Stalingrad

Seventy-five years ago this month, the Soviet Red Army surrounded — and would soon destroy — a huge invading German army at Stalingrad on the Volga River. Nearly 300,000 of Germany’s best soldiers would never return home. The epic 1942–43 battle for the city saw the complete annihilation of the attacking German 6th Army.

It marked the turning point of World War II. Before Stalingrad, Adolf Hitler regularly boasted on German radio as his victorious forces pressed their offensives worldwide. After Stalingrad, Hitler went quiet, brooding in his various bunkers for the rest of the war. During the horrific Battle of Stalingrad, which lasted more than five months, Russian, American, and British forces also went on the offensive against the Axis powers in the Caucasus, in Morocco and Algeria, and on the island of Guadalcanal in the Pacific.

Yet just weeks before the Battle of Stalingrad began, the Allies had been near defeat. They had lost most of European Russia. Much of Western Europe was under Nazi control. Axis armies occupied large swaths of North Africa. The Japanese controlled most of the Pacific and Asia, from Manchuria to Wake Island. Stalingrad was part of a renewed German effort in 1942 to drive southward toward the Caucasus Mountains, to capture the huge Soviet oil fields. The Germans might have pulled it off had Hitler not divided his forces and sent his best army northward to Stalingrad to cut the Volga River traffic and take Stalin’s eponymous frontier city.

By the time two Red Army pincers trapped the Germans at Stalingrad in November, Russia had already suffered some 6 million combat casualties during the first 16 months of Germany’s invasion. By German calculations, Russia should have already submitted, just like all of the Third Reich’s prior European enemies except Britain. Instead, the Red Army drew the Germans deeper into the traditional quagmire of Russia until the 6th Army was low on supplies, freezing in the winter cold, and trapped more than 1,500 miles from Berlin.

How did the Red Army not only survive but go on the offensive against the deadly invadersIn part, it had no choice. Germany was intent on not just absorbing Russia, but wiping it out or enslaving millions of its citizens. In part, Britain and the United States under the Lend-Lease policy began sending huge amounts of material aid, providing everything from boots to locomotives. In part, Red Army soldiers were terrified of their own communist strongman, Josef Stalin. Prior to the German invasion, Stalin was responsible for some 20 million Russian deaths through forced farm collectivization, planned famine, show trials and purges, and the murders of his own Red Army troops.

More than 10,000 soldiers were likely executed at Stalingrad by their own officers. But most important, no European invader — neither Sweden under Charles XII in the early 1700s nor France under Napoleon in the early 1800s — had ever successfully invaded and defeated Russia. The country was too large, both geographically and demographically. Good weather was too brief between the spring floods and the bitter Russian winter. And Russians always fought heroically as defenders of their own soil, even if this wasn’t always the case when they were fighting abroad as invaders.

Despite the horrors of Soviet Communism, the Allied winners of World War II owed a great deal to the Russian people. Russia’s male and female soldiers were most responsible for destroying Hitler’s vast ground forces, having killed more than two-thirds of the German soldiers lost in the war. The Soviet Union lost about 27 million soldiers and civilians — about 60 times more than America lost in the war.

Due to memories of the Soviet Union’s Cold War ruthlessness, and because of Vladimir Putin’s autocratic government, it is now fashionable to demonize Russia. Moscow sent troops into eastern Ukraine, absorbed Crimea, and has sought to tamper with a U.S. presidential election.

But most Americans have forgotten key aspects of Russia’s 20th-century history, a tragedy of unspeakable human losses. Outside Kiev in late summer of 1941, more than 700,000 Russian soldiers were killed or captured by Germans in a single battle. In one of the costliest sieges in history, at Sevastopol in July 1942, 100,000 Russians were killed or captured in a failed effort to save the port on the Black Sea.

