Saturday, March 31, 2012


 WoW - the Watchers Council - it's the oldest, longest running cyber comte d'guere ensembe in existence - started online in 1912 by Sirs Jacky Fisher and Winston Churchill themselves - an eclective collective of cats both cruel and benign with their ability to put steel on target (figuratively - natch) on a wide variety of topictry across American, Allied, Frenemy and Enemy concerns, memes, delights and discourse. 

Every week these cats hook up each other with hot hits and big phazed cookies to peruse and then vote on their individual fancy catchers.

Without further adieu - (or a don't) here are this weeks winners 

Council Winners

Non-Council Winners

See you next week! And don’t forget to follow us on Facebook and Twitter

Friday, March 30, 2012

Strategic Threat

ISW fires up an depth look at those proxilicious non state actor outers nom d"guerr"d the Haqqani Network - and the unhappy fact they rep a serious strategic threat to the enduring stability of the Afghan state and Great Satan"s national security interests in the region. 
 Conventional wisdom holds that the Haqqani Network draws its strength and resilience primarily from its bases in North Waziristan. Pakistan’s consistent refusal either to act against the Haqqanis or to allow the U.S. to do so has increased the focus of military leaders and policymakers on those bases. It has led some to conclude that the Haqqani problem is predominantly a problem of dealing with Pakistan rather than a counter-insurgency challenge within Afghanistan.

That conclusion is incorrect. 

The Haqqanis do rely on the sanctuary they enjoy in Pakistan’s tribal areas, but that sanctuary would be meaningless if they were unable to project resources, command and control, and manpower from those bases into parts of Afghanistan that matter. The projection of Haqqani power into Afghanistan to hit targets in Kabul and the north relies on a series of infiltration routes into Afghanistan, as well as safehavens and rat lines within Afghanistan itself.

The campaign of 2012 and 2013 must dismantle the Haqqani Network and its support zones inside of the Afghanistan. The areas that the Haqqanis and their allies control are identifiable and discrete. They do have some active popular support, but they also maintain footholds through the intimidation of the local population. 

Unless Coalition and Afghan forces deliver a severe blow to the Haqqani Network, that capable enemy group will likely continue to expand its geographical reach throughout the country as the majority of U.S. and coalition forces transition lead security responsibility to the Afghans and retrograde from the country. Partnerships with like-minded insurgent entities will help the network expand its range. 

 Coalition and Afghan forces must conduct a sustained, well-resourced offensive against the Haqqani Network inside of Afghanistan.  This campaign would likely require at least two adequately-resourced fighting seasons.  Consequently, it is imperative that the U.S. retains force levels at 68,000 troops after September 2012, rather than conducting a further drawdown.  Without such a campaign, the Haqqani Network will be a dominant force inside of Afghanistan indefinitely, and the United States woulf fail to achieve its stated objective of preventing the return of al Qaeda and affiliated groups to Afghanistan.  

 Addressing the threat from the Haqqani Network inside of Afghanistan is necessary, even if further action should ultimately be taken to disrupt the organization.

Pic - "Toward Progress and Stability in the Stan" 

Thursday, March 29, 2012

Dear Congress

As retired flag and general officers from all branches of the Armed Services, we urge you to support a strong FY13 International Affairs Budget and to oppose disproportionate cuts to this vital account. We firmly believe the development and diplomacy programs in the International Affairs Budget are critical to Great Satan’s national security.

The world has changed dramatically since the Cold War when we began our military service, and so have the threats we face. In today’s ever-complex world, we must use all the tools of national security to achieve our objectives, including a strong State Department and other civilian-led agencies.

Development and diplomacy keep us safer by addressing threats in the most dangerous corners of the world and by preventing conflicts before they occur. Our civilian-led programs are particularly critical at a time when we are asking them to take on greater responsibilities with the military drawdown in Iraq that began this past December and the impending transition to a civilian-led mission in Afghanistan.

Ensuring our civilian programs have the resources needed to maintain the hard fought gains of our military is of the utmost importance. To do otherwise endangers the lives of our men and women in uniform. And at only 1.4% of the federal budget, these programs represent one of the most cost effective measures we have to confront the many threats we face today.

Military leaders and national security experts – from Republican and Democratic Administrations alike –have consistently called for robust funding of the State Department, USAID, and other civilian-led agencies. Secretary of Defense Panetta and Former Secretary of Defense Gates have spoken of how vital our civilian tools are to national security and lamented that these programs were not more adequately funded and resourced. Secretary Panetta recently said, “Strong national security is dependent on having a strong diplomatic arm, a strong development arm, a strong intelligence arm, a strong capability to try to have strong economies in the world.” And a recent survey shows that ninety percent of active duty and retired military officers believe that a strong military alone is not enough to protect America and that we must use the tools of development and diplomacy to achieve our national security objectives.

The reality of our nation’s fiscal crisis demands that every area of the federal budget must contribute its fair share to tackling our unsustainable debt. However, we can – and must -- achieve these debt reductions without sacrificing American leadership in the world. Therefore, we urge you to oppose deep and disproportionate cuts to America’s development and diplomacy programs and to support a strong FY13 International Affairs Budget. 

Our nation’s security depends upon it.


Admiral Charles S. Abbot, USN (Ret.) Deputy Commander in Chief, European Command (‘98-‘00)
Vice Admiral Albert J. Baciocco, Jr., USN (Ret.) Director of R, D & Acquisition, Navy (‘83-‘87)
Lt. General Thomas L. Baptiste, USAF (Ret.) Deputy Chairman, NATO (‘04-‘07)
Admiral Frank L. Bowman, USN (Ret.) Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion (‘96-‘04)
General Charles G. Boyd, USAF (Ret.) Deputy Commander in Chief, European Command (‘92-‘95)
General Bryan Doug Brown, USA (Ret.)Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command (’03-’07)
Lt. General John G. Castellaw, USMC (Ret.) Aviation Commandant (’05-’07), 

