Fragged in a fracas of course!
Way back 'round Original Surge - World Famous Army Lt Col Yingling author'd a massive hello at the highest levels of the This We'll Defend cats command.
"America's Generals have been checked by a form of war they did not prep for and do not understand. As matters now stand, a private who loses his rifle suffers far greater consequences than a general who loses a war."
Within a few hours "A Failure In Generalship" instantly shehabb'd throughout every level of the Army and anxious fams at home whose own dear sons, dads, bros, nephews, uncles and cuzes crunk up the Army of the Tigress.
The essay sashayed that the prob in Great Satan's leadershipping Generalshippedness was a system that reinforced and sucked up to conformity and dissed risk takers.
LTC Yingling's bona fides were particulary powerful - a SOSH cat at the Point, fixing to lead nearly 600 of Great Satan's voltiguers in a combat battalion to the Haj betwixt the 2 Rivers for his 3rd volunteer tour. Col Y had a lot to lose.
While the COINganksta/COINtra debatery is quite legendary (for those that follow such more bigger brain making sexercises) prob no one looms more larger than Colonel Gentile.
von Clausewitz said that a center of gravity is something to be discovered, and it could vary depending on the aims of the war being fought. Yet COIN experts essentially tell us that there is no need to discover a center of gravity or even an operational method because the rules of our current COIN doctrine have already done the discovering and planning for us. For instance, if there is one hard and fast prescription in our doctrine that must always be followed as a rule, it is that the people must always be protected because they are the "prize."
Col G quizes Col Y to redux the Failure's of Generalship Re: AFPAK
"In light of your 2007 article can we make the same critique of Army generalship in Afghanistan today? Might you consider writing “A Failure of Generalship, Version 2” for Afghanistan? If not, might you spell out the differences between what you saw as the failure of American generalship in Iraq from 2003-2006 with the past two years plus in Afghanistan. In other words, how has American generalship been a failure in Iraq and not in Afghanistan?"
Col G advances his COINtra couture d'gurre with a comment about CNAS
So CNAS were the cats who promoted a deeply flawed strategy in Iraq and especially Afghanistan where the nation committed billions and billions to a strategy that employed hearts and minds counterinsurgency that simply has not worked. In effect, as sad as it is to say, we have burned billions and buckets of blood on an operational method that does not work, and CNAS had a huge hand in promoting it.
When will they be held accountable?
Where in defense circles is the intellectual criticism of the place and its most prominent pundits?
Why are they getting a free ride with this?
Don't kid yourself kids - the original AFPAK Surge sweetly envisioned doing Helmand and the East at the same incredible instant - not 44's finalized Helmand 1st solo and then maybe sorta do up the Easterly bit.
AFPAK Surge and COIN by extension got ye olde Benadryl dose in the Amaretto Sour trick (haha - the old tricks are the best - nicht wahr?) and may have more to do with Epic Fail than leadership?
Pic - "Courtney, intellectual integrity and accountability produces good strategy."