certainly were not “our allies when
we were fighting the Russians.” How could they have been, considering
that the Taliban did not exist at the time of the Soviet invasion and
occupation of Afghanistan?
To claim that the Taliban is just opposed to foreign interference in
Afghanistan is patently absurd. To begin with, the Taliban’s creation
was a direct result not of foreign invasion but of Afghanistan’s
internecine tribal warfare after the Soviets left and the Americans lost
interest. Its unabashed goal was to crush Afghan factions that impeded
its establishment of a retrograde sharia state.
Moreover, the Taliban craves foreign interference, without which it
would never have come to power. A Pashtun movement driven by Islamic
scholars and spearheaded by Mullah Mohammed Omar in Kandahar, the
Taliban owes its existence to Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Two of the only three nations in the world to recognize the
Taliban-led government in Kabul, nurtured, armed, and financed the
Taliban in its origin.
They did so precisely because the Taliban was an
effective ally in their machinations against regional rivals — India for
the Pakistanis and Iran for the Saudis. The alliance was also grounded
in the Taliban’s espousal of Deobandism, an uncompromising construction
of you know whatslam propagated in Afghan madrassas built by the Saudis’ m"Hammedist World League in conjunction with Jamaat-e-Islami, Pakistan’s supremacist
movement.
Even after Congress authorized the use of military force, 43
pointedly asked the Taliban to hand bin Laden and his organization over to Great Satan so that they could be tried — bin Laden having
been indicted years earlier by an American grand jury. Taliban
repeatedly refused. The choice at that point was either to invade,
overthrow the Taliban, and smash al-Qaeda, or to let it be known that Great Satan would tolerate a massive attack on our homeland. That
was no choice at all.
What about the not digging foreigners part?
Taliban does not say, “We don’t want foreigners.” If you are an Arab
jihadist, an operative of Pakistan’s heavily Islamist intelligence
service, or a Saudi Wahhabist royal ready to build Afghanistan’s
next-generation madrassas, the Taliban is delighted to have you in their
country. It is non-m"Hammedists they don’t want. And such superpowers that they especially despise, since these they
see as standing athwart their divine mission to subject the world to the
rule of "slamic law.
That is why they protected al-Qaeda even at the cost of their own power.
That is why negotiating with them is self-defeating and leaving them
alone is suicidal.
Pic - "As long as the Taliban believe that they have a backer in Pakistan, even if is passive backing to provide safe havens, they are inclined to play the long game with the United States, which is to wait it out in Afghanistan."
WoW - the Watchers Council
- it's the oldest, longest running cyber comte d'guere ensembe in
existence - started online in 1912 by Sirs Jacky Fisher and Winston
Churchill themselves - an eclective collective of cats both cruel and
benign with
their ability to put steel on target (figuratively - natch) on a wide
variety of topictry across American, Allied, Frenemy and Enemy concerns,
memes, delights and discourse.
Every week these cats hook up each other with hot hits and big phazed
cookies to peruse and then vote on their individual fancy catchers.
Without further adieu - (or a don't) here are this weeks winners
Council Winners
Non-Council Winners
See you next week! And don’t forget to follow us on Facebook and Twitter
Vom Kriege!
How did vClausewitz put it? "Victory means making your enemies scream 'God! Please! Stop!"
Wunderliche Dreifaltigkeit mein schatzen bitte! nicht wahr?
GsGf"s Iran Security Initiative cat lays it out to play it out
"Courtney, If Great Satan does not demonstrate through both word and deed the risks that Preacher Command and her proxilicious minions faces, overly optimistic Iranian hardliners may wrongly decide
that the benefits of a confrontation outweigh
the costs."
Check it out thru Preacher Command's Periscope:
War could turn out badly for the regime. Great Satan can do much to shape the perceptions of both Iranian leaders
and world opinion regarding the risks Iran would face from such a
conflict.
Resisting Global Arrogance
The Iranian doctrine of resistance assigns primary importance to
psychological effects. In assuming that victory is achieved by
demoralizing the enemy, it emphasizes the moral and spiritual dimensions
of war over the physical and technological. From this viewpoint, how an
action appears is the key test of its success. This fits well with a
twenty-four-hour-news world in which image often matters more than
reality.
The United States presents itself as, and is seen to be, a great
military power. Standing up to U.S. forces could therefore be a great
propaganda coup for Tehran. Consider that the Iranian navy still regards
its 1988 confrontation with the United States -- sparked by the mining
of a U.S. warship -- as a great victory that it studies closely, despite
the sinking of several Iranian vessels. A new confrontation in the
Strait of Hormuz and nearby Persian Gulf waters might play to Iran's
greatest naval strength and the U.S. Navy's greatest weakness -- though
of course even at its strongest, Iran's navy is still much weaker than
the U.S. Navy at its weakest.