We rightly see Putin as an aggressive autocrat. But millions of Russians view Ukraine and the Crimea as sacred, blood-soaked Russian ground. After the collapse of the nightmarish Soviet Union, Stalingrad was renamed Volgograd “city on the Volga.” Today, few in the West know exactly what happened there 75 years ago this month. This Veterans Day, we should also remember those heroic Russian soldiers. In bitter cold, and after losing hundreds of thousands of lives, they finally did the unbelievable: They halted the march of Nazi Germany.

Hail Columbia!

Christopher Columbus sailed the ocean blue way back in 1492.

This delightful ditty firmly places the date of the discovery of the New World into the minds of saavy kids everywhere in Great Satan.

Later on, CC get's dissed in crash courses for introducing alien concepts like slavery, STD's, baby Jesus and advanced weaponry to hapless, childlike human sacrificing races in places from South America all the way to Alaska.

What ev.

What was the motivation for CC to split sail from Europa and head west?

Easy!

Find a short cut to India.

The real quiz is quite significant. Why?

After all, Europa was the centre of the world for the tech saavy Europeans - India's locale was well known since Alexander the Great's era and thanks to Prince Henry (the cat who put the 'gator' in navigator) sealanes and land routes could have sweetly hooked up to provide the fastest transport times circa 1500 anywhere on earth.

Check out a World map from 1500 AD and the answer is prett obvious.

Critical portions of any route to and from India were totally beseiged by totalitarian monarchies like the Ottomans, Safavid Persia and an unhealthy mix of sundry and "...various m"Hammedist states..."

Plus, a newly reconstituted Xian Spain had just fought an expensive, bloody reconquista against 7th century time traveling control freaks and all of Europa wanted to get as far away as possible from said jerks and creeps.

Amazing that the reason for the season of Columbus Day is traced back to probs that kicked off Great Satan's very 1st regime change and are facing the world today.

Unfun, unfree and unhinged regimes built, cruelly maintained and by their very design expansionist, feature intolerance, nonegalitarian and misery projection with all the trimmings like slavery, pitiful lit rates and of course - violence.

Detours allowing the avoidance of such 'tardist, backward civs were in high demand, thanks to Columbus - Europa turned her back on the faux, played league of failed states - and concentrated her efforts on the "New World"

Pic - "Admiral of the Ocean"
 

Nuclear Nippon And SoKo?

Just when cautious optimism was beginning to resurface that the North Korea crisis might be fading slightly, Pyongyang took yet more actions to alarm the international community. Kim Jong-un’s government announced that it had conducted another nuclear test. The latest move came just days after the launch of an intermediate-range missile that flew directly over Japan’s northernmost island before breaking up and splashing down in the western Pacific.

The nuclear test was even more alarming than the missile test. Pyongyang stated that, unlike North Korea’s previous underground detonations of atomic bombs, this one was a much more destructive hydrogen bomb. Seismic data confirmed that the explosion was approximately five times larger than previous tests. The North Korean government also insisted that the device was designed to be placed on an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). A missile with that range would be capable of reaching targets on the west coast of the United States, and perhaps beyond

Although the latest developments are worrisome, there is no need yet to assume that North Korea currently poses a mortal threat to the American homeland. The North’s boast that it has been able to miniaturize the apparent hydrogen weapon for deployment aboard a missile should be viewed with considerable skepticism. So, too, should Pyongyang’s assertion that it already possesses missiles capable of striking the continental United States. More sober analyses point out that although Pyongyang has tested components of an ICBM, as well as testing at least three intermediate-range missiles, such achievements are not the same as a successful, full-range ICBM test. Moreover, even the more limited tests have hardly been flawless. The missile fired over Japan, for example, apparently came apart during re-entry—a defect noted in several previous tests as well.

At the same time, complacency on the part of U.S. leaders and the general public is unwarranted. It is clear that Pyongyang is making rapid strides in both its nuclear and missile programs. Within a few more years, North Korea will have the ability to attack the American homeland. The real danger is not the prospect of an unprovoked strike out of the blue. Contrary to the panicky mythology that American hawks cultivate, there is no evidence that North Korean leaders are suicidal. They fully realize that any nuclear attack on the United States would lead to massive retaliation and the annihilation of the communist regime.