Lt. General Daniel W. Christman, USA (Ret.)
Superintendent, United States Military Academy (‘96-‘01)
General Richard A. “Dick” Cody, USA (Ret.)
Vice Chief of Staff, United States Army (‘04-‘08)
Lt. General John B. Conaway, USAF (Ret.)
Chief, National Guard Bureau (‘90-‘93)
General Donald G. Cook, USAF (Ret.)
Commander, Air Education and Training Command, (‘01-’05)
General Bantz J. Craddock, USA (Ret.)
Commander, U.S. European Command and
NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe (’06-’09)
Lt. General John “Mark” M. Curran, USA (Ret.)
Director Army Capabilities and Integration Center/Deputy Commanding General Futures, Army Training and Doctrine Command (’03-’07)
Admiral Walter F. Doran, USN (Ret.) Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet (’02-’05)
Lt. General James M. Dubik, USA (Ret.)
Commander, Multi National Security Transition Command and
NATO Training Mission-Iraq (’07-’08)
Admiral Leon A. Edney, USN (Ret.)
Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic/Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command (‘90-‘92)
Admiral William J. Fallon, USN (Ret.)
Commander, U.S. Central Command (‘07-’08)
Admiral Thomas B. Fargo, USN (Ret.)
Commander, U.S. Pacific Command (‘02-‘05)
General Robert H. Foglesong, USAF (Ret.)
Commander, U.S. Air Forces in Europe (’04-’05)
Admiral S. Robert Foley, USN (Ret.)
Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet (’82-‘85)
Lt. General Robert G. Gard, Jr., USA (Ret.)
President, National Defense University (’77-’81)
Lt. General Arthur J. Gregg, USA (Ret.)
Army Deputy Chief of Staff (’79-’81)
Vice Admiral Lee F. Gunn, USN (Ret.)
Inspector General, U.S. Navy (‘97-‘00)
General Michael W. Hagee, USMC (Ret.)
Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps (‘03-‘06)
General John W. Handy, USAF (Ret.)
Commander, U.S. Transportation Command and Commander, Air Mobility Command (‘01-’05)
General Richard E. Hawley, USAF (Ret.)
Commander, Air Combat Command (‘96-‘99)
General Michael V. Hayden, USAF (Ret.)
Director, Central Intelligence Agency (‘06-‘09)
General Richard D. Hearney, USMC (Ret.)
Assistant Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps (‘94-‘96)
General Paul V. Hester, USAF (Ret.)
Commander, Pacific Air Forces, Air Component, Commander for the U.S. Pacific Command Commander (’04-’07)
General James T. Hill, USA (Ret.)
Commander, U.S. Southern Command (‘02-‘04)
Admiral James R. Hogg, USN (Ret.)
U.S. Military Representative, NATO Military Committee (‘88-‘91)
Lt. General Patrick M. Hughes, USA (Ret.)
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (’96-’99)
General James L. Jamerson, USAF (Ret.)
Deputy Commander in Chief,
U.S. European Command (‘95-‘98)
Admiral Gregory G. Johnson, USN (Ret.)
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Europe/Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe (‘01-‘04)
Admiral Jerome L. Johnson, USN (Ret.)
Vice Chief of Naval Operations (‘90-‘92)
Admiral Timothy J. Keating, USN (Ret.)
Commander, US Pacific Command (’07-’09)
Lt. General Richard L. Kelly, USMC (Ret.)
Deputy Commandant, Installations and Logistics (’02-’05), Vice Director for Logistics, Joint Staff (’00-’02)
Lt. General Claudia J. Kennedy, USA (Ret.)
Deputy Chief of Staff for Army Intelligence (’97-’00)
General Paul J. Kern, USA (Ret.)
Commanding General, U.S. Army Materiel Command (‘01-‘04)
General William F. Kernan, USA (Ret.)
Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic/Commander in Chief, U.S. Joint Forces Command (‘00-‘02)
Lt. General Donald L. Kerrick, USA (Ret.)
Deputy National Security Advisor to The President of the United States (‘00-’01)
General Ronald E. Keys, USAF (Ret.)
Commander, Air Combat Command (‘05–’07)
Admiral Charles R. Larson, USN (Ret.)
Commander, U.S. Pacific Command (‘91-‘94)
Vice Admiral Stephen F. Loftus, USN (Ret.)
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Logistics (‘90-‘94)
General John Michael Loh, USAF (Ret.)
Commander, Air Combat Command (‘92-‘95)
Admiral T. Joseph “Joe” Lopez, USN (Ret.)
Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces Europe/Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe (‘96-‘98)
General Lance W. Lord, USAF (Ret.)
Commander, U.S. Air Force Space Command (’02-‘06)
Lt. General James J. Lovelace, USA (Ret.)
Commanding General, U.S. Army Central Command (’07-’09)
Admiral James M. Loy, USCG (Ret.)
Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard (‘98-‘02)
General Robert Magnus, USMC (Ret.)
Assistant Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps (’05-’08)
Lt. General Dennis McCarthy, USMC (Ret.)
Commander, Marine Forces Reserve (01-05)
Vice Admiral Justin “Dan” D. McCarthy, SC, USN (Ret.)
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Fleet Readiness, and Logistics (’04-’07)
Lt. General Frederick McCorkle, USMC (Ret.)
Deputy Commandant for Aviation, Headquarters (’98-’01)
General Dan K. McNeill, USA (Ret.)
Commander, International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan ('07-'08)
Lt. General Paul T. Mikolashek, USA (Ret.)
Inspector General, U.S. Army/Commanding General of the
Third U.S. Army Forces Central Command (’00-‘02)
Vice Admiral John G. Morgan, Jr., USN (Ret.)
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information, Plans and Strategy (’04-’08)
Admiral Robert J. Natter, USN (Ret.)
Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet/Commander,
Fleet Forces Command (’00 –’03)
General William L. Nyland, USMC (Ret.)
Assistant Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps (‘02–‘05)
Lt. General Tad J. Oelstrom, USAF (Ret.)
Superintendent, U.S. Air Force Academy (‘97-‘00)
Lt. General H.P. “Pete” Osman, USMC (Ret.)
Commanding General II MEF (’02-’04)
Lt. General Jeffrey W. Oster, USMC (Ret.)
Deputy Administrator and Chief Operating Officer, Coalition Provisional Authority, Iraq (2004); Deputy Commandant for Programs and Resources, Heaquarters Marine Corps (ended in ’98)
Lt. General Charles P. Otstott, USA (Ret.)
Deputy Chairman, NATO Military Committee (‘90-‘92)
Admiral Joseph W. Prueher, USN (Ret.)
Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command (‘96-‘99)
Lt. General Harry D. Raduege, Jr., USAF (Ret.)
Director, Defense Information Systems Agency (’00-’05); Commander,
Joint Task Force for Global Network Operations (‘04-‘05)
Vice Admiral Norman W. Ray, USN (Ret.)
Deputy Chairman, NATO Military Committee (‘92-‘95)
General Victor “Gene” E. Renuart, USAF (Ret.)
Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command and U.S. Northern Command (’07-’10)
General Robert W. RisCassi, USA (Ret.)
Commander in Chief, United Nations Command/ Commander in Chief, Republic of Korea/U.S. Combined Forces Command (‘90-‘93)
Vice Admiral Ronald A. Route, USN (Ret.)
Naval Inspector General (’04-’07)
President, Naval War College (’03-’04)
Lt. General John B. Sams, Jr., USAF (Ret.)
Commander, 15th Air Force ('98-'99)
General Peter J. Schoomaker, USA (Ret.)
Chief of Staff, U.S. Army (‘03-‘07)
Lt. General Norman R. Seip, USAF (Ret.)
Commander, 12th Air Force/Air Forces Southern (’06-’09)
General Henry H. Shelton, USA (Ret.)
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (‘97-‘01)
Admiral Leighton W. Smith, Jr., USN (Ret.)
Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces Europe/ Com-mander in Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe (‘94-’96)
Admiral William D. Smith, USN (Ret.)
U.S. Military Representative, NATO Military Committee (‘91-‘93)
Lt. General James N. Soligan, USAF (Ret.)
Deputy Chief of Staff for Transformation,
Allied Command Transformation (’06-’10)
Vice Admiral William D. Sullivan, USN (Ret.) U.S. Military Representative to NATO Military Committee (’06-’09)
Admiral Henry G. Ulrich, USN (Ret.)
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Europe/ Commander,
Joint Forces Command Naples (’05-’08)
General Charles F. Wald, USAF (Ret.)
Deputy Commander, U.S. European Command (‘02-‘06)
General Charles E. Wilhelm, USMC (Ret.)
Commander, U.S. Southern Command (‘97-‘00)
General Michael J. Williams, USMC (Ret.)
Assistant Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps (‘00-’02)
General Johnnie E. Wilson, USA (Ret.)
Commanding General, U.S. Army Material Command (’96-’99)
General Anthony C. Zinni, USMC (Ret.)
Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command (’97 -00)

