Koreunification

Ever wonder why cause there are two Koreas?

The yankee part is little more than a starving, slave trading underground rocket factory with an unfree, unfun new clear weaponized nation state attached led by Young General

The Southermost portions - SoKo (or ROK as the ancients insist on nom d'guerr'ing her) is fully crunk with a conscript military totally off the hook with literacy, bling bling, fun and free choice.
Time to start seriously thinking of re hooking up both Koreas


The consequences of Korean unification may include, but are not limited to, the following:

• One or more rogue countries or non-state actors could illicitly obtain North Korean-origin weapons of mass destruction (WMD), missiles or related production technologies. An exodus of fighters and refugees may facilitate a massive, uncontrolled outflow of conventional arms.
• A civil conflict or even a guerilla war may take place in the North, with subversive activities spreading to the South and supporting countries. It is naïve to expect that North Korea’s entire population would welcome the “liberation from tyranny” that unification offers; such an expectation is simply not based on a sober analysis of what North Korea’s existing social strata would gain or lose from the arrival of South Korean governance. The elite and the middle class—possibly about 1 million people or roughly 5% of the population, including members of the party, security apparatus, military and a considerable portion of their brainwashed supporters and families—would have no exit strategy and no place in a South-dominated Korea. Moreover, they could reasonably expect repercussions for their roles in the previous regime. If even a portion of this group (including trained personnel) resorted to armed resistance, the results could be disastrous. This is not just speculation: the regime has spent decades preparing for a guerilla war, and it likely has a network of well-equipped bases concealed throughout its territory for use by dedicated fighters.
• A possible massive refugee exodus, especially in the event of a prolonged simmering conflict, could extend not only to neighboring China and Russia but also to other countries along sea routes. In addition to the humanitarian catastrophe that may follow, longer-term consequences from a mass refugee migration could include the appearance of transnational organized crime rings with North Korean connections. Such organizations could pursue business in areas such as arms sales, human trafficking, drug smuggling and counterfeit currency production.
• If significant civil conflict ended quickly or were completely avoided (which is doubtful), new social tensions would emerge from a growing sense of inequality. North Koreans would likely come to be seen as second-rate citizens, or as “servants” to their South Korean “masters” (or, at best, as “pupils” to their South Korean “teachers”). The present “haves” in North Korea would be relegated to the lowest social status if not direct prosecution, fueling resentment and opposition. Even members of North Korea’s working class might in time grow dissatisfied with their subservient position and their inequality to South Koreans.
• South Korea would suffer a huge drain on its resources as it reformed the North Korean economy, virtually building it anew. Meanwhile, North Korea’s population would face a difficult period of adaptation to new market realities. (To understand the magnitude of this adjustment, consider the difficulties that past North Korean refugees have encountered after voluntarily immigrating to the South.) These economic and cultural transitions would likely slow any increase in productivity from the introduction of modern technology and management practices.
• The collateral damage to South Korea’s economy may be significant enough to reduce its international competiveness. A unified Korea could prove less attractive to foreign investors, and it would face the impossibility of swiftly re-educating the North Korean labor force. As a result, Korea could cede its place in global value chains to newly emerging economies in Asia and elsewhere. The resulting change of fortune for South Koreans may in turn lead to a growing social dissatisfaction in the South and contribute to a political crisis.
• The DPRK’s spontaneous submission to the ROK could severely damage or disrupt the existing system of international security governance, with the supposed central role of the UN Security Council (UNSC). It is difficult to imagine that China and Russia, with their respective geopolitical interests and roles in implementing international law as permanent UNSC members, would approve the de facto, involuntary takeover of one sovereign state and UN member by another. While the ROK Constitution considers the whole Korean peninsula to be ROK territory,[3] that view does not correspond with international law. The UNSC would set a dangerous precedent if it approved South Korea’s annexation of the North,[4] but a lack of international approval would cause the new state to be “illegal” for at least some time.
• In the unlikely event that China allowed such a takeover, Beijing would face a transformed geopolitical situation. Korea’s unification under the ROK would likely result in the deployment of allied US troops close to its border with China, a development that would be seen in China as a major strategic defeat. “Giving away” its former ally, for which thousands of Chinese soldiers sacrificed their lives during the Korean War, would be widely perceived in Asia as a sign of China’s weakness and indecisiveness. It would undermine China’s position not only in Asia, but also as an emerging superpower.
• In addition, this outcome may produce a totally new stage of confrontation between China and the United States. Beijing would have to upgrade its military in Northeast China in order to counter the grave challenge to its military-security interests. It could act in response to a perceived US strategy of “encirclement,” similar to Russia’s post-Cold War behavior in Europe.
• In an alternate scenario, China could react to an impeding unification by taking preventive measures, potentially seizing North Korean border territories and/or installing a pro-Chinese government in Pyongyang. Such steps would generate a tremendous geopolitical shift, leading to a lasting geopolitical confrontation between “continental” and “maritime” powers. The ensuing militarization of China and deepening conflict with the United States would encourage arms buildups throughout the region in response to the threat that many countries would see in an increase in Chinese capabilities. An arms race with new blocs could result, causing inconceivable damage to the global economy.

In short, the strategy of bringing down North Korea’s regime could backfire to the world’s ultimate detriment, no matter how much nuisance the country’s WMD programs currently pose. A comprehensive analysis is necessary before any application of more sanctions, which in fact are meant to suffocate the Pyongyang regime, not change its behavior. A new US administration should conduct a fundamental policy review of this nature.