However, while such direct deterrence remains quite credible, there is always the danger of a miscalculation. The development of a robust North Korean nuclear arsenal and delivery system also significantly erodes the credibility of extended deterrence—Washington’s commitment to risk nuclear war to protect such allies as Japan and South Korea. A bold North Korean leader might very well wonder whether U.S. leaders would really chance the destruction of American cities to protect third parties, even valued allies.

The credibility dilemma of extended deterrence often troubled Washington’s European allies during the Cold War, and was a key reason why NATO members sought not only multiple assurances but the presence of U.S. troops as a tripwire to guarantee that the United States would honor its commitment if Moscow challenged it. The East Asian allies now face a similar problem involving a far more unpredictable adversary.

Various analysts have argued recently that the United States must climb down from its long-standing demand that North Korea abandon its nuclear and missile ambitions. Instead, they advocate moving to a new policy based on negotiations, containment and deterrence. Such proposals are more realistic than the current bankrupt approach insisting that Pyongyang return to nuclear virginity, and they are far more prudent than reckless suggestions that the United States consider launching a preemptive conventional or nuclear attack.

However, they still contain the central defect of retaining America’s role as the lead player in trying to contain and deter Pyongyang. Washington’s chief objective instead should be to reduce America’s risk exposure in Northeast Asia’s increasingly dangerous strategic environment.

That means recognizing the reality that primary deterrence has greater credibility than extended deterrence. In other words, it is time for North Korea’s neighbors to acquire their own nuclear deterrents, with America’s blessing. Unfortunately, too many American officials, political figures and pundits believe that all forms of nuclear proliferation are equally bad. That is not true, and in any case, nuclear proliferation is already far advanced in Northeast Asia. When China, governed by a dictatorial regime, and North Korea, a bizarre communist monarchy, already have nuclear weapons, it is misplaced to fret about stable, status quo–oriented democracies such as South Korea and Japan possessing modest nuclear deterrents.


Moving to empower Tokyo and Seoul in that fashion is necessary to credibly deter North Korea over the coming decades.

A doctrine of mutually assured destruction between North Korea and its noncommunist neighbors, along the same lines as the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, is hardly an optimal solution. But it beats having America continue being on the front lines of a potentially catastrophic confrontation. It is time to offload that risk to the countries that have the most at stake in deterring North Korea.

Never Forget

If there’s one lesson the nation should have learned from that awful day 16 years ago, it’s that the United States cannot afford to ignore a rabidly anti-American terrorist group that has established a haven in a faraway place.

Fall Weiß

At dawn on September 1st, Luftwaffe struck at Polish airfields destroying most of the planes before they could get off the ground. With control of the skies assured wicked Wehrmacht began the systematic destruction of railroads and the few communications nodes. From the very outset the Poles mobilization plan was seriously compromised. Before the day ended, chaos reigned at Polish Army HQ.

The first phase of the campaign, fought on the frontiers was over by September 5th and the morning of the 7th found reconnaissance elements of Army Group South’s 10th Army just 36 miles southwest of Warsaw. Meanwhile, also on September 5th, vBock’s Army Group North had cut across the corridor and turned southeast for Warsaw. Units of the 3rd Army reached the banks of the River Narew on September 7th, just 25 miles north of Warsaw. The fast moving armored panzer 'Schwerpunkts' of blitzing attacks left the immobile Polish armies cut up, surrounded and out of supply.

Meanwhile the closing of the inner ring at Warsaw witnessed some tough fighting as the Polish Poznan Army, bypassed in the first week of the war, charged heading and attacked toward Warsaw to the southeast. The German 8th and 10th Armies were put to the test as they were forced to turn some divisions completely around to meet the desperate Polish assault. In the end the gallant attack fell short and by September 19th the Poznan Army surrendered some 100,000 men and Poland’s last intact army.

As this was occurring the second, more deeper envelopment led by General Heinz Guderian’s panzers took the city of Brest-Litovsk on September 17th, and continued past the city where they made contact with the 10th Army spearhead at Wlodowa 30 miles to the south.