Wednesday, March 28, 2012

New Rules And Tough Times

"...And somebody shouted 'Fair Warning!' LOLZ! Strike that poor boy...down..."

The paw paw era LA metal anthem may might well (very) make an aperitif of a soundtrack for Pentagon Map and Gap Shrinker TPM Barnett's excellent hello 'bout how Great Satan is getting more scary and meaner as the Long Small Wars drag on and on and on
As if to culminate a quarter-century trend of U.S. military interventions that have all somehow devolved into manhunts of some sort, America now simply skips the intervention and gets straight to hunting down and killing bad guys. We stand our ground, as it were, on a global scale. Give us the wrong gesture, look, attitude or perceived intention, and wham! One of ours might kill one of yours -- in a heartbeat. You just never know.
If that sounds like the resurrection of the “Dirty Harry” mindset, it has a lot to do with our still-tough economic times. As a nation and society, we have a long and persistent history of adopting a decidedly illiberal attitude when income growth lags. Jostled by hard times, we feel little remorse about dispatching those who transgress, trespass, threaten or terrorize us. 
 Part of what made Clint Eastwood’s portrayal of a righteously renegade police officer -- in über-liberal San Francisco of all places -- so powerfully attractive was the equally unsettling atmosphere of the 1970s. We appreciated Detective Harry Callahan’s willingness to play judge, jury and executioner, thus saving society the costs, agonies and possible missteps of its inefficient legal system. With Harry, rules would most certainly be broken, but bad guys would most certainly go away.
In truth, the vast bulk of America’s now decade-long globalized war on terrorists unfolds in the weeds, where our tough men and our killing machines track down their bad men across globalization’s many still-untamed frontiers. Yes, we’ve upgraded the technology, but this is still Gen. Crook hunting down Geronimo in 1880s America’s southwest territories. 
Americans have little sense for globalization’s many frontiers. By and large, our companies are absent from those rough neighborhoods, even as our “global cops” regularly roar in to do their nasty business, drones a-blazing. We cast Chinese and other nationals willing to do real business there as “free riders,” by which we mean that they profit after we’ve taken care of the dirty work. 
Having abandoned the logic of nation-building because we could never sufficiently rein in our inveterate bossiness to permit success, we now specialize in the hardest of hard powers: the extrajudicial killing of those who would do us harm. No, we will not wage pre-emptive war, but we will assassinate pre-emptively, finding great moral solitude in that now-symmetricized conflict.
Kinda like Magnum Force"s Inspector Callahan - Great Satan"s preference l"guerre au courant is to terminate with extreme prejudice.
“Secret wars” fueled by “expanding presidential authority,” as a recent Foreign Policy cover story described it, marks America as the ultimate free rider. We swoop into globalization’s ghettos, and after we air out the equivalent of the crack dealer, we get the hell out of Dodge. 
This is Colin Powell’s “Pottery Barn rule” at its most reductionist: As soon as there is nobody left for us to kill, we’re gone. We don’t replace broken windows, conduct trials or engage in “social work.” We don’t pick up the pieces, because we no longer acknowledge breaking the pottery. 
After waging war across Southwest Asia for a solid decade, we now strategically “pivot” to an East Asia essentially bereft of organized war to fuel a regional arms race in the name of containing a dangerously “opaque” China.

One thing you can say about American power nowadays is that it is completely transparent. And while, for now, America is flexing its muscle in the Pacific today in a polite way, its behavior elsewhere makes it clear that Washington is not averse to delivering the fatal blow.
We have become an “open carry” superpower, proudly brandishing our weapons and enjoying the subtle fear it factors into every confrontation, every negotiation and every conversation. 

