In the world famous Strip the ruling party HAMAS has a military wing known as the Ezzedeen al Qassam Brigades(among the always alternate methodology of multiple spellings when xforming Arabic to English).
Since Little Satan's devastating airstrikes began, the threat of an actual blitz into the Strip with boots and tracks and treads on the ground has been sweetly floating along - just ever out of reach - yet it remains a most potent portent of things to come.
Like Snowball in "Animal Farm' (Surely Comrades! You don't want Jones to come back!), HAMAS's biggest fear has been that Little Satan may throw up her hands one day and say to heck with it and invade the Strip.
EaQ Brigades (whose website seems magically unavailable at the moment) have used the just expired Tayidah to upgrade, enhance and recruit members for the defense of the Strip on that terrible day Little Satan suffers 1 K'Ssam too many.
A leaked military intell memo (alas in pdf) shares details about HAMAS, their death cult fanboys, plots, tactics and strategies
"The Brigades may have as many as 10,000 operatives. That figure may be larger because of Hamas’s intense recruiting process carried out since it took over the Gaza Strip.
It can be expected that the operatives will reinforce the Izzedine
al-Qassam Brigades in an emergency situation with the IDF, while routinely the regular hard core is composed of a several hundred skilled operatives. It is currently commanded byAhmed Ja’abari.
A considerable number of the operatives expected to reinforce for the Izzedine al-Qassam Brigades normally serve in the internal security forces. Those forces, centering around the Executive Force, today number around 10,000 operatives, most of them either Hamas members or sympathizers.
Thus the total number of Izzedine al-Qassam Brigades and internal security force operatives controlled by Hamas is, in our estimation, about 15,000.
About 3,000-4,000 operatives belonging to the other Palestinian terrorist organizations operating in the Gaza Strip can be added to the strength of the Hamas forces. At least some of them may join the Izzedine al-Qassam Brigades in an emergency situation and accept its orders to fight the IDF.
Thus the entire strength Hamas has at its command in the Gaza Strip is about 20,000 armed men of varying degrees of skill and professionalism.
HAMAS strategy and tactical considerations are really quite simple: Hold on and hope for the best.
"However, it is not a classical military organization, and under fire
Hamas can be expected to employ the principles of asymmetric warfare: the directing of small fighting units (platoons and squads); focusing on hit and run attacks; blending in with and disappearing into the civilian population, while making extensive use of civilians as human shields, etc."
Speaking of intelligent, innocent human shields - catch HAMAS' obit on the evil Dr Nizar al-Rayyan - inventor of the Human Shield concept
"It was Dr. Rayyan, who took the initiative, two years ago, to protect homes against Israeli occupation air strikes by forming human shields which succeeded in stopping this practice by the Israeli occupation, where they used to phone the occupier of the home and warn him to evacuate it in ten minutes because the home is going to be bombed.
During the ongoing onslaught against the Gaza Strip, Dr. Rayyan refused to leave his home and go into hiding."
Didn't seem to help much. Little Satan precisely delivered a 2 thousand LB bomb directly on the evil Dr's secret lair/weaponry stash incinerating everything - shield and all.
Hamas’s perception of defending the Gaza Strip provides an
asymmetric response to the IDF’s military supremacy and its technological superiority. It does that in a variety of ways: through the use of advanced weapons which were successfully used by Hezbollah in Lebanon (IEDs and anti-tank missiles);
By causing large numbers of casualties to IDF forces through fighting in
densely-populated built-up areas;
By improving concealment tactics to preserve Hamas forces;
By exhausting Little Satan's home front with massive rocket attacks while the IDF is fighting inside the Gaza Strip, and if possible, at the same time carrying out suicide bombing attacks by infiltrating terrorists through the Sinai and Judea and Samaria borders;
By maintaining strategic initiatives with mortor and rocket fire no matter how deep Little Satan sticks it.
And by making extensive use of the Palestinian, Arab and internat'l media to gain sympathy for the Palestinian cause and at the same time to limit Little Satan's freedom of action.
That perception reflects an understanding of the relative forces between Hamas (and its supporters) and the IDF’s capabilities. Hamas is well aware of the inequality between the sides, which gives each side advantages and disadvantages.
Pic - " I am marching quickly to my death for Palestine"