Iran has invested heavily to create a multilayered system for sinking
ships: mines, missiles from fast craft, missiles from bunkers hidden in
the hills along the strait, and submarines. In the most realistic U.S.
Navy simulation of what war with Iran might be like -- the $250 million
Millennium Challenge exercise conducted in 2002 -- a similar array of
forces sank sixteen American ships and might have done even more damage
had the Navy not stopped the game to change the rules.
If Iran got lucky
and sank a U.S. warship during an actual conflict, television viewers
around the world might conclude that the Navy had lost the war no matter
what happened next, since the destruction of a U.S. ship could define
the conflict's public image. The Navy has not lost a ship since 1968,
and its leaders rarely if ever mention the possibility that it might
lose one in any war, much less one with Iran. Washington would therefore
be prudent to shape expectations, frequently pointing out that while
Iran might get in a few blows during a conflict, the more relevant
measure of success would be whose forces are left standing at the end of
the day, which would most assuredly be the U.S. military.
Iranian leaders might also decide that the U.S. and European strategy of
escalating pressure leaves them with few options, in which case resistance may offer the best prospects. After all, when the United
States got its nose bloodied by the 1983 Beirut Marine barracks bombing
and the 1993 Somali "Black Hawk down" incident, Washington withdrew its
forces from both countries. Iran may hope for the same result via
confrontation in the Gulf. Demonstrated U.S. commitment to continuing
America's seventy-year military presence in the Gulf is the best way to
disabuse Tehran of this notion.
The threat of fierce U.S. retaliation to any Iranian attack may not
matter to some Iranian hardliners as much as one might think. The
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Iran's most powerful political
force, does not necessarily care so much about the regular navy's large
ships. The IRGC navy's swarming approach relies instead on hundreds of
small boats that could mix in with the thousands of civilian dhows and
other small craft in the Gulf. The U.S. Navy could face something akin
to guerrilla warfare at sea, not the conflict-at-a-distance it prefers.
Defeating such an opponent would take time, during which U.S. forces
might appear tied down and not necessarily winning. The best way to
forestall this line of Iranian propaganda is shaping expectations with
statements -- such as those recently made by U.S. military leaders --
pointing out that fully halting Iranian attacks on shipping could take
many weeks.
The United States should also carefully consider its escalation options,
because each approach to broadening the fight could pose problems that
must be prepared for in advance. For instance, attacks on Iran's oil
infrastructure might drive prices up and invite Iranian retaliation
against critical infrastructure in frightened Gulf monarchies -- a
scenario that lends heightened importance to those countries' recent
efforts to step up infrastructure protection. And ground operations,
even by Special Forces, could prove controversial among Americans, most
of whom would presumably not welcome perceptions of another land war.
Any such actions should therefore be preceded by careful explanation of
the underlying U.S. strategy.
Creating Disorder in Oil Markets
Iranian leaders may hope that attacks in the Gulf, especially if
sustained for weeks, might create disorder in world oil markets. That
would have two important benefits for Tehran. First, shortages could
allow Iran to sell its oil at high prices despite U.S. and European
pressure. The 1979 revolution, for example, cut Iran's oil exports in
half but doubled world prices. Yet that outcome seems less likely today
if plans are put in place to release strategic reserves and expand use
of pipelines that bypass the Strait of Hormuz during the weeks-long
process of halting Iran's attacks.
Second, Iranian hardliners may hope that chaotic oil markets -- with
their attendant high gas prices hurting the American and European
economies and U.S. Gulf allies becoming nervous -- might pressure
Washington into ending the conflict even without securing Iranian
concessions. Were that to happen, Tehran could conclude that U.S.
military power is unable to stop it from doing as it pleases. Hardliners
might see this as confirming Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's saying, "The
United States cannot do a damn thing." Continuing consultation with
potentially nervous allies will be needed to counter this problem.
Justifying the New Clear Chiz
A military conflict might also provide an opportunity for Iran to
declare that the United States and Europe are hostile powers with which
it cannot negotiate regarding the nuclear impasse, especially if
European forces joined in the protection of shipping against Iranian
attacks. Tehran could also claim that it needs a powerful deterrent
against future U.S. or European action, namely, the capability to
acquire nuclear arms in extreme circumstances if it exercised its
claimed right to leave the Nonproliferation Treaty.