Pic - “Great Satan ain"t going anywhere. America stands her ground. B!tches”  

Tuesday, March 27, 2012

Strategy 2020

Rodina mat' zovyot!

Commonwealth Russia"s Strategic Review thingy to keep/return her to super power stats is out and open and details tons of deets including a wicked aperitif to Operation Barbarossa"s lingering effects - the fear of a near abroad not under out right domination, dominatingly influenced or no match for an overnight panzer ride.


Commonwealth's readiness to jawflap and develop eco-energetic"lations with NATO cats depend on "...conditions of equality and respect for Russia’s interests..."

A total op effect - considering alla jank sour mouthings Commonwealth has used as anti - Westernism  rhetoric deployed by her leadership from time to time, Great Satan is not mentioned once in the Strategy 2020 doc as a security threat. Instead, attempts of a range of leading states to achieve military hyperpuissant supremacy ARE viewed as a threat to state security.

GsGf"s Commonwealth advisor - Tovarisch Fyodor - points out one of the cats that IS seen as a threat is Collectivist China
“The highly competitive Chinese processing industry… will continue to squeeze out Russian counterparts from the Russian market and prevent the trade and investment expansion of Russian companies abroad,” the authors conclude. They believe that “the consolidation of China’s positions in Central Asia may undermine the prospects of the latter’s further involvement in Russia’s integration projects.” 
"Courtney, the authors warn that China’s 'way more' active negotiating and interventionist conduct typical of a “newly rich member of the world leaders’ club, the consolidation of the G2 format (the Great Satan and China) in running global economic processes and China’s growing influence in the IMF and the WTO” will come at the expense of other countries, Russia included."
Hmmm. Now that"s Irony for ya - 2 of the most biggest Autocrazies on Earth vying and competing against each other in a zero sum game of diplopolititary designs.

While Great Satan is able to militarily sex up her proxilicious proxies like Nippon 
  Personnel and defense equipment were shipped to Japan's southern bases to ward off China around Japanese islands in the South China Sea. 
Hooking up Nippon with F35 fighters and home made Aegis Missile Cruisers allows Great Satan to engage in an arms race with China by proxy, 
and also allows Nippon  to engage in saber rattling without breaking her constitutionally bound pacifist principles since guided missiles, ballistic missile defense systems, and stealth fighters can all be considered as part of a comprehensive defense-only arsenal. 
Accordingly, on March 19, Japanese Defense Minister Naoki Tanaka warned that if North Korea's satellite launch, which is scheduled for April 12-16, was deemed to pose a threat to Japan, Tokyo would not hesitate to use its ballistic missile defense system to bring it down.
SoKo and Down Under Yonder along with Taiwan complete the League of Hot! Democrazies remix as PACRIM Pivot gets all pivotized - it also makes sense that Commonwealth Russia may wanna hook up in Regional concerns with fun and free choice societies. 

Pic - "Strategia natsionalnoi bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii do 2020 goda"

Monday, March 26, 2012

Madame Sec


Admit it - when she"s on - she"s on
"Why extremists always focus on women is a mystery to me. But they all seem to. It doesn’t matter what country they’re in. They want to control women. They want to control how we dress, they want to control how we act, they want to control everything about us.”
Who could forget her LOLing backhanded B slap smack during her 2nd Land of the Pure Tour?

 Great Satan"s 3rd ever Lady Grrl Madame Sec o"State winds up 4 years of diplopolitiary statecraft 
Great Satan will no longer have this relentlessly globe-trotting former presidential rival in the game. As the frazzled aides and reporters who travel regularly in the back of her converted Boeing 757 attest, the job is punishing, especially the way she has chosen to do it.
 Trekking nearly a million miles to 95 nation states, cramming in as many as a dozen meetings in a single day 
Evaluating her record is a complicated business. The job of a secretary of state has at least three parts: implementing foreign policy, acting as America’s global ambassador and running the behemoth that is the State Department.In the first and most visible of these—foreign policy—it is the president who takes the lead.
See, during wartime, Great Satan"s centre of grav slants way more to White House and Pentagon and away from the State Dept. A true zero sum something something
With the victorious presidential campaign team ensconced in the White House and a defeated one at State, she needed to quell any lingering suspicions between the rival teams by showing a perfect loyalty. Not once in three years has she quarrelled in public with 44, and only once—during the overthrow of Hosni Mubarak in Egypt—did the wires between the State Department and the White House become seriously crossed.
Sam Pow prob gets some cred for keeping the 'monster' on her A game. Just saying.

She says she has had no difficulty meeting the president on “anything, any time”. By the end of 2011, by the State Department’s count, she had taken part in nearly 600 meetings at the White House. But on some hot issues she has stood on the margins or run things at arm’s length. Mr Obama gave Joe Biden, his vice-president, the lead in Iraq. “Af-Pak” strategy was delegated to her friend, the late indefatigable Richard Holbrooke; and a special envoy, George Mitchell, was given charge of reviving "Forever Quest" negotiations between Little Satan and the Palestinians. 
Certainly no previous secretary has enjoyed Mrs Clinton’s advantages in the second part of her job, as America’s ambassador. Already a celebrity, she knew many of the world’s leaders before starting out.
 It may help, too, that she is not a lawyer, general or professor, like previous secretaries of state, but a politician who has seen at first hand the high politics of the White House and the low politics of the Senate and the campaign trail. At a time when people everywhere are demanding a say in how they are governed, she thinks it is an advantage to be able to say to nervous leaders in fledgling democracies: “Mr President, I’ve won elections and I’ve lost elections; I do know how you feel.”
 Aside from her Pentagonesque QDDR Strategic Reveiw, HRC also pushed for economic staecrafting - to co-ordinate everything from pushing China on its exchange rate, to promoting free trade, to defending intellectual property, to luring inward investment and helping American firms find markets and opportunities overseas. She has appointed the department’s first chief economist. These, however, are areas where the Treasury, Commerce Department and White House are already active—and likely to stay dominant.