The war, for all practical purposes was over by September 17th. Lvov surrendered on the 19th. Warsaw held out until September 27th, gave up the ghost and the last organized resistance ended October 6th with the surrender of 17,000 Polish soldiers at Kock.

The campaign had lasted less than two months and ended in the destruction of the Polish Army and the fourth partition of Poland. German losses were surprisingly heavy considering the brevity of the campaign.

Deutsch casualties total some 48,000 of which 16,000 were killed. Fully one quarter of the panzers the German committed to battle were lost to Polish anti-panzer guns.  Luftwaffe was forced to trash  550 aircraft.

It was not a cheap victory by any means but it did confirm to the generals of  Wehrmacht that the military machine that they had built was indeed the best in the world and worthy of their confidence.

Reaction around the world on 1 Sept 1939?

France - mobilized her military and demanded Deutschland withdraw from Poland.

Great Britain - mobilized her army and RAF (the Navy was mobilized the day before) and demanded Germany withdraw from Poland.

Italy - Announced no military plans or initiatives.

Russia - warned concern for civilian population of Russian descent and fear of Polish bandits would warrant armed intervention. She also mobilized her military.

Great Satan - Demanded a halt of indescriminate bombing of towns and civilians.

Finland, Norway, Sweden and the Swiss - announced neutrality

Deutschland - "Determined to eliminate insecurity and perpetual civil war from the borders of the Reich"

Poland - appealed to Great Britain and France to intervene in honour of the Mutual Assistance Treaty of 1939.

1 September is the day an old world order was violently overturned, chock full of lessons, promises and harbingers that echo still today.

Abu Mazen's Last Stand?

Following Israel’s July 16 decision to install metal detectors at the entrance to the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif, the Palestinian leadership announced the suspension of security coordination with Israel. The detectors have since been removed, but coordination has not been reinstated.

Maybe M'moud Abbas, the , uh, leader of  Palestine's last stand ala Alamo?

“The decisions to freeze or to resume security coordination between the Palestinian Authority [PA] and Israel have been expropriated from the Palestinian leadership,” an Israeli security source speaking on the condition of anonymity told Al-Monitor. “Those decisions are now in the hands of the Palestinian street.” Now more than ever, according to the source, it appears that the Palestinian public controls the leadership, not the other way around.


Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas had withstood a barrage of criticism leveled at him over the past two years by opponents accusing him of collaborating with Israel, but he caved during the events last month on the Temple Mount sparked by the July 14 killing of two Israeli policemen at the site and Israel’s subsequent installation of the metal detectors. Now he no longer seems able to muster the great courage required to retake the high road. 

The crisis over the Temple Mount is over, Israel has removed the metal detectors and cameras, and the Palestinians have declared victory in the volatile struggle over Al-Aqsa Mosque. The anti-Israel climate on the Palestinian street, however, has worsened, and the “victory” has awakened an appetite for more of the same by putting pressure on Israel — for example, by freezing security coordination.


When the PA informed Israel that it was severing ties in response to what it described as Israel's “violation” of Al-Aqsa, Islam’s third holiest site, Defense Minister Avigdor Liberman said dismissively, “It's a Palestinian need first and foremost. If they want it, they'll continue [coordination]; if not, they won't. We don't intend to chase after them over it or force the issue. We’ll manage either way.” He emphasized that Abbas needs the coordination more than Israel does.

Seemingly punitive Israeli actions taken over the past week appear to signal that Israeli security professionals disagree with Liberman’s attempts to minimize the importance of security ties with the PA.

Actually, in recent days, US officials have told the head of Palestinian intelligence, Majid Faraj, that security cooperation must be resumed immediately, warning that the PA was playing with fire. It is unclear whether the American demand followed an Israeli request, but the fact is that joint efforts are underway to renew coordination — the Americans through diplomacy, the Israelis with threats.


