Since ebberdobby all sobered up from "Shi Lang!" and all undiffused from the Diffusion of Military Power
PLA Navy is totally hot with and for overreliance on “anti-access” and “area-denial” weaponry to shut adversary forces—chiefly Great Satan—out of East Asian waters during a Taiwan contingency or some other clash along China’s nautical periphery. This constitutes a static, passive approach inimical to global navies.
Under collectivist mommieland's anti-access strategy, diesel subses, anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), stealthy catamarans, and other shorty short-range or shore-based weapons to, uh, you know - like, erect - a dense, “layered” defense against forces that venture into China’s geographic environs.
Pounding on forces steaming westward across the Pacific, PLA defenders could ratchet up the costs of intervention so high that Great Satan would hesitate long enough for China to accomplish her goals. Better yet, (for the wicked bolsheviks) Great Satan might desist from a rescue effort altogether.
"If the Chinese navy is training and planning to operate within fixed areas and along fixed lines at sea, then it is demonstrating its lack of understanding of naval warfare and exposing itself to failure."
Red Star over the Pacific cat ahoys and belays that with a dose ala Capt AT Mahan"s Influ of Seapower upon History
Astute PLA Navy commanders backed by shore-based missiles and combat aircraft could give a superior adversary like the U.S. Navy fits. If Beijing can hold U.S. forces off with its “flotilla” of diesel submarines, fast patrol boats, and anti-ship missiles, it can liberate the surface fleet to operate freely under the protective shield provided by access denial. ASBM coverage will extend hundreds of miles seaward if that “bird” lives up to its billing—perhaps even out to the second island chain.Just lucky perhaps - Collectivist China's Naval Paw Paw - Admiral Liu - also was a General in Peoples Liberation Army. His ouija board vision of PLN is like 3 stages:
A map in the Pentagon’s annual reports on Chinese military power shows the ASBM “threat envelope” covering most of the Western Pacific, the entire South China Sea, the Strait of Malacca, the Bay of Bengal, and parts of the Arabian Sea.
That opens up vast maneuvering room for the Chinese fleet, allowing naval commanders to operate with the mobility and flexibility Bud Cole rightly extols, not to mention the confidence that comes with ready fire support from PLA rocketeers based on home soil.
A defensive fleet can be a venturesome fleet.
• By 2000, the PLAN would be capable of exerting sea control out to the First Island Chain, defined by a line drawn from the Kurile Islands, through Japan and the Ryukyu Islands, then through the Philippines to the Indonesian archipelago.
• By 2020, it could exert sea control out to the Second Island Chain, defined by a line drawn from the Kuriles, through Japan and the Bonin Islands, then through the Marianas Islands, Palau, and the Indonesian archipelago, with the implied inclusion of the island of Java, which would extend the navy’s control through the Singapore and Malacca straits.
• By 2050, the PLAN would include aircraft carriers and have the capacity to operate globally.
Pic - "Shashou Jian!"