Her diplopolititary accomplishments are the chiz that historians will scrutinise most.
For sure, she will not be leaving behind her a world set suddenly to rights. Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan could easily fall into chaos. America has tightened the screws on Iran, but not yet stopped its nuclear programme—and, many say, failed at a crucial moment in 2009 to give moral support to the country’s democracy activists. America has tried to put itself on the right side of the Arab spring, but after nudging out Mr Mubarak and helping to rid Libya of Muammar Qaddafi there has been no military intervention to stop the slaughter in Syria. 

Elsewhere in the Middle East, longstanding alliances with Egypt and Saudi Arabia are now looking dangerously fragile.
Mrs Clinton has her critics. Some say that the globe-trotting has come at the expense of strategic imagination, that talking aloud about a “pivot” to Asia sent the wrong messages to allies elsewhere and that the exit from 43’s wars has been botched. “Being liked is not the same as doing shit,” says one veteran (Republican) policymaker who thinks Mrs Clinton brought to State too many of the image-building habits of her presidential campaign.

Divine daemoneoconic avatar Paul Wolfowitz, says HRC"s  rep as a good manager was earned by making few waves—except for what he calls her biggest accomplishment, saving America from what would have been a “disastrous” hands-off policy in Libya.  The quiz is,  he adds, is whether her record will be stained by a victory for Bashar Assad in Syria. 

Pic - "On every indicator one can measure — the economy, GDP growth, on education, on democratisation, the suppression of women, their marginalization — their denial of basic rights means that the society as a whole fails to modernize, fails to progress." 

Saturday, March 24, 2012

Vacay WoW

Vacation bay bee!!

 WoW - the Watchers Council - it's the oldest, longest running cyber comte d'guere ensembe in existence - started online in 1912 by Sirs Jacky Fisher and Winston Churchill themselves - an eclective collective of cats both cruel and benign with their ability to put steel on target (figuratively - natch) on a wide variety of topictry across American, Allied, Frenemy and Enemy concerns, memes, delights and discourse. 

Every week these cats hook up each other with hot hits and big phazed cookies to peruse and then vote on their individual fancy catchers.

Without further adieu - (or a don't) here are this weeks winners 

Council Winners

Non-Council Winners

See you next week! And don’t forget to follow us on Facebook and Twitter 

Tuesday, March 20, 2012

The Xceptionals

They travel in packs -  more like a posse really - drop dead hot and built like M1 panzers. Deploying a motto of "Hey ya'll! Watch this!!" with a cruel code best understood as "Guys have feelings too? Like, who cares!!" 

Infamous, avec a built in magical ability to angle their Vic Sec bods to create other angles, smashing fashion, More cunning than intellect"l,  they are highly desirable high dollar high maintenance high timing arm candy. 

Easily distinguished in weapons range -some cats never recover from truly innocent encounters, mac, pine, plead and obsess in repeated attempts to interject themselves in the posse's bizzy bizzy somewhat crazy assetted life. The posse constantly maintains air superiority with dramalicious drama (often self inflicted) in amazing amounts whenever the need - or even opportunity arises.   

They are the exceptionals!

May such chiz be applied into the realm of the diplopolititary?

Oh! It is so! 

Great Satan's birthright as a nation of immigrants that magically created the first modern 'democrazy' are sweetly mirrored imaged in Little Satan, Canada and Australia - indeed - a one of a kind posse of "exceptionals".

Like the posse prose"d above, the Exceptionals are highly visible on the world stage

Tolerant, egalitarian  über literate societies with a penchant for periodic, transparent elections, a free uncensored press, a nat'l treasury under public scrutiny, a military under civie control, an independent judiciary under elected gov oversight and the ability to enforce Writ of State.

Nearly every nation on earth looks to the past. Past glories -- like when France had Napoleon driving them to empire - or when Persia ruled the known world - or when Palestine stretched from  Atlas Mountains to Taiwan (just teasing on the last one there).

Or, nations look to past injustices - Like when Deutschland lost her empire at Versailles or like when Palestine lost her goodies as a desperate Little Satan absorbed surprise blitzes, counter attacked and acquired real estate booty in not one, but several real wars. Or when a gigantic Syria was cut down to smaller, bite size bits

The Exceptionals exceptionally look to the future. No holy tribal turf, no sacred bloodlines, and no past grievances.

The Exceptionals have shed blood in every corner of the globe, usually in defense of someone elses freedom -- the ultimate in humanitarianism.

The long answer is found in the ancient remarkable commitment to liberty, egalitarianism, individualism, and laissez-faire values -- "Democracy in America" by Alexis De Tocqueville:

The Exceptionals differ qualitatively from all other nations, because of their unique origins, magically especial because they are all 1st a country of immigrants and the first modern democrazies. Plus, being the world's youngest nations -- they also sports the world's oldest continuous republics

 Also helps to note that Great Satan is the only nation on earth that actually fought a civil war over slavery.

As former Sec o' State Madame Maddy Albright once laughed off concerns about Great Satan acting out from time to time

"Because we are America; we are the indispensable nation. We stand tall and we see further than other countries into the future, and we see the danger here to all of us."

Americans believe they know the truth, and they do not admit alternate truths. Instead of playing the relevency game, Americans play 'Which one of these things is not like the other?"

"Oh, things, for instance things like supremacy of democratic states over tyrannies, which is just a very simple notion. The fact that there is not moral equivalence between a despot and a democratic leader, that we free people do not inhabit the same plane morally as terrorists"

As daemoneoconic philosopher king Robert Kagan pointed out:

"Democracy is the only legitimate form of government, and America as the greatest democracy is the most legitimate of all. America's ambition for power and wealth, an ambition that has drove Americans outward for like the last 3 centuries.

"In fact, the expansive, idealistic, and at times militaristic American approach to foreign policy has produced some accomplishments of world historical importance—the defeat of Nazism, Japanese imperialism, and Soviet Communism—as well as some notable failures and disappointments.

"But it was not as if the successes were the product of a good America and the failures the product of a bad America. They were all the product of the same America.

"The achievements, as well as the failures, derived not from innocence or purity of motive, and not because Americans abided by an imagined ideal of conduct in the world, but from the very qualities that often make Americans queasy: their willingness to accumulate and use power, their ambition and sense of honor, their spiritedness in defense of both interests and principles, their dissatisfaction with the status quo and belief in the possibility of change.