If the United States
were seen as the aggressor, that argument might win much sympathy
around the world, possibly undermining the vigor with which UN sanctions
were enforced. Hence the importance of emphasizing that Washington and
its allies seek a diplomatic resolution to the nuclear impasse and have
turned to sanctions only because Iran refuses to follow Security Council
orders and engage directly with the United States.
Rallying the Nation
Some Iranian leaders might welcome war with America in the hope of
rekindling the revolutionary spirit and rallying nationalist sentiment.
As described above, the most important factor in predicting Iranian
actions is the leadership's perceptions of what will happen, not what is
actually most likely to occur. In fact, an Iranian public already
unhappy at privations due to hardline policies could well blame their
leaders for starting a conflict. Iranians have already gone through one
protracted, bloody war under the Islamic Republic, and there are few
indications they would welcome another, this time against any enemy much
more powerful than Iraq.
Would the United States Lose, or Would Both Sides Win?
Just because one side wins a war does not mean the other side loses. If
both sides advance their political objectives, then both sides win. For
the United States, a key test of any conflict with Iran is how it
affects the nuclear impasse. In that sense, a war might work out well
for the United States -- damage inflicted during the conflict could
overcome Iran's factional infighting on the nuclear issue and force a
dramatic reversal, as happened in 1989 to end the Iran-Iraq War. Yet war
is a risky business, and naval conflicts could instead stiffen Tehran's
resolve to acquire dangerous nuclear capabilities as quickly as
possible in order to deter further U.S. attacks. In that case, further
pressure might be needed to induce Iran to seek a diplomatic solution.
Nor is it clear what war would do to Iran's nuclear capabilities, as
distinct from its intentions. In the event of a naval conflict in the
Gulf, the United States might debate whether to attack Iran's nuclear
facilities as well. If so, the challenge for the United States would be
to ensure that such strikes significantly affect Iran's ability to
reconstitute the nuclear program, and that the existing UN sanctions
against dual-use items would hold after a strike.
Will War Come?
Because it is by no means clear that war with Iran would advance U.S.
interests, Washington is unlikely to start a conflict except in the most
dire circumstances. The more likely scenario is Iran inadvertently
stepping over a U.S. red line, and Washington reacting more vigorously
than Tehran expects. Much as the Korean War began in no small part
because of mistaken North Korean and Soviet assumptions about U.S. red
lines, so too might Iran blunder into a conflict with the United States.
Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei was cautious for years, but he has made
several risky decisions of late, such as rigging the 2009 presidential
election. In his view, refusing to compromise and hitting back hard were
the keys to victory over the mass protests that followed the disputed
vote. Over the past few months, Tehran has at times applied that same
principle abroad: when slapped, slap back harder. For example, when
Tehran plotted to kill the Saudi ambassador to Washington, it may have
been responding to Riyadh's prior intervention in Bahrain, which had
prevented Iran from aiding the island's Shiites. Afterward, the UN
General Assembly voted 106 to 9 to remind Iran of its obligations to
protect diplomats (not one Muslim-majority country stood with Tehran),
while Britain and other countries imposed financial sanctions. Tehran
responded by orchestrating the ransacking of the British embassy the
next week. Both the assassination plot and the embassy attack hurt
Iran's interests, but the regime ordered them anyway. That is not
reassuring when considering whether Iran might attack in the Strait of
Hormuz.
Indeed, the recent record suggests that Iranian leaders have
become less cautious about taking aggressive gambles and more confident
that the United States will not react. Washington should vigorously
remind them how such over-optimism has repeatedly misled them. For
example, they apparently -- and wrongly -- believed that the United
States and Europe would not apply pressure against Iran's Central Bank,
and that Europe would not boycott Iranian oil.
Tehran's chances of achieving its objectives through war
presumably look much better if it can convincingly portray itself as the
victim rather than the aggressor. Iranian officials may therefore do
their best to paint U.S. and European actions as an attack that
justifies a response. Tehran is less likely to carry out that threat if
Western allies and Iran's neighbors vigorously counter the "victim"
claim and loudly repeat their calls for engagement with Iran and
negotiation of all outstanding differences.
For Washington's part, the proverb "if you want peace, prepare
for war" holds true: the best prospect for persuading Khamenei to revert
to his past cautiousness is to clearly lay out that the United States
has red lines which, if crossed, will cost Iran dearly. Declaratory
policy, such as 44's recent letter to Iran about red lines,
helps. But Iran may be more impressed by deeds that back up those
words.
Peace is more likely to be preserved if the United States
marshals its allies and demonstrates its power -- hopefully through
military exercises alone, but also by vigorous response to any Iranian
aggression if necessary.