On Aug. 2, Israeli soldiers raided the office of the Palestinian security forces in Hebron that deals mostly with civilian and crime-related issues among the city’s Palestinian residents. At the same time, Israel removed the checkpoint at the exit from Ramallah (near the Beit El settlement) that provided top PA officials with convenient, coordinated passage out of PA-controlled territory.


The Israeli security source confirmed that Israel had indeed adopted some measures against the PA, calling them “adjustments” to changing circumstances, such as the absence of formal coordination, rather than sanctions. A Palestinian security force member, however, told Al-Monitor on the condition of anonymity that Israel is clearly punishing the PA.

He warned that it was “making a serious mistake that would make renewal of coordination even harder’’ and added that despite the excellent coordination previously, Israel had implicated the PA time and again, when its troops entered West Bank Area A (under full Palestinian control according to the Oslo Accord) and carried out arrests. “We were perceived as having opened the door to them and even telling them, ‘Go ahead, arrest [so and so],’” he said.


Abbas has provoked great anger, especially in the Dheisheh, Jalazone, Qalandia and Balata refugee camps. The almost regular raids by Israeli soldiers on those camps to conduct arrests have led to a breakdown of trust between the local populations and the PA in general, and its security forces in particular. Residents of the camps consider Abbas an enemy and his security forces traitors to their people.


Abbas withstood pressure for months to halt security coordination with Israel; at the height of the “individual intifada” in November 2015, he called security coordination with Israel “sacred.” During those stormy months, Abbas met at least twice with the then-Shin Bet chief, Yoram Cohen, with the understanding that chaos might harm the PA and that therefore security coordination was also in the interest of the Palestinians. That is likely what Liberman meant when he claimed that the PA needs coordination more than Israel.


The Temple Mount crisis, which caused Abbas to cut short a visit to China and rush back to Ramallah, changed Abbas’ priorities. To restore some measure of public support, he was “forced” to set aside the sanctity of coordination with Israel for the sanctity of Al-Aqsa. Turning back the clock now seems almost impossible.


“The Israelis chose to undermine the Palestinian VIPs' status,” the Palestinian source told Al-Monitor. Top PA officials carry a card issued by Israel that enables them passage through specific checkpoints into Israel or into Jordan and from there to the rest of the world, virtually without undergoing security checks. Now, he argues, Israel is making it difficult for these officials to exit the West Bank “to make their lives miserable.” He explained, “Israel thinks they will put pressure on Abbas to restore the security coordination and with it their pampered existence. But it’s not that simple.”


Restoring security coordination will require careful preparation of Palestinian public opinion to dispel the perception of Abbas as a leader who does Israel’s bidding. The Palestinians will be seeking “revisions” to security ties with Israel to present them as achievements.


The PA's first demand, to appease refugee camp residents, will be an express promise from Israel to avoid surprise raids into Area A. The second demand will be to ease the passage of all Palestinians through Israeli roadblocks and to allow the presence of Palestinian police at the Allenby Bridge crossing into Jordan, where Palestinian are required to go through Israeli metal detectors. The issue of metal detectors has become very sensitive following the Temple Mount crisis.


Can Israel accede to these demands? The Israeli source told Al-Monitor that the Palestinians are going out on a limb, and there is no chance of them getting such concessions from Israel. The conclusion, therefore, must be that the resumption of security coordination is nowhere on the horizon.

Options On Iran

In the Middle East, the Administration has signaled its preference to strengthen relationships with the Sunni Gulf states by way of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.  By strengthening relationships with the Sunni Gulf states, as well as announcing an arms deal with Saudi Arabia, the United States appears willing to continue isolating Iran.  

This has the potential to exacerbate tensions with Iran, which if one views it through an international relations theory lens, Iran will attempt to counteract actual or perceived Saudi (read: Sunni) influence gains to maintain balance in the region, as well as prevent loss of Iranian influence.

Iran has a variety of proxies, as well branches of its armed services serving in countries throughout the Middle East.  This is illustrated through the Iranian-backed Hezbollah in southern Lebanon, as well as deployment of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Syria and Yemen.  This does not include the activities of the IRGC in other countries that include Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan[1].  Iran’s military adventurism throughout the Middle East serves to advance the foreign policy agenda of its Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.  

