Vom Kriege!
How did vClausewitz put it? "Victory means making your enemies scream 'God! Please! Stop!"
Wunderliche Dreifaltigkeit mein schatzen bitte! nicht wahr?
GsGf"s Iran Security Initiative cat lays it out to play it out
"Courtney, If Great Satan does not demonstrate through both word and deed the risks that Preacher Command and her proxilicious minions faces, overly optimistic Iranian hardliners may wrongly decide
that the benefits of a confrontation outweigh
the costs."
Check it out thru Preacher Command's Periscope:
War could turn out badly for the regime. Great Satan can do much to shape the perceptions of both Iranian leaders
and world opinion regarding the risks Iran would face from such a
conflict.
Resisting Global Arrogance
The Iranian doctrine of resistance assigns primary importance to
psychological effects. In assuming that victory is achieved by
demoralizing the enemy, it emphasizes the moral and spiritual dimensions
of war over the physical and technological. From this viewpoint, how an
action appears is the key test of its success. This fits well with a
twenty-four-hour-news world in which image often matters more than
reality.
The United States presents itself as, and is seen to be, a great
military power. Standing up to U.S. forces could therefore be a great
propaganda coup for Tehran. Consider that the Iranian navy still regards
its 1988 confrontation with the United States -- sparked by the mining
of a U.S. warship -- as a great victory that it studies closely, despite
the sinking of several Iranian vessels. A new confrontation in the
Strait of Hormuz and nearby Persian Gulf waters might play to Iran's
greatest naval strength and the U.S. Navy's greatest weakness -- though
of course even at its strongest, Iran's navy is still much weaker than
the U.S. Navy at its weakest.
Iran has invested heavily to create a multilayered system for sinking
ships: mines, missiles from fast craft, missiles from bunkers hidden in
the hills along the strait, and submarines. In the most realistic U.S.
Navy simulation of what war with Iran might be like -- the $250 million
Millennium Challenge exercise conducted in 2002 -- a similar array of
forces sank sixteen American ships and might have done even more damage
had the Navy not stopped the game to change the rules.
If Iran got lucky
and sank a U.S. warship during an actual conflict, television viewers
around the world might conclude that the Navy had lost the war no matter
what happened next, since the destruction of a U.S. ship could define
the conflict's public image. The Navy has not lost a ship since 1968,
and its leaders rarely if ever mention the possibility that it might
lose one in any war, much less one with Iran. Washington would therefore
be prudent to shape expectations, frequently pointing out that while
Iran might get in a few blows during a conflict, the more relevant
measure of success would be whose forces are left standing at the end of
the day, which would most assuredly be the U.S. military.
Iranian leaders might also decide that the U.S. and European strategy of
escalating pressure leaves them with few options, in which case resistance may offer the best prospects. After all, when the United
States got its nose bloodied by the 1983 Beirut Marine barracks bombing
and the 1993 Somali "Black Hawk down" incident, Washington withdrew its
forces from both countries. Iran may hope for the same result via
confrontation in the Gulf. Demonstrated U.S. commitment to continuing
America's seventy-year military presence in the Gulf is the best way to
disabuse Tehran of this notion.
The threat of fierce U.S. retaliation to any Iranian attack may not
matter to some Iranian hardliners as much as one might think. The
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Iran's most powerful political
force, does not necessarily care so much about the regular navy's large
ships. The IRGC navy's swarming approach relies instead on hundreds of
small boats that could mix in with the thousands of civilian dhows and
other small craft in the Gulf. The U.S. Navy could face something akin
to guerrilla warfare at sea, not the conflict-at-a-distance it prefers.
Defeating such an opponent would take time, during which U.S. forces
might appear tied down and not necessarily winning. The best way to
forestall this line of Iranian propaganda is shaping expectations with
statements -- such as those recently made by U.S. military leaders --
pointing out that fully halting Iranian attacks on shipping could take
many weeks.
The United States should also carefully consider its escalation options,
because each approach to broadening the fight could pose problems that
must be prepared for in advance. For instance, attacks on Iran's oil
infrastructure might drive prices up and invite Iranian retaliation
against critical infrastructure in frightened Gulf monarchies -- a
scenario that lends heightened importance to those countries' recent
efforts to step up infrastructure protection. And ground operations,
even by Special Forces, could prove controversial among Americans, most
of whom would presumably not welcome perceptions of another land war.