Pic - "What If Iran Strikes First?"
While the Guitars of War amp up the overdrive for doing Persia - Center of Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) delivers the hot PDF ing climax for Velayat E 90 - Preacher Command's tactical and strategic MO for keeping Great Satan at arms length and closing up Hormuz Strait tighter than school girl night at Hooter's.
"Outside-In: Operating from Range to Defeat Iran’s Anti-Access and Area-Denial Threats"
Iran has had ample opportunity over the last twenty years to examine the “American way of war” and to deduce that allowing the United States and its allies to mass overwhelming combat power on its borders is a prescription for defeat.
Therefore, Iran is pursuing measures to deny the U.S. military access to close-in basing and make traditional U.S. power-projection operations in the Persian Gulf possible only at a prohibitive cost.
Oh snap! Check this bit 'bout getting Hormuz re opened:
Joint Amphibbin'
Two Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs), supported by SOF [special
operations forces] and possibly Army airborne and air assault units,
could seize and hold a lodgment at a time and location of Central
Command’s choosing. An objective area for an amphibious landing should
be located where enemy A2/AD [Anti-access/area-denial] threats have been
suppressed, and may not be in proximity to “existing ports, airfields,
and logistics infrastructure.”
Immediately after landing, SOF, Marine
Corps, and Army forces would concentrate their efforts on expanding
their operating perimeter and preventing the enemy from closing within
range to use G-RAMM [Guided-rockets, artillery, mortars, missiles]
weapons. Non-lethal capabilities and mobile high-energy laser weapons
could help deny hostile forces access to key areas and create a
defensive “barrier” against G-RAMM attacks.
U.S. forces could then use
this secure lodgment as a jumping off point for follow-on assaults up
the coastline of Iran to clear areas that could be used by the enemy to
launch attacks against vessels in the Gulf of Oman and Strait of Hormuz,
including vulnerable U.S. MCM [Mine countermeasures] forces.
Throughout a theater-entry operation, Air Force and Navy surveillance
and strike aircraft, along with Army ATACMS [Army Tactical Missile
System ] stationed in the UAE or Oman, if available, could help suppress
Iran’s long-range ballistic missile and ASCM [Anti-ship cruise missile]
threats, provide close air support to expeditionary forces, and prevent
enemy ground forces from massing to execute counterattacks.
Seizing Islands at Strategic Locations.
In addition to creating lodgments on the Iranian coast, islands just
inside the Gulf—including Abu-Musa, Sirri, Greater Tunb and Lesser
Tunb—should be targeted by precision strikes and occupied by U.S.
expeditionary forces as required. If permitted to remain under the
command of the IRGCN [Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy], these
islands could be staging locations for operations to re-seed minefields
and harass U.S. forces and civilian shipping transiting the Strait.
Clearing the Path in to the Persian Gulf.
Completing mine clearing operations would likely be a key task for
Littoral Combat Ships equipped with MCM modules, UUVs [Unmanned
underwater vehicles], rotary wing aircraft, and supporting sensors. To
prevent Iran from regenerating its maritime exclusion defenses, U.S. air
forces would need to continue attacks against known mine storage and
distribution sites, and destroy or suppress small craft, helicopters,
submarines, and enemy “commercial” vessels capable of dispensing mines.
Although it is unknown to what extent Iran will expand its inventory
of smart mines in the future, history has shown that even a small number
of mines placed in shipping lanes “have been able to halt surface
traffic when their presence was known.” Moreover, as mine countermeasure
operations in 1991 and 2003 suggest, clearing large areas in the Strait
of Hormuz and Persian Gulf of mines could require a month or even
longer.
Pic - "Given the likely fallout from even a limited militarystrike, the question the United States should ask itself is, Why not take thenext step? After all, Iran's nuclear program is a symptom of a larger illness-- the revolutionary fundamentalist regime in Tehran."
"7 knew exactly what to do with Great Satan"s enemies. Kill them"
Whoa!
The sirens of Isolationalistic intent often hope for the hap hap happy days of 1912. Withdraw, retreat, hide under our beds and let the rest of the world devour itself whilst Great Satan sweetly focuses on cool stuff like education, art, biz, communications, medical and technological break thrus, space exploration and women worshipping
Decorated ex Combat historian and all around America Rocks y'all! PHD Bevin Alexander prophesied that such doofussness giganteus, in heat with defeat or (even worse) -
deceivers
"Many critics of American foreign policy - both at home and abroad - assert
that the United States has overextended herself unnecessarily in other
nations affairs. Some liberal critcs even chastise the United States for
becoming an "Imperial Power."
