Tuesday, December 27, 2011

Battle Of Taiwan

Shashou Jian!

On or about 13:33 hours Feb 13th 2015, a Chinese SU-27 fighter and a Taiwanese F-16 collide over the Taiwan Strait.

The incident spirals out of control when the world's largest collectivist mommieland does what she always does in a crisis: blame the other ho. 

For a myriad of mayhemic maneuvers (truly - who can say?) - events end up with a Air Power fight that makes Battle of Britain seem like an uneventful day at the mall.

And like watching your adored beloved xform into a shrieking hissy fitting, cussing spitting she devil - it ain"t pretty, my pretty.

GsGf"s Research and Development Cats deliver a spirited PDF***ing that satiates desires subtle and  ginormous
"The first objective of such a campaign would be to seize air superiority through attacks on air defense firepower, early warning, command and control, airbases, and aircraft on the ground."
 Arcing wads of Dong Fengs (DF's 11 - DF15b and c, and the porn star herself - the dreaded DF21) and other missiley minions get appropriate play along with asymmetrical and diplopolitical chiz (splitting Nippon away from Great Satan - or at least coaxing her to sit on her hands while Taiwan gets  her comeuppance may be a priority for China)
The primary threat to Okinawan airbases, the DF-15, cannot range many locations in mainland Japan or in the Philippines. But that is not to say that other regional bases, or potential contingency locations, are not exposed as well. The DF-21, in particular, could be used to hold a variety of USAF facilities or potential contingency locations at risk – especially given the very small numbers of submunition warheads required to inflict a grave amount of damage to aircraft parked in the open. There is no reason to assume that, given the efficacy of such weapons, that China will not produce more; convert some even longer-range weapons to conventional, airfield-attack duty; or build newer, conventional longer-range missiles.
A pre empting panty raid including Especial Forces raids on Kadena AB Okinawa (how bout Andersen at Guam?) with portable air defenses (MANPADs), rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), way more accurate (precision-guided) mortars, and large-caliber sniper rifles might yield a high return on invest - to be cold blooded about it.
"Well-trained SOF armed with sniper rifles might be able to target radars of AWACS aircraft; rocket-propelled grenades could damage or destroy airframes. The aerial view of a part of Kadena shows how close heavily populated areas are to parking ramps – including several high rises. The opportunities for mayhem that a SOF presence on Okinawa would present could make the effort worthwhile. A similar story could be told for other facilities in the western Pacific."
So when the catfighting dogfighting gets fully crunk on the approaches to and over Taiwan as China flings her projected 350 plus Flankers (Su 27"s and Su 30"s), Chengdu"s and Shenyang"s (J10"s and J11"s) against 96 Raptors?

An exhaustive (think Spring Break sans Red Bull) one on one tryst d'l'air l'guerre comparison essentially means like a 6 to 36 ratio of Raptors versus Flankers.
The result of a 6 on 36 engagement in which USAF fighters perfectly deconflict their targeted aircraft would be that all 36 hostile aircraft would either be destroyed or forced to disengage. However, 36 constitutes the upper limit that a 6-ship CAP, limited by internal armaments, could engage. This is a best-scenario, based on perfect deconfliction of targets and virtually invisible F-22s. Any aircraft beyond the first 36 would be unmolested, as the on-station missile magazine would be exhausted. This suggest a PLAAF CONOP as simple as sending two or more regiments of 24 aircraft each to attack USAF ISR, AWACs, and tankers. Such a raid, while not directly threatening the F- 22s, would result in losses to other critical assets – making the USAF air action untenable.

So far the consideration of an air battle has been largely onesided. USAF aircraft have attrited a PLAAF raid considerably, but their engagements are limited by the size of the on-station missile magazine. Engaging WVR will not result in a suitably high kill ratio to make it worthwhile. Thus, as long as PLAAF fighters raid with numbers sufficient to exhaust USAF fighters’ BVR missiles, some PLAAF aircraft will survive unmolested to engage their objective: high-value USAF aircraft like the E-3s, E-8s, and tankers that enable the entire operation (or ground or naval targets).

 The dramatic advantages that USAF fighters, especially the F-22, enjoy in combat are diminished or negated in close-range aerial combat.

If PLAAF fighters were to raid USAF ISR orbits or tanker tracks with even a modest-sized surge, they would overwhelm the ability of USAF F-22s to destroy them. The table above shows expected losses from a 48- aircraft raid in which 36 PLAAF aircraft are engaged, leaving 12 PLAAF fighters (those not shot down or engaged) that survive unmolested – able to engage USAF force enablers. If the raid were bigger, even more PLAAF aircraft could survive to the terminal stage – meaning more blue force enablers would be destroyed.

Further, it is not necessary that all of the PLAAF aircraft participating in such a raid be their top-of-the-line air superiority assets. The first regiment or two could be unmanned decoys or older, and somewhat expendable, aircraft – like China’s vast J-7 (Mig-21) inventory. As long as USAF aircraft shot at them, they would serve their purpose of exhausting the magazines of USAF fighters.

Pic - "In the end, you care more about LA than Taipei."