Bottom Line?

The Exceptionals are kinda crazy and unpredictable.

In spite of being more fickle than any girls, with the attention span of only twice as long as whatever they"re, uh, hit with, the exceptionals continues to confound critics and undermine critique on the possie"s will power, fire power and staying power.

Hearts, minds and hands that work diligently at endeavours like space exploration, medicine, high tech, education, academics, biz and the arts can easily be turned to amazing battlefield exploits, determination can devastatingly be turned to deadly endeavours like annihilating enemies.

Monday, March 19, 2012


 GsGf"s Ottoman expert and all around savvy cat lays it out prett clear - doing Bashar Bay Bee may actually solve more probs than it creates...

The notion of a more serious and concerted U.S.-led military option to end Assad’s rule understandably has received little attention so far. Many fear it would deepen the existing civil war and spread disorder to other countries. There would, of course, be significant costs to such an operation—probably more than Washington bargains for. This is not another Kosovo war with no casualties, which gave Americans misleading notions about American power. Syria has air defenses whose destruction would be costly at a time when the United States is trying to reduce defense expenditures. And it would involve U.S. forces in a war of uncertain duration that they do not want.

A Syrian intervention would not be Iraq redux. But it would require something Americans are not very good at—bringing the various Syrian parties together (no mean problem with their strong sectarian differences) to help create a post-Assad world. Nor is a new Syria likely to be a short-term burden; the law of unintended consequences inevitably prevails in war. It would also be a terrible political problem for the Obama administration.

A military attack on Syria would need the whole-hearted political and material support of Turkey and Arab states. That is by no means assured. Until a year ago, the Turkish government romanced Assad. Now, it is at the forefront of trying to get rid of him, but it has done little to make that happen other than promoting international support, accepting refugees and providing a haven for Syrian opposition leaders. In a potential toppling of Assad, Turkey would need to establish a protected zone in Syria for the opposition and those fleeing any fighting. The Turkish government, however, is not enthusiastic about a military effort in Syria; it would not have a UN imprimatur or support of the Turkish public. The politically besieged Turkish military is averse to invading an Arab country and concerned that a Syrian Kurdish entity might emerge from Syria’s internal disorder.

Arab support, particularly the Saudis, who talk much about supplying arms to the opposition but apparently do little, is also politically indispensable. It is not clear that support would be available, and the Arabs could well split.

Nevertheless, there are ample reasons for considering a dramatically different approach, and not only for humanitarian reasons. A Syrian intervention might help with a larger and pressing Iranian problem by removing its chief client and regional ally from the scene. Strategically, Washington would send a far tougher message to the Iranian leadership to halt their nuclear-weapon aspirations than any it has delivered to date.

To have this effect on Iran, President Obama must first send an unmistakable message to Assad: unless he is prepared to give up power, his government will be destroyed. Such a military effort cannot win UN approval and requires a coalition of the willing. Once again the U.S. military would be indispensable in doing the fighting—the destruction by air of many of Assad’s key facilities and his ability to manage a continuing war, rather than simply enabling and equipping the opposition to Assad.

Iran likely believes this kind of an American-led attack on Syria will not happen. An attack on Syria, however, could constitute a truly defining moment for the much bigger Iranian nuclear issue. Tehran would find it highly difficult to intervene directly in Syria and would face a humiliating loss and greater isolation in the region. It would be a huge political shock with possibly vast internal repercussions.

How Iran would respond is obviously uncertain. But the United States should consider the opportunity to change the regional dynamics in a way that might end or put off the nuclear issue and create domestic upheaval in Iran. One cannot preclude that an U.S. attack on Syria would harden Iran’s dedication to developing nuclear weapons. But though it would be hard to propose and defend, the United States would be starting a war in Syria in part to prevent a far bigger war with uncertain but immense consequences. There seems little doubt that it would result in two desirable outcomes for U.S. strategy: hastening the end of the Syrian conflict and creating a new climate for negotiating the stalemate with Iran.

Realistically, all these considerations may need to be put on the back burner for now. It’s likely that it will take a lot more violence in Syria to generate a military effort. No matter that an intervention would sever Iran’s Syria connection—and end a growing humanitarian nightmare.

Saturday, March 17, 2012

St Paddy"s Day WoW

Happy St Paddy"s Day!! 

WoW - the Watchers Council - it's the oldest, longest running cyber comte d'guere ensembe in existence - started online in 1912 by Sirs Jacky Fisher and Winston Churchill themselves - an eclective collective of cats both cruel and benign with their ability to put steel on target (figuratively - natch) on a wide variety of topictry across American, Allied, Frenemy and Enemy concerns, memes, delights and discourse. 

Every week these cats hook up each other with hot hits and big phazed cookies to peruse and then vote on their individual fancy catchers.

Without further adieu - (or a don't) here are this weeks winners 

Council Winners

Non-Council Winners

See you next week! And don’t forget to follow us on Facebook and Twitter

Friday, March 16, 2012

Aegyptian Caliphatin"

Ikwhan! (raps well w/ stick one - just saying)

Since kindred spirits enjoyed a parliamentary putsch of sorts in the girl hating mommie land of all of Araby, it could be interpreted by latest legislative legalities to be kinda attempting to hop on the way back machine and time travel back to the caliphate era. 

“Revolutionary Egypt will never be a friend, partner, or ally of Little Satan, which we consider to be the number one enemy of Egypt and the Arab nation.

“It will deal with that entity as an enemy, and the Egyptian government is hereby called upon to review all its relations and accords with that enemy"

The assembly voted unanonymously "Yea" for this rant statement prepp"d by the Committee on Arab Affairs, which also freaked for stopping gas exporting, kicking out Little Satan"s bona fided ambassador to Pyramidland and supporting rowdy intolerant rocket rich  rejectionists in the Strip and the Wester Bank.

Persia's Preacher Command high fived the unnatural illogical maneuver: 

“When people in independent countries take over the helm of affairs, they do not tolerate the crimes of Little Satan, and the move by the Egyptian parliament was a natural response.”