Any such actions should therefore be preceded by careful explanation of
the underlying U.S. strategy.
Creating Disorder in Oil Markets
Iranian leaders may hope that attacks in the Gulf, especially if
sustained for weeks, might create disorder in world oil markets. That
would have two important benefits for Tehran. First, shortages could
allow Iran to sell its oil at high prices despite U.S. and European
pressure. The 1979 revolution, for example, cut Iran's oil exports in
half but doubled world prices. Yet that outcome seems less likely today
if plans are put in place to release strategic reserves and expand use
of pipelines that bypass the Strait of Hormuz during the weeks-long
process of halting Iran's attacks.
Second, Iranian hardliners may hope that chaotic oil markets -- with
their attendant high gas prices hurting the American and European
economies and U.S. Gulf allies becoming nervous -- might pressure
Washington into ending the conflict even without securing Iranian
concessions. Were that to happen, Tehran could conclude that U.S.
military power is unable to stop it from doing as it pleases. Hardliners
might see this as confirming Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's saying, "The
United States cannot do a damn thing." Continuing consultation with
potentially nervous allies will be needed to counter this problem.
Justifying the New Clear Chiz
A military conflict might also provide an opportunity for Iran to
declare that the United States and Europe are hostile powers with which
it cannot negotiate regarding the nuclear impasse, especially if
European forces joined in the protection of shipping against Iranian
attacks. Tehran could also claim that it needs a powerful deterrent
against future U.S. or European action, namely, the capability to
acquire nuclear arms in extreme circumstances if it exercised its
claimed right to leave the Nonproliferation Treaty.
If the United States
were seen as the aggressor, that argument might win much sympathy
around the world, possibly undermining the vigor with which UN sanctions
were enforced. Hence the importance of emphasizing that Washington and
its allies seek a diplomatic resolution to the nuclear impasse and have
turned to sanctions only because Iran refuses to follow Security Council
orders and engage directly with the United States.
Rallying the Nation
Some Iranian leaders might welcome war with America in the hope of
rekindling the revolutionary spirit and rallying nationalist sentiment.
As described above, the most important factor in predicting Iranian
actions is the leadership's perceptions of what will happen, not what is
actually most likely to occur. In fact, an Iranian public already
unhappy at privations due to hardline policies could well blame their
leaders for starting a conflict. Iranians have already gone through one
protracted, bloody war under the Islamic Republic, and there are few
indications they would welcome another, this time against any enemy much
more powerful than Iraq.
Would the United States Lose, or Would Both Sides Win?
Just because one side wins a war does not mean the other side loses. If
both sides advance their political objectives, then both sides win. For
the United States, a key test of any conflict with Iran is how it
affects the nuclear impasse. In that sense, a war might work out well
for the United States -- damage inflicted during the conflict could
overcome Iran's factional infighting on the nuclear issue and force a
dramatic reversal, as happened in 1989 to end the Iran-Iraq War. Yet war
is a risky business, and naval conflicts could instead stiffen Tehran's
resolve to acquire dangerous nuclear capabilities as quickly as
possible in order to deter further U.S. attacks. In that case, further
pressure might be needed to induce Iran to seek a diplomatic solution.
Nor is it clear what war would do to Iran's nuclear capabilities, as
distinct from its intentions. In the event of a naval conflict in the
Gulf, the United States might debate whether to attack Iran's nuclear
facilities as well. If so, the challenge for the United States would be
to ensure that such strikes significantly affect Iran's ability to
reconstitute the nuclear program, and that the existing UN sanctions
against dual-use items would hold after a strike.
Will War Come?
Because it is by no means clear that war with Iran would advance U.S.
interests, Washington is unlikely to start a conflict except in the most
dire circumstances. The more likely scenario is Iran inadvertently
stepping over a U.S. red line, and Washington reacting more vigorously
than Tehran expects. Much as the Korean War began in no small part
because of mistaken North Korean and Soviet assumptions about U.S. red
lines, so too might Iran blunder into a conflict with the United States.
Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei was cautious for years, but he has made
several risky decisions of late, such as rigging the 2009 presidential
election. In his view, refusing to compromise and hitting back hard were
the keys to victory over the mass protests that followed the disputed
vote. Over the past few months, Tehran has at times applied that same
principle abroad: when slapped, slap back harder. For example, when
Tehran plotted to kill the Saudi ambassador to Washington, it may have
been responding to Riyadh's prior intervention in Bahrain, which had
prevented Iran from aiding the island's Shiites. Afterward, the UN
General Assembly voted 106 to 9 to remind Iran of its obligations to
protect diplomats (not one Muslim-majority country stood with Tehran),
while Britain and other countries imposed financial sanctions. Tehran
responded by orchestrating the ransacking of the British embassy the
next week. Both the assassination plot and the embassy attack hurt
Iran's interests, but the regime ordered them anyway. That is not
reassuring when considering whether Iran might attack in the Strait of
Hormuz.
Indeed, the recent record suggests that Iranian leaders have
become less cautious about taking aggressive gambles and more confident
that the United States will not react. Washington should vigorously
remind them how such over-optimism has repeatedly misled them. For
example, they apparently -- and wrongly -- believed that the United
States and Europe would not apply pressure against Iran's Central Bank,
and that Europe would not boycott Iranian oil.
Tehran's chances of achieving its objectives through war
presumably look much better if it can convincingly portray itself as the
victim rather than the aggressor. Iranian officials may therefore do
their best to paint U.S. and European actions as an attack that
justifies a response. Tehran is less likely to carry out that threat if
Western allies and Iran's neighbors vigorously counter the "victim"
claim and loudly repeat their calls for engagement with Iran and
negotiation of all outstanding differences.
For Washington's part, the proverb "if you want peace, prepare
for war" holds true: the best prospect for persuading Khamenei to revert
to his past cautiousness is to clearly lay out that the United States
has red lines which, if crossed, will cost Iran dearly. Declaratory
policy, such as 44's recent letter to Iran about red lines,
helps. But Iran may be more impressed by deeds that back up those
words.
Peace is more likely to be preserved if the United States
marshals its allies and demonstrates its power -- hopefully through
military exercises alone, but also by vigorous response to any Iranian
aggression if necessary.
Pic - "What If Iran Strikes First?"
Interesting posting, gives an idea of what the Iranians might be thinking.
ReplyDeleteAlso, some fairly dangerous ideas in that article. It kinda reminds me of what War must've been like before the world wars, that two nation-states could go to war, without the expectation that one state is annihilated as an outcome. With that kind of reasoning, war becomes much more acceptable and more frequent.
If the US has any "redlines" vis a vis Iran, then those lines need to be extreme, because we can't have a 'limited war' with Iran. The very idea is ridiculous, I think that the author hits the nail on the head on that issue. The US /will/ loose some high class naval ships, it will be extremely expensive for us, and if we're bombing 'civilian power production facilities', then the rest of the world is clearly going to think we're being bullies, and, more importantly, that Iran needs to have nukes to defend itself. Hell, people in the US, probably in the US Congress, will be openly saying that!
The only acceptable war is Total War, the only possible result can be utter annihilation of the opponent. Put in an extreme way, the only acceptable outcome in Iran is practically the installation of a Zoroastrian Monarchy, might as well bring the Peacok throne out of mothballs too.
Any situation where there's open military between the US and the Islamic Republic, that ends with the Islamic Republic still existing is CLEARLY an Iranian victory.
Thanks Schenk. FPI echoed what me and the posse been saying for a while - if we're gon stir it up - may as well annihilate the regime or wound it unto death so to speak. Pussy footing around new clear sites may be a smokescreen for hitting the top 20% of Preacher Command.
ReplyDeleteGsGf"s Staff Advisors put this out the other day about it
http://www.foreignpolicyi.org/content/if-us-strikes-iran-it-should-target-regime-well-its-nuclear-program-says-fpis-jamie-fly
Consider the possibility that all those Iranian sailors getting rescued, (this is the third bunch, right?) are actually spies, checking out the US Navy's ships, etc.
ReplyDeleteJust too coincidental that all of a sudden all these Iranian boats/ships, whatever, need rescuing, by US ships.
Rene, indeed, wouldn't put it past the people that invented chess. Good thing we're enemies, if the 'merkans and persians were allies, we'd've propably taken the world over already!
ReplyDeleteBut also consider the possibility that all those acts in Iran of wooden-shoes-in-the-gears and exploding nuke engineers are the acts of our spies.
Further consider that we prefer to be overprepared, and that therefore those acts represent maybe a tenth of what our spies and agents are capable of doing.
It's possible, but, many Iranians suspect, with good reason, the IRI may be assassinating these guys themselves. and not all of them are actual nuclear scientists, or working on the installations.
ReplyDelete