Preacher Command"s Aero Defense/Offensive abilities are like split up into 3 sections:
Iran has the largest and most diverse inventory of long-range artillery
rockets and ballistic missiles in the Middle East. It is estimated to
have between 200 and 300 Scud-B and Scud–C missiles, which Iran has
renamed the Shahab-1 and Shahab-2. It also owns hundreds of Zelzal
rockets and Fateh-110 semi-guided rockets (see below).
These systems allow Iran to threaten targets throughout the Gulf
littoral, but they are not accurate enough to be decisive militarily.
Iran would need at least 100 missiles armed with 500-kg conventional
warheads — and potentially many more — to destroy a specific target with
a moderate level of confidence.
If fired in large numbers, Iranian missiles might be able to harass or
disrupt operations at large U.S. or GCC military targets, such as
airfields, naval ports or fuel depots. But such attacks are unlikely to
not halt activities for a significantly long time.
Iran is also unlikely to be able to improve the accuracy of its
short-range missiles for at least the next five to ten years. The
addition of more sophisticated inertial guidance units — or Global
Positioning System (GPS) receivers — could improve accuracy by only 25
percent if properly incorporated into a Shahab or Fateh-110 missile, and
then thoroughly tested.
To
further enhance its accuracy, Iran would have to develop the capacity to
terminate missile thrust precisely or add correction systems for the
post-boost phase. But adding these mechanisms would also require flight
testing likely to take four years or longer.
Iran’s longer-range missiles — the Shahab-3 and Ghadr-1 — are capable
of striking targets throughout the Middle East, including Israel, as
well as portions of southeastern Europe. But these missiles are highly
inaccurate. And Iran’s stockpile likely totals less than 100.
This could change once Iran completes development of the solid-fuelled
Sajjil-2 missile. Iranian engineers are widely believed to have the
capacity to manufacture this system, although they still rely on foreign
sources for fuel-production ingredients. Development may have stalled,
however, since Iran has conducted only one flight test since 2009.
The utility of Iran’s ballistic missiles is likely to remain weak for
years, yet they could be used effectively as a psychological weapon on
population centers. The most vulnerable cities are Baghdad, Kuwait City
and Dubai, since they are within range of the Zelzal rockets that Iran
has in large quantity. Abu Dhabi, Manama, Doha and Saudi coastal cities
are far enough to require the longer-range Shahab-1 and -2 missiles,
which are in shorter supply.
The Islamic Republic’s air forces and ground-based air defense
systems offer limited protection of Iranian air space. They are no match
for the combined capacity of the United States and its six Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC) allies. In a prolonged and intensive conflict
involving the United States, Iran would have difficulty protecting its
strategic assets, including its nuclear facilities, air bases, and
command-and-control centers.
An
integrated U.S. air defense network would probably prevent Iranian
pilots from reaching many military targets within GCC territory,
although limited air raids might have some success in the opening days
of a conflict. (The GCC includes six sheikhdoms — Saudi Arabia, Kuwait,
the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain and Oman — that make up most of
the Arabian Peninsula.)
Most of
Iran’s aircraft were purchased before the 1979 Islamic Revolution and
are widely considered obsolete. Even Iran’s Russian-made MiG-29 and
Su-24 fighter-jets, acquired more recently, lack the modern avionics and
air-to-air missiles needed to compete with the U.S. and GCC air forces.
Iran also lacks sophisticated airborne command-and-warning assets, as
well as the secure communications network needed to relay vital threat
and targeting information. These deficiencies place Iranian pilots at a
severe disadvantage when engaging hostile air forces armed with a
complete picture of the airspace.
Perhaps Iran’s most significant shortcoming is its limited capacity to
maintain airplanes and generate anything beyond one sortie per day for
each fighter jet. Iran has a very limited ability to surge its air
forces. It would probably be quickly overwhelmed by a combined attack by
U.S. and GCC forces.
If Iran modified anti-ship missiles for land attacks, it could target key infrastructure assets located along the Gulf littoral, although the small warheads carried by these missiles would limit the damage.
UAVs
Iran is developing a wide-range of unmanned aerial vehicles. Most of the systems seen so far are slow, have limited maneuverability, and carry small payloads, so are used primarily as reconnaissance and intelligence-gathering platforms.
One notable exception is the Karrar, also known as the “ambassador of
death.” The Karrar is based on target-drone technology, which was
originally used for training air-defense crews. Nonetheless, it carries
500-kg gravity bombs and presents yet another means of delivery that
American and GCC forces must track and, if necessary, defeat.
The larger concern, however, is Iran’s large arsenal of anti-ship
cruise missiles acquired from China. These weapons pose a significant
threat to Gulf shipping as well as navies operating near the Strait of
Hormuz. Iranian use of anti-ship missiles would significantly escalate
any conflict, so Tehran would probably use them only if the regime felt
threatened. But their mere existence — and the threat they pose — offers
Tehran an effective component for deterring attack by others.
1 comments:
Interesting, but largely irrelevant. The Iranians aren't stupid. They're not going to rely primarily on weapon systems that we can easily defeat. Commando / suicide attacks launched from heavily fortified and well-concealed bases on the small islands of the Persian Gulf will be their weapon of choice. Think the naval war in the Baltic during the Great Northern War with suicide attacks thrown in.
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