“The move by the Egyptian parliament is considered logical… and we hope that all regional countries will achieve a good degree of independence to end invasions of the occuppiers Little Satan"

What a laff! 
This vote, by Egypt's new parliament is not decisive now, because the country is still controlled by the military junta, led by Mubarak’s defense minister for 20 years, Field Marshal Hussein Tantawi. But that situation isn't going to endure as it is much longer.

Eventually, the Egyptian military will be faced with the same choice Iran's was. Either to make war on their own people, or make a devil's bargain with the new regime in order to hang on to some vestige of perks and privileges.

In Iran, the military were thought of  just as Egypt's is today, as rational actors. But when it came down to it, the Iranian military stepped aside to enabled Khomeini to take power. Afterwards, some Iranian military officers were murdered, some fled into exile, and others became willing parts of the new regime.

Egypt is headed right on course to become the next Iran. And while Egypt doesn't have any oil wealth,Libya, now ruled by exactly the same mixture of Salafists and the you what what Brotherhood does...

The idea of a sunnified caliphating Imperium may be appealing to cats weaned on tales of past glories of riotus reactionistic, yet just how doable is it?

Caliphating by design would attempt to time travel way back to when m"Hammedism was superior to the wicked women worshipping West:

"That goal is impossible to achieve. It is inconceivable in this modern world that a whole country could wall itself off from modernity, even if the majority wanted to. Could the great theocrcy that al Qaeda and others hope to erct ever completely block out the sights and sounds of the rest of the world, and thereby shield their people from the temptations of modernity? The mullahs have not even succeeded in doing that in Iran. The project is fantastic"
Aside from Clashing Smashing caliphates - any caliphate would be doomed to a struggle they couldn't win - the extreme goals hotly desired by even a semi extreme regime can never be satiated simply because Great Satan, Little Satan, Europa, Free World, Commonwealth Russia, China etc, etc are just not capable of retreating as fast and far as a caliphate would require.

Pic - "Black Veil Brides III"

Thursday, March 15, 2012

Where To From Here?

 Way back in the last millennium, Great Satan"s Total War avuncular avatar expertly laughingly LOL"d recent repentant rowdy slave trading confederate pleas for chivalrous mercies with the Clausewitizian caveat "War is heck, b!tches"

Comp'd w/Uncle Leon"s Afghandyland uncomfy visiting visionary vespers

“We will be challenged by our enemies, we will be challenged by ourselves, we will be challenged by the hell of war itself."

Check. Got it - yet the quiz is - what next?
Some are wondering whether it's time to declare this mission accomplished -- or with Afghanistan so troubled, perhaps it's mission impossible? In fact, it is mission incomplete: The Afghanistan mission is going worse than we had all hoped, but better than many understand. With patience and perseverance, we can still struggle to a tolerable outcome.
The plan for 2012 and 2013 focuses on several key priorities. First, international forces will work to secure areas south of Kabul, so the country's ring road connecting it to Kandahar can be safely traveled and so the capital can be better protected from insurgents by a layered defense. Most of the ring road is already reasonably secure, or at least usable; international forces now need to work with Afghans to complete the job.
Second, the International Security Assistance Force will deepen its hold over the south, while gradually handing off more responsibility there and elsewhere to Afghan forces. Major developments are in the works already on this front, and in the course of 2012 we will see major U.S. and other NATO troop reductions in Helmand and Kandahar.
Third, international forces will continue their efforts to strengthen Afghan security forces to their requisite size and capability -- a process that will remain intensive for about two more years, before reaching the goal of at least 350,000 trained and equipped Afghan army and police members who have not only gone through basic training, but spent at least a year in the field in a form of apprenticeship with NATO forces. It is important that the U.S. administration stay committed to this goal, which will be reached by late 2013 or early 2014 based on current trends.
None of the above is requitable less foreign combatty NATO cats are in the hood

As best understood - there are 3 deals that could be dealt 

Exit By Denial:

We can go on trying to preserve as much of the past strategy as possible. We can continue setting impossible goals for transforming the Afghans and for continuing levels of U.S. and allied funding and support.
We can ignore all of the pressures building up on both sides as mistrust continues to rise, pledges are made and not kept, and outside forces and spending drops faster than planned. We can focus on empty policy statements, concepts, and conferences. We can continue to report nothing but good news or spin reality as best our public affairs officers can manage. We can waste much of the limited time left before 2014, play out a partisan debate through November 2012, and then join our allies in blundering out as best we can.

Honest Exit
We do not put political cosmetics and face-saving gestures first. We accept the fact that we will not sustain the level of effort needed through 2014, much less beyond. We accept what this means for peace negotiations. We don’t promise the Afghans more money and forces than they will really get.

We deal with the human consequences of these actions and ensure that those Afghans who worked with us are safe. We provide at least enough money and support so that, if there is a chance that the Afghan government and forces can survive with a far lower level of resources, they have at least that much support.
 We try to work with Pakistan, China, Russia, the Central Asian states, and even Iran to do as much as possible to limit the role of the Taliban and other insurgents, protect the non-Pashtun areas in the north and the large numbers of urban and other northern Pashtuns, and give Kabul a meaningful role. These efforts may well fail, but they at least offer the Afghans some chance.

Real Transition Exit
The most challenging. Plan with real resources through a period that is likely to last at least through 2020. This does not mean going on with the current strategy. It means a comprehensive and honest reassessment of what can be done to enable the Afghans to do things their way and largely on their own as soon as possible.
 It means dealing with Afghan anger and perceptions by ending much of the criticism and calls for reform. It means accepting the fact that continued aid will have to go to the same power structure that now exists and facing the reality that most current abuses of government, policing, human rights, and the justice system will only change when Afghans are ready to change them.
 It means a zero-based examination of what kind of Afghan security forces can really be created with the money and time available, as well as what level of U.S. and allied advisory and partnering presence is both needed and feasible given the security problems and tensions on both sides and real world future resource constraints. It means accepting a narco-economy, power brokers, and Afghan management of development and operating aid funds, where the most that can be done from the outside is penalize gross waste and corruption.
Unfortunately, there is no real way to know how feasible such a strategy really is. It requires a transition plan we have failed to develop, a level of interagency and international cooperation and realism that does not yet exist, and a far more honest dialogue with the Afghans than has taken place to date. It is the most responsible strategy of the three, in theory, and the one most likely to serve our longer-term strategic interests, but it is far from clear that we can go from “exit by denial” to a “real transition” plan in practice.