Put succinctly, the foreign policy agenda of the Supreme Leader is the expansion of Iranian (read: Shia) influence throughout the Middle East to serve as an ideological counterweight against the expansion of Saudi/Wahhabi ideology.

Recently, on May 20, 2017, Iran held a presidential election.  The incumbent, President Hassan Rouhani, won re-election by receiving 57% of the vote.  Mr. Rouhani is seen as a reformer in Iran, and he is expected to attempt most of his proposed reforms now that he is in his second term.  How many reforms will actually take place is anyone’s guess, as is the influence Mr. Rouhani will have on IGRC policy, but it will be a factor that should be considered when considering the United States’ approach to great power interactions.

Significance:  The Middle East will continue to be a region that perplexes United States policymakers.  United States’ Allies will continue to be confused as to policy direction in the Middle East until more fidelity is provided from Washington.  Iranian meddling will continue in sovereign nations until it is addressed, whether diplomatically or militarily.  Furthermore, Iranian meddling in the region, and interference in the affairs of sovereign nations, will continue to destabilize the Middle East and exacerbate tensions in areas where conflict is occurring, such as Syria and Yemen.  A complete withdrawal of the United States’ presence in the region would likely create a stronger vacuum potentially filled by an adversary.  As such, the United States must choose the option that will provide the strongest amount of leverage and be amicable to all parties involved in the decision.

Option #1:  Maintain the status quo – the United States continues to strengthen Sunni states and isolate Iran.  Through maintaining the status quo, the United States will signal to its allies and partners in the Middle East that they will continue to enjoy their relationship with the United States as it exists in current form.  45’s recent trip to Saudi Arabia signals this intent through proposed arms sales, announcing the establishment of a center to combat extremism, and the use of negative language towards Iran.

Risk:  The risk inherent in pursuing Option #1 is that the window of opportunity on having a moderate, reform-minded person as President of Iran will eventually close.  Through isolating Iran, it is likely they will not be keen on attempting to make overtures to the United States to reconsider the relationship between the two countries.  Since the United States is not going to pursue a relationship with Iran, other countries will seek to do so.  The risk of missed economic opportunities with an Iran that is an emerging market also has the possibility of closing the window for the United States to be involved in another area where it can exert its influence to change Iranian behavior.

Gain:  Through maintaining the status quo that exists in the Middle East, the United States can be sure that pending any diplomatic, political, or international incidents, it can maintain its presence there.  The United States can continue to nurture the preexisting relationships and attempt to maintain the upper hand in its interactions with Iran.  The United States will also remain the dominant player in the great power interactions with other countries in the Middle East.

Option #2:  The United States strengthens its relationship with Iran through moderate reformers and building relationships with moderates in Sunni states to provide shared interests and commonalities.  Given the propensity of nation-states to expand their power and influence, whether through political or military means, it is likely inevitable that conflict between Iran and the Sunni states will take place in the near future.  If a relationship can be built with moderates in the Iranian government as well as Sunni states, it is possible that commonalities will overlap and reduce tensions between the different powers.

Risk:  The risk exists that neither rival will want to have the United States attempting to influence matters that may be viewed as neighborly business.  The possibility also exists that neither nation would want to build a relationship with the other, likely originating from the religious leaders of Iran or Saudi Arabia.  Finally, the worst-case scenario would be that any type of relationship-building would be undercut through actions from independent and/or non-state actors (i.e. terrorist groups, minority religious leaders, familial rivals from ruling families).  These undercutting actions would destroy trust in the process and likely devolve into reprisals from both sides towards the other.

Gain:  Through interacting with Iran, the United States and other powers can establish relationships which could eventually allow the opportunity to address grievances towards existing policies that serve to inflame tensions.  It is also likely that by having a partner in Iran, instability in the Middle East can be addressed in a more effective manner than is currently being done right now