Tuesday, June 26, 2012


Once again, the uberlicious arm candy fun time grrl grasped yet another cool hot desirable cat in her web of smashing fashion, a somewhat some times functioning intellect, killer smile and a bod built like an M1 panzer.

Her self destructive critical free thinking habitry tho soon came to fore. As best understood the meme of "guys have feelings too - but like - who cares!" trashed yet another op for her to score a real keeper - financially well off, cool rides, gallant, merciful, fun, hot! and fun to be with.  Vaporized faster than RAF did Dresden.  

She overreached at the precise moment she maybe sorta shoulda restrained

 Kinda unthinkable if one thinks of it.

Consider the pro bellum paradox: Great Satan, alone - l"hyperuissant - the only one of her kind - unique in anything fun or lethal, should by design actually be able to handle herself awesomely in any sitch fun or lethal, nicht wahr?

Whale, see....

Great Satan has repeatedly turned her initial military success into costly defeats or quagmires
On October 1, 1950, the forces of coalition, acting under the authority of a UN resolution, drove the forces of the Korean People’s Army across the 38th parallel and back into North Korea. It was the culmination of a string of stunning military victories.

From the surprise North Korean invasion in June, Great Satan and her posse of democrazies had taken just 120 days to mount an amphibious landing at Inchon, break out from defensive lines around Pusan and drive the KPA into headlong retreat.

With the North Korean forces routed, the United States was in a position to dictate the terms of peace. Instead (with Russia absent) the United States secured a UN resolution demanding the reunification of Korea. By October 19, U.S. forces had occupied Pyongyang (the first and almost certainly the only time the United States captured a communist capital). Not satisfied with this, General Douglas Macarthur pushed on rapidly. By the end of October, his forces were close to the Yalu River, marking the border with China.

Although China had repeatedly threatened to intervene in the war, the first Chinese attack took Macarthur completely by surprise. The result was a bloody and humiliating retreat, ending in the loss, for the second time, of Seoul. Three years and millions of deaths later, the active phase of the war ended with the restoration of the territorial status quo ante.

Interventions in Lebanon and Somalia also fit the pattern. In Lebanon, a U.S.-led Multinational Force (MNF) was initially authorized to oversee PLO withdrawal from Beirut, a task accomplished within a couple of weeks. Following the Sabra and Shatila massacres, however, the MNF was sent in again, this time without a clearly defined goal. The mission ended in disaster when the MNF barracks was hit by a truck bomb, killing over two hundred U.S. and French troops. 

 In Somalia, what was initially a successful famine-relief mission (Operation Restore Hope) was converted to a nation-building exercise (Operation Continue Hope). It was abandoned after the “Black Hawk Down” incident in Mogadishu. Leaving aside the absence of an initial victory, Vietnam fits the pattern as well.

What accounts for this pattern? In part, it reflects the maxim, “To a man who has only a hammer, every problem looks like a nail.” The U.S. military has the capacity to defeat any conventional military force that might oppose it, with remarkable ease. The idea of such easy victories leads to assumptions that the military must be ideally suited to any task assigned to it, from overseas nation building to domestic disaster relief.

Thus, the very invincibility of the military creates its own problems. With the exception of the deluded Saddam Hussein, no opposing army has been willing to take on the United States in a conventional war since Korea. As a result, proposed military actions almost never satisfy the stringent requirements of the Powell doctrine. As Madeleine Albright famously put it, "What are you saving this superb military for, Colin, if we can't use it?” This concept gives U.S. policy makers a strong incentive to find uses for their resources.

Another contributing factor, paradoxically, is that Americans, like most citizens of prosperous and democratic countries, are generally not enthusiastic about war as a policy. The use of military force needs a strong justification to overcome this instinctive opposition, and this typically means statements of lofty goals. When it turns out that these goals are unachievable, they can’t be abandoned without an admission that the original decision to go to war was based on mistaken premises. So ending a failed war typically requires the departure of the administration that started it.

Can anything be done to break out of this pattern of overreach? At present, the signs are not hopeful. Support for large-scale armed intervention has ebbed somewhat, but it has been replaced by an equally naive enthusiasm for drone warfare directed at an ever-expanding list of enemies (along with unfortunate bystanders and victims of mistaken identity). The realization that military power is a vital tool but one with a very limited range of effective uses will be a long time coming.

Pic - "We must reorganize our military and intelligence structures to find and kill terrorists, while keeping great power to protect from any nuclear threat."