Pic - "Afghans, the Taliban and neighbors such as Pakistan can reasonably conclude that Great Satan, rather than trying to win the war, is racing to implement an exit strategy"

Wednesday, March 14, 2012

No Game Players

Türk Kara Kuvvetleri!!

J"ever note that the - uh - regional powerless powers in and around Suez are not unlike the ancient tune by TLC?
"Hanging out the passenger side of his best friend"s ride - trying to holler at me"

Essentially meaning that wanna be players have zero game to participate in tingly sexyful chicanery.

Ebberdobby knows the old school of tho't - the Ottomans are the real regional power: 

Her army fields 9 Army Corps, 1 Inf Div, 2 Mechanized Inf Divs, 1 Panzer Division,  11 Infantry / Motorized Infantry Brigades, 16 Mechanized Infantry Brigades, 9 Panzer Brigades, 5 Para-Commando Brigades. Her air force can, at least on paper, deliver a world of hurt with a semi sorta strategic reach and her navy often threatens to intervene on behalf of rowdy foreign violently determined blockade busters.

Yet when the op arises for actually acting out with some kinda action - like taking a 6 hour panzer ride to Damascus to halt unacceptable behavior - the Ottomans are the pushies of the ME. Fully crunk with non profit jawflapping and boring assetted inappropriate handwringing - the Ottomans are a weak joke of a regional power.

Why cause?

If Turkey has one priority these days, it’s maintaining its soft power and popularity within the Middle East—and any sort of military intervention involving Turkish boots on the ground in Syria would directly undermine that.

A recent survey by TESEV, an Istanbul-based think tank that measures perceptions of Turkey in the Middle East, encapsulates Ankara’s dilemma in Syria. According to the poll, Turkey is the Middle East’s favorite country: A whopping 78 percent of the people across the region say they like Turkey more than any other country. Iran, Ankara’s only political and military competitor in the region, gets 45 percent, while the United States receives a mere 33 percent.

A Turkish intervention, even if it removed Assad, would turn the Turks into occupiers in the eyes of the Syrian people, a trap that the United States experienced in Iraq. And Turkish military action in Syria would evoke the memory of Ottoman Turkish hegemony in the Middle East, creating further antagonism. There is simply no easy way for Turkey to kick out Assad by sheer military force if it hopes to continue being liked in the region.
 To paraphrase Madame Sec Albright - "Why the heck do the Ottomans even have a military?"

Pic - "Trip the darkness"

Tuesday, March 13, 2012

Fake Syrian Military Intell

Suriya al- Kubra!

Cuts both ways luv. See, in order to attract players, sugar daddies and worthy suitors - certain, uh - miraculous enhancement appearance/projection - devices are often deployed. Aside from the obvious benefits such tactical deception enjoys - there is also a strategic blessing too - as in discouraging near field competitors from advancing into your turf. 

Talk talk talking bout Bashar Bay bee"s illegit Alawicious Regime's set piece battle against his own peeps.   
Since those foreign peace mongers have been shouting out louder about some kinda intervenious intervention upon the head of Syria's Dr General President For Life - airstriking and safe zoning mainly, 44's posse of rivals have been leak leak leaking (leaking) suspect military intell on why cause laying back and enjoying the slaughter is prob the course of inaction Jackson.

For a semi illiterate nation state (of sorts)  like Syria and her military of conscripted semi illiterates, 44's Admin is disingeniously dissing cats that know better - 

Check it:
“President Bashar Assad commands a formidable army!! A highly professional, 330K-man army plus reserves that was built and trained to invade Little Satan. Toting 4,500 tanks and some 500 aircraft, including armed helicopters, doing a safe zone means facing off against "formidable” air defenses with hundreds of anti-aircraft artillery batteries and thousands of shoulder-fired missiles, making up for their lack of technical sophistication through sheer numbers."

Oh, really?
 "Manpower numbers have little meaning as a measure of military capability or merit. … Syria’s conventional forces are the impoverished stepchild of the region …and have become something of a military museum—a problem compounded by poorly organized technical and maintenance support and the failure to modify and update much of its equipment. … Syria, however, has compounded these problems with corruption, nepotism, and an occupation of Lebanon that further politicized and corrupted its forces. … 

Some Special Forces and armored units are exceptions, but promotion is highly dependent on favoritism and nepotism. … Syria, with the largest numbers, has one of the least capable air forces. Certainly, it is the worst air force per plane in service. … Syria’s [air defense] system is generally obsolete in weapons, sensors, and command and control capability. It also has a weak command and control system, as well as training and readiness problems. … 

Much of Syria’s conventional force posture is now obsolescent or obsolete, and its failure to properly modernize and ‘recapitalize”’ its forces has reached the crisis level. … Syria has effectively created hollow forces. … On paper, Syria had one low-grade reserve armored unit with about half the effective strength of its active divisions, plus 31 infantry, three artillery reserve regiments, four armored brigades. Most of these Syrian reserve units are poorly equipped and trained..."

True that - Syria's AAA Defenses are tough. If you're like gonna sortee Sturzkampfflugzeug or Lancasters LOL

 Even the mighty mighty Commonwealth Jet Hating missile batteries are like totally helpless versus Stealth bombers and the sexyfully stealthy Raptors. Not to mention choice hits via cruise missiles. Or her stockpiles of nasty nasty Chemical, Biological and Nerve Agentlicious WMD nastiness.

Intelligence failure as a deliberate policy or code for "Don"t just do sump!! Stand there!!"
The use of the intelligence community for orchestrated briefings designed to justify inaction by making Assad’s military sound like the Wehrmacht.
House and Senate Intelligence Committees would do well to find out who ordered that briefing, and ask the Director of Central Intelligence and the Director of National Intelligence why they permitted it.

Pic - "Once equipped with the right anti-armor weapons and shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles the Syrian rebels have enough manpower to establish their own safe zone and safe corridors in the northern and southern parts of the country."