Great Satan's 2010 "Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China" reportage got laid out to Congress and it is smoking bay bee!
Defense Dept's gossip sheet has tons of bling to blang - despite the world's largest Collectivist State (with the world's 2nd honkingest economy) bashful attempt to maintain a less transparent secretive stance.
"...Earlier this decade, China began a new phase of military development by articulating roles and missions for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) that go beyond China’s immediate territorial interests.
"...Other investments have allowed the PLA to pursue anti-access and area-denial strategies. Still others appear designed to improve the PLA’s ability for extended-range power projection, although China’s ability to sustain military power at a distance, today, remains limited.
The report features tons of hot! intell and military capabilities, contingencies, maps and sexyful scenarios, featuring the projected Air Craft Carrier fleet in 2020, rocket forces, au courant and future air power.
And China's brand new Joint Operational ability - deemed essential in modern warfighting:
Enabling Modern Warfare: Joint Operations
China’s military has been working for several years to develop the capability to conduct integrated joint operations (IJO), a concept the PRC believes essential to modern warfare.
IJO are characterized by the integration of multiple service elements under a joint command headquarters, making full use of advanced information technology and a networked command platform. China’s research, training, and preparations for joint operations have evolved substantially since the promulgation of its first joint campaign doctrine in the late 1990s, but
serious challenges limit the PLA’s ability to conduct IJO through at least 2010.
Early Chinese attempts at joint operations focused on the cooperation of branches within a service and operations loosely coordinated among the services using phased operations.
The PLA issued its first doctrine for the conduct of joint operations in 1999. However, PLA training and exercises for several years after the doctrine’s establishment reflected a reliance on pre-determined sequencing of service operations with little interaction or integration of the forces.
Recent efforts toward more integrated operations are embodied in the January 2009 edition of the PLA OMTE. This OMTE has been noted in official Chinese media as a new starting point for IJO and as making PLA training more joint and complex.
Obstacles. China’s military leaders recognize and acknowledge that one of the primary obstacles to IJO is that many PLA commanders have little or no training for, or experience operating in, a joint environment.
Key challenges include a shortage of commanders and staff qualified for such operations; a lack of understanding of the capabilities, equipment, and tactics of the other services; and a lack of advanced technology to enable communication and information sharing among the services.
Efforts to Improve. To rectify these deficiencies, the PLA launched enhanced training and professional military education, cross-training rotational assignments to different services, war simulations, military training coordination zones, and multi-regional military exercises.
In 2009, the PLA conducted at least three high-profile joint exercises through mid-September, including a joint ground-air exercise involving cross-military region deployment of up to 50,000 troops, a joint campaign exercise to train theater-level commanders in joint operations, and a joint anti-terrorism exercise with Russia.
Pic "Long March V Missile?! Oh, Long March IV - we barely knew you"