These
criticisms are completely off the mark. Those who worry about America's
projection of power are overlooking how America got to the position she
occupies at this moment in history: the world's dominant political and
military, the only nation that will actually go into the world and
strike down evil."
This is significant. For Great Satan, "National Interest" is not a 'geo mapi - graphical' phrase (well
maybe for trade and enviro regulating) it is global. Tiny and small
nations might appropiately feel that their nat'l interest begin and end
at the border. Natch, their foreign policy would most likely be
defensive only.
A larger nation has more extensive interests - by
design. Like Soviet Union time Russia and Great Satan today -
collective ID is ideological, big boys have ideological interests in
addition to purely materialistic concerns.
Sans something weird
and unheard of, Great Satan will always feel bound and obliged to defend
any democracy under the gun from unfree, unhinged and undemocratic
threats - external or internal. Kinda like the Euro escapade in both
world wars.
Same thing with Japan, SoKo, Taiwan or Little Satan
today. When geopolitical best girl friends forever are under attack -
the claws come out. Nothing magic about it.
Fact is, the Great
Satan's 30 years in the future military is super superior (and some are
in denial about this - which says more about their world views than
anything else) to any imaginable combination that could be arrayed
against her. This wasn't an evil plot by pre emptive, preventive
plotters.
It came with the turf. Just lucky - bad or good - Great
Satan racked up one heck of a military biz during the half century
since WWII time Deutschland and Nippon gave up fascist and imperial
ghosts and succumbed to Regime Changes.
While Europa rebuilt,
recovered and rehabbed, Warsaw Pact time Russia laid out of real combat
(except for losing their hide in Afghanistan) and used Soviet homies and
local fanboys to do the fighting.
Not Great Satan! She was
involved with combat ops nearly everywhere. Korea, Greece, Vietnam,
Cambodia, Dominican Repub, El Salvador, Grenada, Lebanon, Libya, Panama,
Kuwait, Somalia, Kosovo, the Balkans, Afghanistan and of course, her
latest regime change - Iraq.
When Russia tried to put down Grozny the 1st time in the Commonwealth era - it was horribly embarrassing. - like catching a longtime Gf hooking up with a guy that she KNEW you liked.
"The initial attack ended with a major rout of the attacking forces and led to
heavy Russian casualties and nearly a complete breakdown of morale. An
estimated 1,000 to 2,000 federal soldiers died in the disastrous New Year's
Eve assault.
All units of the 131st "Maikop" Motor Rifle Brigade sent into the city,
numbering more than 1,000 men, were destroyed during the 60-hour fight in the
area of the Grozny's central railway station, leaving only about 230 survivors
(1/3 of them captured). Several other Russian armored columns each lost hundreds
of men during the first two days and nights of the siege."
The
mighty Red Army quagmired in their own back yard with the first defeat
suffered by Russia nearly 51 years to the day. Not since the wicked Wehrmacht desperately delivered a bloody nose at Zhitomir Ukrainia had the Red Army been defeated and retreated.
When an almost identical sitch occured at Ah Nasiriyah in '03 - Great Satan pretty much redecorated the place (in
early millenium 'Steel on target' fashion), launched an on the spot
counterattack that not only reached temporarily cut off units - but
ended up capturing the entire burg.Half a century of nigh
constant confrontation cloned creative combat cadre that would never
leave a comrade behind. Armed with the ultimate in Battlefield meds,
real time communications and more precise firepower in hand, on hold and
on call than panzer prima donna's ever dreamed.
Great Satan blinging for combat stuff rate wise expanded along
with America's economic growth - while Euro powers blinged on social
programs and refrained from fighting amoungst themselves, cut spending
on their militaries and focused on trading and tech.
The Soviet Union spent cash (rubles, actually) at an alarming rate. Mostly wasteful, Mother Russia's military AND economy bashed heads and knocked each other all the way out in collapse.
Magically, after 20 years or so, despite faux school ideas like "imperial decline"
Great Satan busted out of her cocoon as uniquely powerful - the only
one of Her kind. Meds, science and high tech were off the hook - and
generously applied to creating and upgrading everything from electric
pencil sharpeners to cruise missiles.
Just like Spider - man, with all this great power came great responsibilities. It's a fact Jack - whether sought after, wanted, welcomed or not.
A
lot like the armies of attention attracting sporty shorties at the mall
that demand, deflect and encouragingly discourage players.
And, like little hottie drama magnets, Great Satan will find opportunities to use it - or the world will discover opportunities for Great Satan.
Pic -"Dangerous!"
