Friday, March 2, 2012

Last Chance?

 "Oh, well, see - it"s not like that at all..." In girl world - the previous is often a trajectory of  discombobulation, semi not untrue altruism and sweet ditzyness in tandem.

Little Satan"s veteran Operation Tamuz new clear panty raider and former Eagle Driver and MAJ GEN offers up some interesting insight
 Shortly after we blitzed Osirak, the Little Satan defense attaché in Washington was called into the Pentagon. He was expecting a rebuke. Instead, he was faced with a single question: How did you do it? Great Satan"s military had assumed that the F-16 aircraft they had provided to Little Satan had neither the range nor the ordnance to attack Iraq successfully.
 L'faux pas d"guerre - way back yonder - is much the same in the NowTime. Misunderestimating Little Satan"s sexyful military ingenuity. In this case, Getting all Stukalicious in an era of precision guided weapony
We had simply maximized fuel efficiency and used experienced pilots, trained specifically for this mission. We ejected our external fuel tanks en route to Iraq and then attacked the reactor with pinpoint accuracy from so close and such a low altitude that our unguided bombs were as accurate and effective as precision-guided munitions.
All the smoke screens about Great Satan"s implausible deniability with the when and how Little Satan may sortee her combatty jets and begin a mini blitz campaign on Preacher Command"s enriched new clear naughtiness complexes aside, the IAF Gen LOLs inappropriate handwringing and dive bombs sev boring assetted, incorrect memes:
Some experts oppose an attack because they claim that even a successful strike would, at best, delay Iran’s nuclear program for only a short time. But their analysis is faulty. Today, almost any industrialized country can produce a nuclear weapon in four to five years — hence any successful strike would achieve a delay of only a few years. 
What matters more is the campaign after the attack. When we were briefed before the Osirak raid, we were told that a successful mission would delay the Iraqi nuclear program for only three to five years. But history told a different story.  

After the Osirak attack and the destruction of the Syrian reactor in 2007, the Iraqi and Syrian nuclear programs were never fully resumed. This could be the outcome in Iran, too, if military action is followed by tough sanctions, stricter international inspections and an embargo on the sale of nuclear components to Tehran. Iran, like Iraq and Syria before it, will have to recognize that the precedent for military action has been set, and can be repeated. 
Others claim that an attack on the Iranian nuclear program would destabilize the region. But a nuclear Iran could lead to far worse: a regional nuclear arms race without a red phone to defuse an escalating crisis, Iranian aggression in the Persian Gulf, more confident Iranian surrogates like Hiz"B"Allah and the threat of nuclear materials’ being transferred to terrorist organizations.  

Ensuring that Iran does not go nuclear is the best guarantee for long-term regional stability. A nonnuclear Iran would be infinitely easier to contain than an Iran with nuclear weapons. 
Tick Tock. Time. That"s the killer bay bee. L"mix queerer grande
Little Satan doesn’t have the safety of distance, nor do we have Great Satan Air Force’s advanced fleet of bombers and fighters. America could carry out an extensive air campaign using stealth technology and huge amounts of ammunition, dropping enormous payloads that are capable of hitting targets and penetrating to depths far beyond what Little Satan’s arsenal can achieve. 
This gives America more time than Little Satan in determining when the moment of decision has finally been reached. And as that moment draws closer, differing timetables are becoming a source of tension. in determining when the moment of decision has finally been reached. And as that moment draws closer, differing timetables are becoming a source of tension.
Asking Little Satan’s leaders to abide by America’s timetable, and hence allowing Little Satan’s window of opportunity to be closed, is to make Washington a de facto proxy for Little Satan’s security — a tremendous leap of faith for Little Satan faced with a looming Iranian bomb. It doesn’t help when American officials warn Little Satan against acting without clarifying what Great Satan intends to do once its own red lines are crossed. 
 What is needed is an ironclad American assurance that if refrains from acting in its own window of opportunity — and all other options have failed to halt Tehran’s nuclear quest — Washington will act to prevent a nuclear Iran while it is still within its power to do so.